

# נחל נובע

על סדר קדשים



Articles  
and  
Revision Questions  
on  
Mishnayot



לעילוי נשמת

יחזקאל זעליג בן ישראל ע"ה



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## Editors Forward

As with the study of *Mishnayot* the *Torah* teaches that the *menora's* light had to continuously illuminate – *tamid*. The *Torah* however teaches that this light had to be before *Hashem* always as well – לפני ה' תמיד.

The *Torat Kohanim* learns that the *Torah* is teaching that one is not allowed to prepare the *menora* outside the *heichal* and then bring it inside. Instead, both the preparation and lighting had to be performed inside the *heichal*.

*Rav Hirsch* explains that from here we learn that “Israel must place the education and illumination of its mind *constantly* under the supervision of G-d. And that, in its constant work on the development of its mind, provided it is done לפני ה', it can always expect the furthering and illuminating assistance of G-d”.

Indeed, with the help of *Hashem*, we have just completed *Seder Kodshim* whose entire content places one in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*, before *Hashem*. *Im yirtze Hashem*, we should continue to merit the help of *Hashem* as we attempt to embark of the final *sefer* of *Shas*.

Yisrael-Yitzchak Bankier



## Zevachim

### Priestly Garments

Zevachim (2:1)

Alex Tsykin

All the animal sacrifices whose blood is received by... [a *kohen*] lacking [any of the priestly] garments, are invalid.

*Zevachim* (2:1)

This *Mishnah* raises the question of why the priests are not required to wear their ceremonial robes when performing other duties. The reason for this discrepancy can be found in the *Gemara*'s description of the priests' role in sacrifices, in their blessing of the nation (*birkat kohanim*) and in the redemption of firstborn sons (*pidyon haben*).

#### *Birkat Kohanim*

The *Gemara* (*Chagigah* 16a) explains:

Everybody who gazes upon [one of] three things, his eyes are darkened (he is blinded): upon a rainbow, upon a *nasi* and upon the priests... [This speaks of] one who gazed upon the priests when the Temple stood when they stood in their places and blessed the nation with G-d's explicit name (the Tetragrammaton).

*Rashi* tells us that when the priests bless the nation, "G-d's presence resides between their fingers." From here we see that the priests, when blessing the nation act as vehicles for G-d to bless us.

#### *Pidyon Haben*

And G-d spoke to Moses to say [to Israel]: "Sanctify for me every first born, the issue of every womb among the children of Israel among the men and among the beasts is mine... And you shall set aside the first issue of every womb of the livestock which you possess, the males for G-d. And the first issue of every donkey you will redeem with a lamb and if you do not

redeem [it] you will axe the back of its neck and the first born of every man from you sons you will redeem.” (*Shmot* 13: 1-2, 13: 12-13)

To understand the reason that the first born son is born with holiness, only to have that immediately stripped away, it is necessary to examine some other *p'sukim* in the *Torah* (*Bamidbar* 3: 11-12):

And G-d spoke to Moses to say [to Israel]: “And behold, I have taken the *Levi'im* from within the children of Israel in place of every first born son.”

As such, it can be seen that the temple duties were taken away from the first born sons, and in the redemption of the first born son we transfer that holiness to the priest.

### ***Korbanot***

During sacrifices, the priest acts as an intermediary between the person who is giving the sacrifice and G-d, however the mechanism by which he does so is different from that in *birkat kohanim*. The nature of a sacrifice is to bring someone closer to *Hashem*. We see this most forcefully in the *Rambam's Hilchot Teshuva* (1: 3):

When [they] bring their sacrifices for their... sin, they do not receive forgiveness... until they repent.

The Hebrew word for repentance is *teshuva*, which is derived from the word to return (*shuv*), as seen from *Eicha* (5: 21):

Return us, G-d, to You and we will repent.

As such, we can see that the act of repentance, and by extension, the act of making a sacrifice, is a drawing closer to G-d.

### **The Robes**

It appears therefore that a priest's robes are necessary only when the *kohen* acts to bring us closer to G-d. The three rituals described here are the priest's three ceremonial tasks. In only one of these tasks does he perform the role of bringing us closer to G-d, and as such in only one does he require a special garment.

The *Sefer HaChinnuch* (*Mitzvah* 101) states:

...a person acts according to his thoughts and feelings and the *Shaliach* for forgiveness must bend all his thoughts and intentions towards the worship. As such it is suitable to wear unique clothes for it. So that when he gazes on any part of his body the thought of before whom he worships will awaken in his heart and be remembered.

When the continued positive relationship of a person with G-d is at stake, such precautions as completely different attire are necessary to aid a man in maintaining his concentration. Such measures are unnecessary where the stakes are smaller, whether it is that somebody will not receive a particular (optional) blessing, and in the case of *pidyon haben*, the priest is not acting at all as a *Shaliach*. Similarly, with the case of the impure leper, the task itself takes only a minute (the leper's blemishes must simply be inspected) and as such there is no need to ensure lengthy concentration.

## A Non Jewish Korban

Zevachim (4:5)

Allon Ledder

The *Mishnah* (4:5) mentions a *Korban* that is brought by a non-Jew. All of the *Korbanot* that we have learnt about in *Masechet Zevachim* until this point are only relevant for members of *Bnei Yisrael*. What is the role of a non-Jew in the Jewish *Beit Ha'Mikdash*?

When *Shlomo HaMelech* finished building the first *Beit Ha'Mikdash* he offered a lengthy prayer to *Hashem*. As part of that prayer, he asked that *Hashem* answer the prayers of any gentile that comes to the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* so that “all the peoples of the world may know your Name, to fear You, as does Your people Israel” (*Melachim* I 8:28). And later, in *Yeshaya's* prophecies we see a similar theme: “for My House will be called a house of prayer for all the nations” (*Yeshaya* 56:7).

We see that the non-Jew has a role in the most intimate relationship between *Hashem* and *Bnei Yisrael* – the relationship that takes place at the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. The non-Jew is therefore invited to attend the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* to pray and to offer sacrifices.

The infamous story of *Kamtza* and *Bar Kamtza* (*Gittin* 56) provides an example of a non-Jewish *Korban* that went horribly wrong. After being publicly humiliated, *Bar Kamtza* vows revenge. He tells the Roman Caesar who controlled the region that the Jews are planning to revolt. The Roman Caesar sends an animal to be sacrificed in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. *Bar Kamtza* deliberately causes a blemish to the animal so that it becomes disqualified. When the *Sanhedrin* refuses to offer the animal, the Caesar is incensed – he sends an army to *Yerushalaim* and this eventually leads to the destruction of the first *Beit Ha'Mikdash*.



The gentiles are destined to have a more positive experience in the future, when the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* has been rebuilt. After the war of *Gog and Magog*, the war that will result in the final redemption and the Messianic era, the nations will join *Bnei Yisrael* every year in *Yerushalaim*, to celebrate the festival of *Sukkot* (*Zechariah* 14:16).

The whole concept of *Korbanot* may be difficult for us to understand. The *Rambam* in *Moreh Nevuchim* goes so far as to suggest that the reason the *Korbanot* were commanded was to counter the accepted form of worship at the time that the *Torah* was given.<sup>1</sup> There are commentators who attempt to explain the meaning behind the *Korbanot*, however the *halachot* relating to the *Korbanot* fall clearly within the category of *Chukkim* – the laws that do not have an apparent reason.

For example, why is it that certain types of *Korbanot* require the blood to be applied to the upper part of the alter whereas other types of *Korbanot* require the blood to be applied to the lower part of the alter? If the blood is applied to the wrong part of the altar for a particular sacrifice then the meat of the *Korban* becomes forbidden for consumption but the owner of the *Korban* has discharged their obligation. How can we understand this? When faced with so many fine distinctions and detailed *Halachot*, and with our limited intellect, our only response can be that it is a *Gezeirat Ha'katuv* – it is just a decree of the *Torah*.

It is interesting that in the middle of *Masechet Zevachim*, which is packed full of *Chukkim*, we see a reference to one of the most important roles of *Bnei Yisrael*, our role to be a light unto the nations (*Isaiah* 42:6). This role is a clearly understandable role rather than a *Chok*. We have the important task of teaching the world about the existence of *Hashem*. Allowing the gentiles to join us in the worship of *Hashem* in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* is an

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<sup>1</sup> The *Rambam* retracts from this somewhat controversial position and confirms that all of the *mitzvot* have eternal relevance.

important part of that task. It teaches the world that *Hashem* is their G-d as well as ours.

Today in *Galut*, when there is no *Beit Ha'Mikdash* and no *Korbanot*, we still have the task of being a light unto the nations and teaching the world about *Hashem*. We can accomplish this by being a role model for proper behaviour. Our dealings with all people should be in a pleasant manner so that people are forced to say “The person who learned Torah, see how pleasant are his ways, how refined are his deeds.” (*Yoma* 86a)

## Daily *Korbanot* Today

Zevachim (4)  
Yehuda Gottlieb

The fourth *perek* of *Masechet Zevachim* may be familiar to most people as “*korbanot*” which we recite in our daily *tefillot* every morning. This *perek* is known as the *perek* of “*Eizehu Mekoman*” due to its opening words which describe the places where the different types of *korbanot* were offered.

The *Shulchan Aruch* (50) offers the reason as to why this *perek* is recited every morning. Every day a person must endeavour to learn some *Mikrah*, *Mishnah* and *Gemara*. This *perek* of *korbanot* allows a person to fulfil his requirement of learning *mishnayot* for that day.

The *Mishnah Berurah* explains deeper that in fact there is an obligation for one to bring sacrifices and come close to *HaKadosh Baruch Hu*. Unfortunately, today we are unable to bring offerings in the form of *korbanot* – therefore those who study and toil in the *halachot* of the *korbanot* every day are seen as if they have offered them and come close to *Hashem*.

Another reason brought by the *Mishnah Berurah* that this *perek* is singled out to be learnt every day, is because this *perek* is in a sense a “*Mishnah Berurah*” (a ‘clear’ *Mishnah*). There is no *machloket* in the laws presented in this *perek* which means it was received directly from *Moshe* at *Sinai*.

The *Shulchan Aruch*’s reasoning as to the addition of these *mishnayot* into the daily *tefillah* has a practical consequence to us today. The *Mishnah Berurah* mentions that one should be very careful to understand the meaning of the words of these *mishnayot*. This is because their placement in the *tefillah* is not to function as prayer, but rather as *Limmud Torah*. If it was to be

seen as a prayer, then one need not understand the meaning of the words one is saying, as *Hashem* knows a persons *kavanot* and intentions when one is praying. However, since it is seen as *Limmud Torah* – if one does not understand what one is saying it is not considered a proper *limmud*.

R' Shimon Schwab adds a very interesting element to this idea. He mentions that learning the same chapter of *Mishnayot* every day, even if one knows it by heart, is the ultimate display of *Talmud Torah Lishma* (for its own sake). He mentions that the true meaning of one who is an *Oved Elokim* (servant of *Hashem*) is explained in the *Gemara* in *Chagigah* (9b):

There is no comparison between a person who reviews his learning a hundred times and one who reviews it a hundred and one times.

The latter is called an *Oved Elokim*; he serves *Hashem* through his in depth learning and *chazarah*. In the past, the *Torah She'ba'al Peh* was learned literally *ba'al peh* (by-heart). Learning something a hundred times was considered normal, in order to memorise it. However, to review and learn something that extra time (even once) displays that one is learning purely for its own sake, and because *Hashem* wants him to learn.

R' Schwab says that the repeated daily learning of *Eizehu Mekoman* is an example of learning something a hundred and one times. Even though we may know the meaning of these *mishnayot* and have reviewed and said them many times, their constant repetition is *Talmud Torah Lishma*, and is therefore called *Avodat Elokim*. This therefore is another reason why these *mishnayot* are placed in the *tefillah* – in order that the *Avodat Elokim* of *Talmud Torah Lishma* partners with the *Avodah Shebalev* (*Tefillah*), the service of the heart.

***Ba'al Tosif***  
**Zevachim (8:11)**  
**Yaron Gottlieb**

The concept of *Ba'al Tosif* appears in *Devarim* (13:1) where the *Torah* states:

אֵת כָּל-הַדְּבָר, אֲשֶׁר אֶנְכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם--אֹתוֹ תִשְׁמְרוּ, לַעֲשׂוֹת: לֹא-תִסֹּף  
עֲלֵיו, וְלֹא תִגְרַע מִמֶּנּוּ.

All these laws that I am commanding you to guard and do, you shall not add to them nor shall you diminish from them.

There is a dispute as to the precise understanding of this verse. The *Gemara* deals with the problem of sitting in the *sukkah* on the day after *Sukkot*. The person sitting may be doing it only for their enjoyment, but since it appears like he is adding details to the existing *Mitzvah*, one should not sit in the *Sukkah* in Israel the day after *Sukkot*.

This approach is the one that appears in *Rashi's* commentary on the above verse:

You shall not add: five compartments in *tefillin*, five species in the *lulav*, four blessings in the priestly blessings.

*Rashi's* understanding of the verse is consistent with the above view of adding details to *mitzvot* that were not outlined in the *Torah*. The three examples given are not examples of things that would be normally done by someone casually. Sitting in the *sukkah* may be natural on a warm autumn day, but taking the *lulav* is not natural, and no one would take a *lulav* if not for *Sukkot*, hence adding details to that *mitzvah* clearly fall under the category of *Ba'al Tosif*.

*Sforno* commenting on the same verse seems to imply that the problem of adding is directly connected to adding an entire *Mitzvah* that did not exist previously. This does not seem to be the simple understanding of the later sources.

The *Mishnah* in *Zevachim* (8:11) discusses the concept in further detail and seems to fall on the side of *Rashi* in this dispute.

The whole chapter deals with different parts of different sacrifices that were accidentally mixed and how we respond to it. The *Mishnah* in question deals with blood that should be sprinkled four times around the *mizbeach* getting mixed with blood that should only be sprinkled once. There is no doubt that the blood can be sprinkled and does not have to be disposed of, since both blood samples should be thrown on the same place, however how many times should it be sprinkled? Once or four times?<sup>2</sup>

*Rabbi Yehoshua* says that there should only be one sprinkling. *Rabbi Eliezer* responds that there should be four sprinklings since with only one sprinkling we would be diminishing the four sprinklings and the three extras are ignored. *Rabbi Yehoshua* counters this argument by saying that *Rabbi Eliezer's* suggestion entails adding to the *Mitzvah*.

The argument then continues that the laws of *Baal Tosif* are only applicable when there is no doubt and the blood is not mixed, however now that the blood has been mixed and one of the concepts (adding or diminishing) has to take precedence and the *Mitzvah* of *Baal Tosif* is waived. The only question remaining is should we work to a minimum or a maximum? Should we get all four sprinklings in despite the fact that there is some blood that requires only one, or should we do only one sprinkling and not perform the three excess sprinklings for the sacrifice that requires four?

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<sup>2</sup> Editor's note: "Blood that should be sprinkled four times", should not be understood as referring to the blood of a *chatat* offering that is quite literally placed on the four corners on the top half of the *mizbeach* but rather referring to those sacrifices that require two sprinkling which are placed on the corners of the *mizbeach* making them really four – for example an *olah* or *asham* offering. This is because such blood is placed on the lower part of the *mizbeach* like those *korbanot* that require one sprinkling.

*Rav Yehoshua* then continues his argument:

כשנתת--עברת על "בל תוסף", ועשית מעשה בידך; וכשלא נתת--עברת על "בל תגרע", ולא עשית בידך.

When you transgressed adding to a *Mitzvah* you did so actively (by doing the extra sprinklings), whereas when you transgressed diminishing a *Mitzvah* you did so, but without doing an action (since all that was done was not sprinkling blood).

It is this argument that finally determines the *Halacha*, and we only throw the blood on the *mizbeach* once.

There are however two significant lessons that can be derived from this dispute. The first is the concept of *Ba'al Tosif* is only applicable in a situation where the case is clear cut and no other possibility legitimately presents itself. These are the cases that *Rashi* presented in his commentary, however he deliberately avoided using the case of *Sukkah*, since as we have described above, there is a possible alternative explanation.

The second principle derived from the *Mishnah* is one that appears numerous times throughout *Halacha*, which is that when in doubt it is best to not do anything rather than do something that may be questionable.

## The *Tzitz* Zevachim (8:12) *Yehuda Gottlieb*

The last *Mishnah* in the eighth *perek* of *Zevachim* mentions the unique qualities of the *tzitz* ('crown' of the *Kohen Gadol*):

The *tzitz* affects acceptance for the *tamei*, but does not affect acceptance for that which has been taken out of the courtyard (or any other invalidation)

To explain, the *Torah* states (*Shmot* 28:38) concerning the *tzitz*: "It shall be on *Aharon's* forehead – so that *Aharon* shall bear a sin of the sacred offerings". The *Gemara* in *Zevachim* (23a-b) and *Pesachim* (16b) interpret this to mean that although it is forbidden to do the *Avodah* of a private offering whose blood or whose meat and sacrificial parts became *tamei*. If the blood or the meat and sacrificial parts of an offering became *tamei* and the *avodah* was nevertheless performed, the *tzitz* has the ability to 'lift' the sin of *tumah* and renders the offering acceptable. The *Mishnah* here teaches that the *tzitz* has no effect on any invalidation except for *tumah*.

Interestingly, the *Rashbam* writes that according to its simple meaning, the above *pasuk* is not referring to an offering which became *tamei*. The *Rashbam* holds that this *pasuk* applies to all *korbanot*, whether they are an *Olah* or *Chatat* or *Asham*. He maintains that the function of the *tzitz* is to partner with the *korban* in order to affect atonement for the individual bringing the offering. It is the *tzitz* that facilitates the *korban's* acceptance by making it a 'remembrance' before *Hashem* and therefore, allows acceptance.

Whichever way the *pasuk* is interpreted, it is clear that the *tzitz* is a powerful and crucial component of the *Avodah*. What is it about the *tzitz* specifically that accounts for its importance?



Rabbi Michael Rosensweig suggests that the significance of the *tzitz* is specifically because of its simplicity. The *tzitz* is inscribed with a simple phrase – “*Kodesh L’Hashem*”. In dealing with the *korbanot* it is very possible to be absorbed on the minutiae of the *halachot* and complex details that go into bringing a *korban*. A person buried in this detail, may lose his focus of the basic truth and purpose of the *korban* – to sanctify G-d’s name. The *Ramchal* in his introduction to *Mesilat Yesharim* states that it is often the most basic truths that we ignore and abuse, precisely because we presume their ‘self evidence’. Therefore, when it comes to the *Avodah* and its importance in serving *Hashem*, the *Torah* does not allow the self evident to go unnoticed. Rather, there is a specific ornament, a crown that must constantly be placed on the forehead of the *Kohen Gadol* to remind us that even while bringing a *korban*. We must not lose focus of what we are bringing it for, and that ultimately, we should be doing the *avodah* ‘*L’Hashem*’ - to sanctify *Hashem*’s name.

This idea can be extended further to explain how the *tzitz* has the ability to affect acceptance for those *korbanot* which have been declared *tamei*. It is precisely because of its simplicity that it provides the flexibility to counteract the potential obstacle of *tumah*. As long as the ideal – the *Kodesh L’Hashem* - has not been breached, the *korban* in this case will still be accepted. Thus, the simple yet powerful theme of *Kodesh L’Hashem* facilitates the bringing of *korbanot* that are *tamei*.

This is also the reason why the *tzitz* does not affect acceptance for *korbanot* that have been affected with the *p’sulim* of *pigul*, *notar* and *yotzei*. These transgressions always reflect improper input or initiative, ulterior motivations and disrespect for the overall theme of *Kadosh L’Hashem*. When one causes one of these *p’sulim* to affect a *korban*, he is showing that he is not interested in the overall idea of bringing a *korban* for the sake of Heaven. His transgressions are an indication that he has no respect for the overall Divine will. Therefore, the *tzitz* which is the representation of this ideal can have no remedy for such a situation.

## Clean and Smashing *Keilim*

Zevachim (11:7)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

In the eleventh *perek* we learnt how to deal with clothing that had been stained with blood from a *korban* and what must be done with the utensils that had been used for *korbanot*. The basis for these laws is learnt from the following *p'sukim* (*Vayikra* 6:20-21):

... If [a sin offering's] blood splashes on any garment, it must be washed off in the sanctified area. Any clay pot in which it is cooked must be broken. However if it is cooked in a copper pot, the pot may be purged and rinsed with water.

We learn from the above *pasuk* that earthenware and metal utensils are to be treated differently.

The above *p'sukim* specifically refer to the blood or cooking of a *korban chatat* (sin-offering). Nevertheless we have learnt that the requirement to scrub metal utensils applies to utensils that were used to cook any *korban* (11:7). *Rashi* further maintains that the requirement to smash earthenware vessels also applies to all *korbanot*. The *Kli Yakar* asks, this being the case, why did the *Torah* choose to teach these laws specifically by the *korban chatat*.

The *Kli Yakar* provides two answers. On a *pshat* level (a simple, straightforward explanation) he explains that when the *Torah* teaches that earthenware utensils must be smashed, it is because the absorbed taste from the sacrifice can never be extracted from such utensils. One may think that this rationale would only apply to *kodshei kalim*, sacrifices that have a longer period of time in which they must be consumed (two days and a night). When dealing with *kodshei kodshim* that must be consumed within a day and night and therefore spend less time in the utensil, one may think that they are not absorbed within the vessel to the same extent and can simply be washed. The *Torah*

therefore teaches this law specifically by a *korban chatat* that has a reduced time for consumption.

The *Kli Yakar* provides a second explanation on level of *remez* (a more profound level). He explains that there are similarities between the purification of utensils, and the purification of sinners. People are affected differently by their engagement in sin. There are those that become “absorbed” and it is very difficult for them to repent – they literally require a “shattering” of their hearts. Others however require less effort in their repentance.<sup>3</sup>

The following *Gemara* (*Arachin* 15b) is brought to illustrate:

What is the remedy for a speaker of *lashon ha’rah*? If he is a *Talmid Chacham* he should engage in *Torah* as it states: “A healed tongue is the tree of life...” (*Mishlei* 15:4). If he is an *Am Ha’Aretz* he should humble himself as it states: “...and the perverted in it – a broken spirit”.

The *Kli Yakar* therefore explains that the laws regarding these utensils is taught specifically by the sin offering to teach us that at a time when such sacrifices are not available to the sinner, one’s purification matches those of the utensils. The *Am Ha’aretz* is compared to an earthenware vessel<sup>4</sup> that requires a shattering of his heart in order to extract the sin. The *Talmid Chacham* on the other hand, is compared to a metal utensil that requires *shetifah u’merikah* – a thorough scrubbing with water inside and out<sup>5</sup>. Therefore for the *Talmid Chacham* his remedy is through “water” – through *Torah* that is compared to water – cleaning him “inside and out” ensuring that his internal being, reflects his external appearance (*tocho k’boro*).

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<sup>3</sup> The *Kli Yakar* is not referring to repentance per se, which has strict *halachic* guidelines that are followed equally by everyone, but rather the negative impact that the sin has on the person and how to remedy it.

<sup>4</sup> See the *Kli Yakar* for proofs and the full explanation.

<sup>5</sup> According to *Rashi*’s explanation.

## Leftover and Rejected

Zevachim (13:8)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* (13:8) discussed two laws regarding a sin-offering whose blood was sprinkled both inside and outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*.

1. If the blood was collected in one cup, then it is irrelevant whether it was first sprinkled inside or outside. In both cases one has transgressed the prohibition of engaging in an offering outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*.
2. If the blood was collected in two cups then if one cup was offered inside first then the other cup offered outside, the person is exempt. If it is the other way around, then the person has transgressed the prohibition.

The *Gemara* (112a) questions the validity of these two laws. In the first case, the *Gemara* argues that once some of the blood has been sprinkled inside, the remaining blood is considering *shirayim* (“leftover”) and should not fall under the prohibition of offering a sacrifice outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. The *Gemara* answers that this law is according to the opinion of *R' Nechemya* who holds that the remainder of a *chatat pnimit* is an essential part of the offering and one is therefore transgressing the prohibition if “offered” outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*.

With that response in hand, the *Gemara* then questions the second law. In other words, the second cup offered outside should be considered *shirayim* and according to *R' Nechemya*, one would be liable. The *Gemara* responds that this law is according to *R' Elazar B'R' Shimon* who maintains that once one cup is offered, the other is considered *dachui* (“pushed aside”) and unsuitable for use in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* and therefore does not fall under the prohibition.

With respect to these two laws, the *Rambam* (*Ma'aseh Korbanot* 19:13) rules as follows:

1. If the blood was collected in one cup, if it was first offered inside then offered outside the person is exempt.
2. If the blood was collected in two cups, whether or not the cup that was offered outside was first or second, the prohibition has been violated.

The first law is consistent with our understanding gleaned from the *Gemara*. The *Rambam* does not rule like *R' Nechemya*, consequently if the blood was first offered inside, the remainder in that cup is considered *shirayim*. The *Ra'avad* questions the validity of the second law. If the first cup was offered inside, then according to all opinions one should not be *chayav* when offering blood from the second cup outside – it is either *shirayim* or *dachui*!

*R' Chayim Brisker* (*Al HaRambam*) explains that there is difference whether the remaining blood is considered *shirayim* or *dachui*. Blood that is considered *shirayim* has a special *din* in that even though the blood originally was not suitable to be poured out at the base of the *mizbeach*, once the sprinkling has been performed the remaining blood has a new *din* (status/law). This is not the case by blood that is *dachui* – it has no special *din*. Simply, since one cup was used to complete the offering of the *korban*, the second one is no longer needed. Here the sprinkling per se does not create a new *din*.

*R' Chaim* provides a practical difference between *shirayim* and *dachui*. We have learnt previously that with respect to sacrifices offered in the courtyard, even though ideally some sacrifices require multiple sprinklings of blood, one sprinkling would suffice (4:1). Consequently, once one sprinkling has been performed, even though there is still a *mitzvah* to complete the (ideally) required sprinklings, the blood has a *din* of *shirayim*. We find therefore that the blood can have a *din* of *shirayim* even prior to all the sprinkling being performed. This is not the case by *dachui*. The blood only becomes *dachui* by virtue of the fact that

everything is complete, no more sprinkling is required – we have no use for that second cup. Consequently blood can only be considered *dachui* once the performance of the sacrifice is complete.

This distinction explains the *Rambam*. In the beginning of the *Halacha* he states that we are referring to a case where only part of the required sprinkling has been performed. In such a case this distinction is significant, as the blood remaining in the case of the single cup already has the *din* of *shirayim* and outside the bounds of the prohibition of offering a sacrifice outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. In the case of two cups, the second cup does not yet have the status of *dachui* as the offering is incomplete. Consequently the prohibition would be violated if blood from the second cup was offered outside. *R' Chaim* explains that when the *Gemara* discusses the exemption of *dachui* it refers to when the first cup was used inside to complete all the requirements of the sacrifice, after which the second cup is considered *dachui*.

## Menachot

### With the Best Intentions

#### Menachot (1)

Allon Ledder

We now make the transition from *Masechet Zevachim* (which deals mainly with animal and bird offerings) to *Masechet Menachot* (which deals mainly with flour or “meal” offerings).

There are many similarities in the laws of the various types of offerings and accordingly many of the themes of *Masechet Menachot* are shared with *Masechet Zevachim*. One such theme that we see in the first few *mishnayot* of *Masechet Menachot* is the requirement for the *kohen* who is performing the offering to have proper intent.

Two *kohanim* can perform the same offering identically, however if their intentions differ then the validity of the offering will also differ. If a *kohen* intends his offering to be for an erroneous designation, the offering is valid however the owner’s obligation to bring an offering is not fulfilled and the owner must bring another offering (*Mishnah* 1:1). If a *kohen* intends the offering to be eaten or burned on the *mizbeach* after the appropriate time, then the offering becomes *pigul* and anyone who eats of the offering is liable to *karet* (*Mishnah* 1:3).

There is a *machloket* among the *Rishonim* concerning the definition of intent. According to *Rashi* and *Tosfot*, the *kohen*’s erroneous intent will only invalidate the *korban* if the *kohen* verbalises his intent. According to *Rambam*, an erroneous thought alone would be sufficient to invalidate the *korban*. The *Gemara* (*Zevachim* 2a) states that the absence of intent is treated as intent for the designated purpose. For this reason, the *Sanhedrin* ruled that those performing the *avodah* should not verbalise the purpose of the offering so that they not make a mistake and state the

wrong purpose (*Zevachim* 4:6). (This understanding of *Zevachim* 4:6 follows *Rashi's* and *Tosfot's* opinion that disqualification of a *Korban* only occurs if the incorrect intent is verbalised.)

The question of intent also arises in relation to our performance of *mitzvot*. Is the proper intent necessary for the performance of *mitzvot*? If so, what level of intent is necessary? There is a well known *machloket* in the *Gemara* as to whether *mitzvot* need *kavana* or not. The question is discussed in relation to many *mitzvot*, including *Kriyat Shema*, eating *matza*, blowing the *shofar* and reading the *megillah*.

Everyone would agree that it is preferable to have the right intentions in mind when performing a *mitzvah* in order to perform the *mitzvah* in the best way. However, is the lack of intention *me'akev*? Is intention an essential component of the performance of the *mitzvah*?

The *Shulchan Aruch* (60:4) refers to the *machloket* and rules that the *Halacha* is that *mitzvot* do require intent. The *Mishnah Berurah* explains that there are two types of intent:

1. Intent of mind in the performance of the *mitzvah* itself – this involves conscious application to what one is saying or doing and not having any other thought in mind at the time; and
2. Intent to fulfil one's duty with one's action – to have in mind that one wishes to discharge one's obligation by means of the action in accordance with *Hashem's* command.

The *Mishnah Berurah* explains that the *Shulchan Aruch's* ruling does not refer to the first type of intent. All authorities agree that *lechatchila* one should have conscious application while one performs *mitzvot*. However, *bedi'aved*, if one performed the *mitzvah* without this level of intent, he will have fulfilled his obligation (except in the case of the first verse of *Shema* and the first *bracha* of the *Amidah*). The ruling of the *Shulchan Aruch* refers to the second type of intent – i.e. before one begins to perform a *mitzvah*, he is obliged to have in mind that he intends to



fulfil his obligation when he performs the *mitzvah*. If he does not have such intent he has not fulfilled his obligation and he will need to redo the *mitzvah*.

However there are a number of qualifications to this ruling:

- Some authorities hold that only *mitzvot d'oraita* require intent whereas *mitzvot d'rabbanan* do not.
- The *Magen Avraham* states that even where the performance of a *mitzvah* is repeated due to a lack of intent, the *bracha* over the *mitzvah* should not be repeated.
- The *Chayei Adam* states that where the circumstances in which a *mitzvah* is performed indicate that one performed the *mitzvah* in order to fulfil their obligation then the obligation will in fact be fulfilled. For example, if one read the *Shema* during the course of *tefillah* or if one ate *matza*, blew the *shofar* or took hold of a *lulav* in the regular way in which those *mitzvot* are performed then one will have satisfied their obligation, even without the correct intent.

Of course, *lechatchila*, one should always strive to have both types of intent when performing a *mitzvah* so that we perform our *mitzvot* in the optimum way.

## Power of the Masses

Menachot (3:1)

Alex Tsykin

Unlike the previous *Mishnayot*, in our *Mishnah* we learn about a case where if someone intends to perform an abnormal action with erroneous intent, the sacrifice is still valid as the *Mishnah* explains:

If one takes a three-fingers-full of the meal offering [with the intention] to eat something which is not usually eaten, [or] to burn something which is not normally burnt – it is fitting [and valid]. *R' Eliezer* invalidates [it].

*Bartenura* in his commentary to our *Mishnah* refers to a case where one intends to eat from a meal offering after a full day has passed (making it invalid and the person who consumes it liable to spiritual excision), from the portion which is normally burnt, or burn a portion that is normally consumed.

The *Gemara* explains that *R' Eliezer* argument is based on a different understanding of a *pasuk*. This raises a question of how it is that, as opposed to ordinary inappropriate intent, in this case the *Chachamim* maintain that it does not invalidate the sacrifice. The question is aggravated by the fact that *R' Eliezer* would agree with this logic, yet simply understood the *pasuk* differently.

*Bartenura* explains that the reason for this *Halacha* is that the intention of the person making the sacrifice is “cancelled against the thoughts of all others.” The phrase means that the thought is so unusual that the *Halacha* cannot take account of it. This would however seem to be unlikely because there are many cases where we do consider his *kavanah* when making a sacrifice to be capable of invalidating the sacrifice if he intended to do something forbidden even though unusual. Possibly, these thoughts are so unusual that we will not actually consider it a real

thought with the *halachic* force of a *da'at*. It could be that this explanation posits that because the intention was so incredibly bizarre that such a thought could not be a real thought. This may be so as it would seem to be that it is completely outside the accepted practice in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* that no one would think it, as opposed to merely eating something later than it should be eaten. As such, it may not receive the same stringent treatment as a normal incorrect intention.

Another possibility in explaining the *Mishnah* can be seen in Rav Kook's writings. It is possible that the thoughts of the person are being influenced by the expectations of others with regard to the sacrifice. To explain this, it is necessary to ask, what is the impact of communal practice on our personal religious observance? Rav Kook discusses this issue in *Orot Hakodesh I 27*:

There is a personal revelation which accompanies every sentence, every part of logical ideas, with every word and letter, and there is a general revelation, when the complete spirit of a book, of a way of life, of the ways of the soul is revealed. And it occurs that the general overcomes until it dims the personal and afterwards [the general] returns and uncovers [the personal] with greater brightness, and in a picture of a more important life.

These ways of revelation occur in every fact, in every movement, in every action that a man will do in his role as one who worships *Hashem*...

It is clear that Rav Kook considers that any truly G-d-fearing Jew will be influenced by the general spiritual state and character of *Am Yisrael*. Because nobody would imagine that such a truly unusual situation could occur, the person's intentions are not considered, however, people could certainly imagine that the schedule in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* might at some point run behind time causing some actions to be undertaken late. A possible difficulty with such an explanation is that in later *Mishnayot* that exact situation is discussed. Nevertheless, it might be supposed that anything can happen by mistake, but the situation is sufficiently unusual that nobody would expect it to happen.

## The Minchat Choteh

Menachot (5:4)

*Shmoiki Berkowitz*

One of the basic components of the *korban mincha* (meal offering) is the addition of olive oil and the spice *levonah*. The *minchat choteh* is listed as one of two exceptions where neither olive oil nor *levonah* is added (*Menachot* 5:4). The *minchat choteh* refers to the sacrifice brought by a poor person who cannot afford to bring an animal offering for a *korban chatat* to atone for a sin carried out unintentionally<sup>6</sup>.

In understanding why olive oil and *levonah* are not offered with the *minchat choteh*, the *Gemara* in *masechet Sotah* (15a) explains since the *minchat choteh* is brought in response to the commission of a sin, it should not be brought with the same grandeur as a regular *mincha* offering. The *Sefer HaChinnuch* (*Mitzvah* 125) writes that olive oil and *levonah* are representative of wealth and opulence. Additionally, olive oil is a symbol of pompousness in that it floats above all liquids. Olive oil and *levonah* are not offered with the *minchat choteh* as the traits they represent do not reflect the humbled and shamed demeanor that would be expected from someone bringing a *minchat choteh*.

In contrast to this punitive tone, the *Sfat Emet* (*Parashat Vayikra* 5642) discussing the *korban mincha* in general, presents a positive quality to its offering. The *Sfat Emet* writes that a *mincha* offering underscores profound honesty and truth. While the *korban mincha* may be viewed as inferior to the offering of an animal *korban*, the recognition of one's own limitations resonates beyond the type of *korban* offered. Offering a *korban mincha* that is honest regarding one's financial situation while disregarding external influences to bring a more lavish *korban*, is heralded "as

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<sup>6</sup> Ed. note: This option of bringing a *minchat choteh* is only available for a select few sins. See *Vayikra* 5:1-14.

if the person sacrificed himself, which is the highest form of sacrifice”.

This approach of the *Sfat Emet* may be seen as presenting an important supplementary role to the reasons why olive oil and *levonah* are not offered with the *minchat choteh*. While it is important to discipline and express discontent to those who sin by not allowing them to offer olive oil and *levonah* with their *minchat choteh*, the offering of a *korban mincha* in favour of an animal *korban* is an honest evaluation of one’s character which is critical function in achieving atonement.

Support for this understanding may be found in the *Sefer HaChinnuch* (*mitzvah* 95). The *Sefer HaChinnuch* writes that it is not enough to merely express regret over committing a sin; appropriate actions need to be taken. Offering a *korban* allows a person to sincerely comprehend the gravity of his actions. The introspection from bringing a *minchat choteh* can most surely provide the impetus for truly appreciating one’s actions.

## The Korban and Lachmei Todah

### Menachot (7)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *korban todah*, “thanksgiving-offering”, is a sacrifice brought by one in gratitude to *Hashem*. The *Gemara* (*Brachot* 54b) lists those particular people that are obligated to bring such a *korban*:

- One who completed a journey at sea;
- One who crossed the desert;
- One who was freed from prison and;
- A person who was healed from illness.

In many ways it resembles a *korban shlamim*. It is one of the *kodshei kalim* and is consumed mostly by the owner of the *korban*. Yet it also differs in two distinct ways. Firstly along with the animal sacrifice, a large number of *mincha* offerings are brought. Three different *matzah menachot* and one *chametz*; numbering ten from each type. These loaves were not small either. We learnt that the flour required to produce all the loaves was between about 50 and 86 litres; that is between about 200 and 350 cups! Furthermore, unlike the *shlamim* the time limit for consuming both the *korban* and *lachmei todah* is reduced to the day of sacrifice and the following night; the *shlamim* could be consumed in the day, night and following day. What is the reason for these differences?

The *Netziv* (*Ha’Emek Davar* 7:13) explains, both the large quantity food and reduced time in consumption forces one to invite a large number of people to join in his feast. The purpose of this sacrifice is not only to thank *Hashem* but also to recount the kindness *Hashem* bestowed upon him to others. These requirements ensure he does so and to a large audience. He (*Harchev Davar*) uses this understanding to explain the verse we read in *Hallel*: “*lecha ezbach zevach todah u’vshem Hashem ekra*” – “To You I will sacrifice thanksgiving offerings and the name of *Hashem* I

will invoke”. The two parts of the verse refer to firstly the sacrifice itself and then the “voice” of the *todah* – the discussion and storytelling over the *todah* that reveals the greatness of *Hashem* to others.<sup>7</sup>

The *Oznayim La'Torah* adds that the requirement for the meal to be eaten on the first day yet be allowed to continue throughout the night enhances the quality of this meal. Without the pressure of a clock, the people are able to sit in a relaxed and festive atmosphere with the host recounting his story in all its detail throughout the night. This might not have been the case if, like the *shlamim*, the meal was allowed to start on the second day, with the strict endpoint being sundown.

*Rav Nebenzahl* provides another reason why the *korban* must be consumed on the first day. He explains that there is an essential difference between a *korban shlamim* and a *korban todah*. The decision to bring a *korban shlamim* is calculated. A person intellectually decides he wishes to come closer to *Hashem* and chooses the *korban shlamim* as his means. There is no sense of urgency in having this wish fulfilled. The catalyst for bringing a *korban todah* however is an awesome event resulting in an outburst of emotion driving one to thank *Hashem*. As is well known, such feelings quickly wane with time. Consequently, the *Torah* requires the person to consume the *korban* in large company on the day of its slaughter, not a day later, while the emotions are still bubbling.

We therefore find that the unique requirements of the *korban todah* are imposed so that the thanksgiving meal is given to a large audience, in a relaxed atmosphere, while the host is still “fired-up” and tells his story in all its detail all for the purpose of thanking *HaKadosh Baruch Hu* and making His greatness known.

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<sup>7</sup> See the *Harchev Davar* inside to see how the *Netziv* explains the other verses that follow in a similar manner.

## A Biblical Proof for a Rabbinic Tradition

Menachot (10:3)  
Rabbi Ben-Zion Hain

The tenth *perek* of *Masechet Menachot* deals with the laws of the *Omer* ritual which is commanded in *Sefer Vayikra* (23:10). The purpose of the *Omer* offering was to allow the use of the new crop of grain and its time is specified in the *Torah* as being “the day after the *Shabbat*” (*Vayikra* 23:11). However, based only on the biblical verses, there are many aspects of the *Omer* offering that remain unclear, including the precise date of the offering.

The Rabbis explain that the “*Shabbat*” mentioned in the above verse refers not to the seventh day of the week, but rather to a day of rest and the day of rest in question is the first day of *Pesach*. Thus, the Rabbis maintain that the *Omer* is brought on the 16<sup>th</sup> day of *Nissan* regardless of the day of the week.

The third *Mishnah* in the tenth *perek* goes into great detail as to how exactly the entire ceremony took place. It is a ceremony that involves a lot of repetition. In fact, as the *Mishnah* states, everything was repeated “three times for each item, and [each time] they said to him, ‘Yes, yes, yes’.” According to the *Mishnah*, the reason for all this repetition is “Because of the Boethusians who declared that the reaping of the *Omer* is not performed at the conclusion of the Festival.”

As we know from previous study, the Boethusians were a group that only believed in the Written Text and as such rejected the rabbinic tradition defining in this verse “the Sabbath” as the first day of *Pesach*. They believed that the “Sabbath” in the verse should be taken literally and hence the *Omer* must be offered on a Sunday.



There are a number of biblical proofs for this rabbinic tradition. The *Gemara* in *Menachot* (65a-66a) offers one proof based on the following two verses from *Vayikra*:

And you shall count for yourselves, from day after *Shabbat*, from the day you bring the *Omer* as a wave offering seven weeks; they shall be complete. You shall count until the day after the seventh week, [namely,] the fiftieth day, [on which] you shall bring a new meal offering to the L-rd.  
(*Vayikra* 23:15-16)

If, according to the Boethusians, *Shabbat* refers to the day of the week and not the first day of *Pesach* and seven complete weeks must be counted from the day after that *Shabbat*, then the ‘meal offering’ which was brought on *Shavuot* will not always be the fiftieth day since *Pesach*. Sometimes it will be the 51<sup>st</sup> or even the 56<sup>th</sup>. Therefore, the *Shabbat* must be referring to the first day of *Pesach*.

This is not the only time in *Tanach* that the *Omer* is mentioned. The Book of *Yehoshua* states:

And the children of Israel encamped in *Gilgal*, and they made the Passover sacrifice on the fourteenth day of the month at evening in the plains of Jericho. And they ate of the grain of the land on the day after Passover, unleavened cakes and parched grain on this very day. (*Yehoshua* 5:10-11)

Although the *Torah* states that the time of the *Omer* is “the day after the *Shabbat*”, in the book of *Yehoshua* the date that they ate the grain was the day after *Pesach*. The *Rambam* in *Hilchot Temidim U’Musafim* (7:11) offers these *p’sukim* from *Yehoshua* as another proof for the rabbinic tradition.

## Lechem Ha'Panim

### Menachot (11:1)

#### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

With the beginning of the eleventh *perek* we started learning in more detail about the *lechem ha'panim* - the “show-bread” placed on the *shulchan* in the *kodesh*. One of the laws that we learnt is that baking the *lechem ha'panim* does not override *Shabbat*. Therefore, even though the *lechem ha'panim* stayed on the *shulchan* for the duration of the week and was replaced on *Shabbat*, the new bread was baked prior to *Shabbat*.

This law presents a problem for a well known and fascinating *Gemara* (*Chagigah* 26b):

*Reish Lakish* taught: The *Torah* refers to the *shulchan* as “*Shulchan Ha'Tahor*” implying that it can become *tameh*. Why? The *shulchan* is an immobile wooden vessel and therefore cannot become *tameh*! Rather [indeed it can become *tameh* because it was movable] as [the *Torah*] teaches that they would lift the *shulchan* and show those that came to Jerusalem for the festival the *lechem ha'panim*. They would say to them “see how dear you are to *Hashem*, just as they were placed on the *Shulchan* so are they removed. As *R' Yehoshua* explains, a great miracle occurred in the *lechem ha'panim*; just as it was placed on the *shulchan* so was it removed. As the *pasuk* states: “placed hot-bread on the day it was removed” (*Shmuel A* 26:7)

*Rashi* explains that the miracle was that even though the *lechem ha'panim* had been on the *shulchan* for a week, it was still as hot as when it was placed on the *shulchan*. *Tosfot* cannot accept that this was the *miracle*. He explains that according to our *Mishnah* the *lechem ha'panim* was baked on *erev Shabbat* and therefore, by the time that they were placed on the *shulchan* they would have cooled down. Instead he offers his own explanation that the miracle was not that they were still hot, but rather that they were

still fresh and moist.<sup>8</sup> He does offer an explanation for *Rashi* that perhaps the *lechem ha'panim* were kept insulated in the warm oven in which they were baked until they were ready to be placed on the *Shulchan*.

The *Beit David* argues that *Tosfot's* question is not a question at all. He explains that the bread maintained its heat from *erev Shabbat* to *Shabbat* also in a miraculous manner; it was part of the miracle. The *Shoshanim le'David*<sup>9</sup> defends the *Tosfot* that such an answer is not possible as the simple understanding of the *Gemara* is that the miracle of the *lechem ha'panim* being removed in the same state as they was placed on the *shulchan* implies that the placement itself was not under any miraculous circumstances.

The *Shoshanim le'David* nonetheless rejects the explanation that the *Tosfot* provided for *Rashi*. Firstly there is no indication anywhere that the *lechem ha'panim* had to be kept insulated in the oven. Quite the reverse! In *masechet Tamid* (31b) we learn that the table in the entrance hall to the *kodesh* on which the *lechem ha'panim* were placed, prior to them being placed on the *Shulchan*, was made of marble. Even though there is a principle of “there should be no poverty in a place of wealth”, marble and not silver or gold was chosen, as the *lechem ha'panim* were hot when placed on the table and unlike marble, the metals would

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<sup>8</sup> If one were brave enough they could ask the following question on the *Tosfot*. The simple understanding is that the *olei regalim* would be able to “see” the miracle. If the miracle was that it maintained its heat then we do not have a problem. As the *Ritva* explains (*Yoma* 21b) the *lechem ha'panim* was placed on the *shulchan* when it was steaming hot and this steam was visible at a great distance. But if the bread maintained its moistness, then the *olei regalim* would need to have come and actually touched the bread. Furthermore the *Yerushalmi Shekalim* (6:3) specifically states that the miracle was in the maintenance of heat.

One should be aware that in *Menachot* the *Tosfot* offer no resolution and explain simply that this *Gemara* goes according to the opinion the baking did override *Shabbat*.

<sup>9</sup> Found in the *likutim* on the *Mishnah*.

heat up and spoil the bread as they would be resting there a long time. He understands therefore that they were placed on that table already on *erev Shabbat*, immediately after baking.<sup>10</sup> He therefore explains that when the *Gemara* says that they were as fresh on the day that “they were placed”, it refers to the day, *erev Shabbat*, that they were placed on the marble table in the entrance hall.<sup>11</sup>

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Above we learnt that the miracle of the *lechem ha'panim* maintaining its heat throughout the week demonstrated how dear *Am Yisrael* is to *Hashem*. Why? The *Imrei Tzvi* explains that the students of *R' Shimon ben Yochai* asked why *Hashem* gave *Am Yisrael mun* each day in the desert and not on a yearly basis. He explained with a parable: there was a king who provided his son with his needs for an entire year, once year. The son however began only to visit him once a year! He therefore changed the policy to provide for his son on a daily basis in order to see him frequently. Similarly, as *Bnei Yisrael* received food on a daily basis they would be concerned regarding the following day and turn their hearts to *Hashem*. Another answer however is provided that there were more practical considerations; either *Hashem* wanted them to have hot food each day, or the load would be too much for them to carry.

The miracle of the *lechem ha'panim* would seem to support the first answer. If the *lechem ha'panim* could maintain its heat, so too could the *mun* in the desert. It must be then that *Hashem* provided the *mun* on a daily basis due to his deep love for *Am Yisrael* and his desire for a connection with us on a daily basis. Similarly, our need to turn constantly to *Hashem* for sustenance should be interpreted in a similar manner.

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<sup>10</sup> He brings the *Bartenura Shekalim* (6:4) and *Tosfot Yom Tov (Menachot 11:7)* in support of this idea.

<sup>11</sup> <sup>4</sup> The *Shoshanim le'David* maintains this can be derived by the language that *Rashi* uses. See inside. One may also find support for this idea in the *Taklin Chadatin (Shekalim 6:3, s.v. "ein mazkirin")* who refers to the placement of the *lechem ha'panim* on the marble table as “*techilat siduro*”.

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## House of Chonyo

Menachot (13:1)

Alex Tsykin

Our *Mishnah* tells us that if one were to make a *neder* to bring a *korban* and then bring it in *Beit Chonyo*, the obligation has not been fulfilled, and (according to *Bartenura*) the prohibition of bringing a *korban* outside of the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* has been violated. Two questions arise from the *Mishnah*: what is *Beit Chonyo* and why would we have thought that a *korban* can be brought there when it seems obvious that it could not?

The first question is easily answered from a *Beraita* brought in the *Gemara* (109b). *Chonyo* was the second son of *Shimon Hatzadik*, but he knew more of the *halachot* of the service in the temple than his elder brother *Shim'i* (according to the *Tosfot* he had great awe of heaven) and as a result his father passed over *Shim'i* to be the next *kohen gadol* in favour of *Chonyo*. *Chonyo* nevertheless gave his brother the position; however, he became jealous and sought to have *Shim'i* killed by the other *kohanim* by dressing him as a woman. When the other *kohanim* learned of the plot, they tried to kill *Chonyo*, so he ran to Alexandria where he built another temple and offered burnt offerings there to *Hashem*.

This story however, is extremely problematic in of itself. How is it that someone who was righteous enough that one of the most righteous men of the entire second temple period felt he should be the next *kohen gadol*, would commit such a grave sin as to try to have his own brother killed out of jealousy? Also, how is it that he did not obey the prohibition against offering sacrifices outside Jerusalem?

To answer the first question, we could say either that *Shimon Hatzadik* was blinded by his love for his son, or alternatively that

indeed *Chonyo* was very righteous but momentarily failed to restrain himself (we know from the *Gemara* in *Sukkah* 52a that a *tzaddik* has greater *yetzer hara* than others). However, the second question about *Chonyo* is more difficult to answer. One possible answer given by the *Tosfot* is that he only brought sacrifices made by non-Jews.

The *Beit Ha'Mikdash* similar status to the *Mishkan* and *Hashem* had the *Mishkan* built so as to dwell among *Am Yisrael* (see *Exodus* 25:8). If so, it can be assumed that the sacrifices brought there were also intended to bring God closer to us, to facilitate the closeness, for otherwise there would be no reason to prohibit sacrifices made outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. The *Sefer HaChinnuch* states that the reason for the prohibition is to prevent us from making a sacrifice in a place where we will not be suitably humble before *Hashem*. Because *Hashem* chose the place for us to bring *korbanot*, he instilled in that place a spirit which allows us to gain greater repentance there than in other places. To prevent us from losing this benefit, he prohibited us from bringing sacrifices elsewhere. Non-Jews can bring sacrifices as we see in the *pasuk*: “Even them will I bring to My holy mountain, and make them joyful in My house of prayer; their burnt-offerings and their sacrifices shall be acceptable upon Mine altar; for My house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples.” (*Yeshayahu* 56:7) Nevertheless, they do not have a requirement to do so because their sacrifices are not a necessary part of their connection to *Hashem*. If so, according to the reason for the prohibition as brought in the *Sefer HaChinnuch*, because their sacrifices are an extra observance, the *Torah* was less strict with them with regard to the special humility one must have at the time of bringing a *korban*. It is also possible that because the *Mishkan* and *Mikdash* were built in part to facilitate the relationship of *Am Yisrael* with *Hashem*, they do not have the same effect on people not part of that relationship.

This allows us to answer the second question we asked of the *Mishnah* at the beginning. We might have thought that the *neder*,

a sacrifice which is inherently optional, would also not require the same level of humility as an ordinary sacrifice, and as such would not be covered by the prohibition, however the *Torah* chose not to differentiate, perhaps because we would still want to reach the highest level of service to *Hashem* that we can. Non-Jews, on the other hand, who do not have any such imperative to serve *Hashem* at the highest level possible, and in any case, possibly obtain no benefit from bringing their sacrifices to Jerusalem, have no prohibition on bringing sacrifices elsewhere.

Alternatively, it may be that because *Yeshayahu* predicted the rise of the temple in Egypt (“In that day shall there be an altar to the L-rd in the midst of the land of Egypt, and a pillar at the border thereof to the L-rd.” *Yeshayahu* 19:19), it might have been assumed that the temple there had divine sanction as a place of worship.

## On Korbanot and Fasting

Menachot (13:11)

Yehuda Gottlieb

The final *Mishnah* in *Masechet Menachot* notes that the words “a fire offering - a pleasing offering” are stated with reference to the *Olah* offering of an animal, the *Olah* offering of a bird and a *Mincha* offering. The *Mishnah* infers from this fact that whether one does much (*marbeh*) or does little (*mam'it*) the only consequential fact is whether one has had the intentions of doing so *Le'shem Shamayim*.

The *Rambam* notes in his commentary to the *Mishnah* that besides the *pasuk* mentioned, there is indeed another *pasuk* that links all the categories of offerings together: “This is the law (*Torah*) for the *Olah*, *Mincha* and *Chatat*” (*Vayikra* 7:37). The reference to all the *Korbanot* in unison and the addition of the word *Torah* teaches us that one who toils in *Torah* study is as if he has offered up an *Olah*, *Mincha* and *Chatat*.

The *Rambam* goes further to chastise those who say that there is no need to learn any of the topics surrounding *korbanot* or *avodat ha'Mikdash* because it is not applicable today. He states that all those who learn and study the *halachot* of the *avodah* is as if he has rebuilt the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* in his days. Therefore it is essential that we continue to study these laws despite the fact that people think they are insignificant and irrelevant to today's day and age.

Besides *Torah* study, there is another action that one can do and be credited as if he has offered a *korban*. The *Gemara* (*Brachot* 17) tells the story of *Rav Sheshet* who, when fasting, would recite the following prayer:

Master of the Universe, it is known before You that when the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* was established a person would sin and bring a *korban* and the fats and bloods would be offered before you and



atone. Now, I have sat in a fast and have weakened my own fat and blood. May it be your will that my fat and blood is as if I have offered them on the *Mizbeach* and may they affect atonement.

The *Ben Ish Chai* notes that the name of a person (*Adam*) is mentioned in the *parsha* of *korbanot*: “When a person (אדם) will offer a *korban*”. This word, made up of א, ט and כ, contains a hint to this weakening of a person’s body through fasting and the translation of this into the *kavanot* for a *korban*. The ט and כ of the word אדם make up the word blood (דם). In turn, the last letter – כ – has the *gematria* (numerical value) of 40, which is the same as the word חלב (fats). Therefore this word within the *pasuk* hints to fasting weakens a person’s fats and blood and its ability to be viewed as having offered a *korban*.

Additionally, the *Ben Ish Chai* notes that the letter ט of אדם is also significant. If one was to take the *gematria* from the last two letters of the Hebrew word for דלת i.e. ל and ת – one would come up with 430. This has the same *gematria* as the word נפש (soul). This implies that it is not enough for one to consecrate his blood and fats to *Hashem* as a *Korban* – it is also necessary to include the soul, the proper intentions, into such a *Korban*. This lesson echoes the lessons taught by the above *Mishnah*. It matters not whether one is rich and can afford to bring a large animal offering or whether one is poor and brings a *Korban Mincha*. The essential part of both the above is to have the proper intentions and to focus on who the *Korban* is being offered to.

May we focus our *kavanot* used in both *Torah* study in general and fasting this *Tisha B’Av* in order to merit the physical rebuilding of the *Beit Ha’Mikdash* in our days.

## Chulin

### Kashrut

#### Chulin (3:6-7)

Rav Yonatan Rosensweig

*Masechet Chulin* deals with the laws of *kashrus*. *Kashrus* is one of the most dominating *halachic* fields in terms of its impact on daily life. Furthermore, in the eyes of many, keeping kosher is deemed to be a litmus test for being considered a *halachic* Jew. If one kept the whole *Torah* but ate non-kosher, I doubt he would be considered by many to be a halachically minded Jew.

In the sixth and seventh *mishnayot* of the third *perek* of *Chulin*, we learn that all animals, fish and fowl have certain signs – whether in the *Torah* or developed by the rabbis – indicating whether they are kosher or not. This comes as no surprise to most of us: we know, of course, that the *Torah* has designated some beings to be kosher and has set out the ways to know which ones they are. However, what will probably come as a surprise to most of you is that the knowledge of these signs is deemed by the *Rambam* as a positive commandment.

The *Rambam* enumerates no less than four different positive commandments (149-152) to **know** the different signs of each creature we may put in our mouths (one for animals, one for fish, one for fowl and one for insects). This is reiterated by the *Rambam* at the beginning of the book of *Kedushah*, in his *Mishneh Torah*. The *Maggid Mishneh* on that very *Halacha* in the *Rambam* mentions that in his opinion there is no specific commandment simply to know the signs, but rather the knowledge is meant as part of the *mitzvah* of eating kosher animals. This, according to him, would be a positive commandment which would be parallel to the negative commandment not to eat *treif* animals. However this does not necessarily reflect the simple understanding of the *Rambam's*

stance, as the *Lechem Mishneh* mentions (though the *Aruch HaShulchan* supports the *Maggid Mishneh*).

Though it may seem that the *Torah* would have no reason to add onto its negative prohibitions, the *Torah* does do this in several cases, and therefore the contention of the *Maggid Mishneh* is not completely preposterous. However, one must understand: what could be the philosophical message contained in such a commandment? The answer, I think, takes us back to our words of introduction. *Kashrus* is not just an issue of opening a kosher book and seeing what is kosher and what is not. One can, theoretically, be completely passive when it comes to *kashrus*: he lets others form the laws for him that he later on follows. This is a passive acceptance of the laws of *kashrus* which has nothing to do with a deeper understanding of what *kashrus* is and what it means. There is, however, another way, and that is the way of active knowledge. Rather than passively reading from a book, one should strive to understand and to act out that understanding.

The *Maggid Mishneh* is trying to tell us that according to the *Rambam* it is not enough to simply know – one must also apply the knowledge. The knowledge must be knowledge that one can put into action. Being an active kosher shopper is what the *Rambam* is emphasizing. Every person must aspire to turn this major and central activity to our lives into an activity we take part in, and through that we can fulfil the words of the *Rambam*.

## Happiness in Meat and Wine

Chulin (5:3)

Alex Tsykin

Our *Mishnah* (5:3) tells us that when *Yom Tov* is coming (except for *Yom Kippur* and *Yom Tov Rishon* of *Sukkot*), the *halachot* for purchasing meat changes. While ordinarily when purchasing a moveable object it would be necessary to take the object for the sale to come into effect, here all that is necessary is the transfer of money. *Rabbi Yochanan* explains that is so because the necessity for actually taking possession of the object is rabbinic whereas the transfer of coins is a *Torah* requirement (*Chulin* 83a). The *Chachamim* lifted their enactment in this period enabling a person who purchased a part of an animal from a butcher, to force him to slaughter the animal even if the rest was not yet sold.

This *Mishnah* may hold the explanation for a particular *Halacha* the *Rambam* wrote which has puzzled many of the *Rishonim* and *Achronim* (*Arba'a Turim* 529a, *Beit Yosef* there and others). The *Rambam*, when discussing the obligation of *Simcha* (happiness) on *Yom Tov*, says: "There is no happiness other than with meat, and there is no happiness other than with wine." (*Hilchot Shvitat Yom Tov* 6, 18) This seems to contradict the following *Gemara*:

*Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira* says in the time that the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* stands, there is no happiness other than with meat as it is written: "And you will sacrifice a peace offering and you will eat there and you will be happy before *Hashem* your God" (*Devarim* 27, 7) and now, there is no happiness other than with wine... (*Pesachim* 109a)

Many explanations are proposed, however the two most common are:

1. The *Rambam* felt that while the primary mover for happiness today is wine, while meat still has a role. (*Bach* on the *Arba'a Turim*, *Orach Chayim* 529)

2. The *Rambam* was referring to different time periods. When he referred to meat he was referring to the time of the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* and when he spoke of wine he was speaking of the period until the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* is rebuilt. (*Bnei Shmuel* on the *Rambam*)

The second explanation suffers from two flaws: no proof is brought that this was the *Rambam's* opinion other than that it seems logical, and it is difficult within the words of the *Rambam* who does not write about or imply any difference between the two with regard to the *mitzvah* of happiness.

The first explanation however, is easier to explain (based on the analysis of the *Bach*). The *Gemara* on *Chulin* 83a presents another explanation of our *Mishnah*:

*Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak* says... [the *Mishnah* speaks of a case] where the benefit was conferred upon him by way of another, [but only] in these four times (*Erev Rosh HaShanah*, *Erev Pesach*, *Erev Shavuot* and *Erev Shmini Atzeret*) because it is a benefit for him, as it is said: one can confer a benefit on another without his knowledge. On other days of the year it is a detriment for him and we do not cause detriment to another without his knowledge.

This means that the meat was given to a third party to deliver. Ordinarily this would be insufficient to effect a change in ownership (meaning that the *Shochet* could change his mind) until the purchaser received the meat, however, in this case, just the transfer of coins to the seller is sufficient. *Rashi* comments on the *Gemara* here, saying:

... "It is a benefit for him" for it (*Yom Tov*) will not be sufficient without meat.  
"It is a detriment for him" [meaning] to pay is a detriment for him...

It would seem from here that there is an obligation of eating meat on *Yom Tov*, for why else would the expense of the meat not be considered a detriment? If so, it must be explained from here that there is a *mitzvah* to eat meat on *Yom Tov* albeit not a very strong one as opposed to the obligation which *Rabbi Yehuda* speaks

about in *Gemara Pesachim* that refers specifically to eating the sacrifice, which is no longer.

However, the question must now be asked, why is the first *Yom Tov* of *Sukkot* different? *Rabbi Ovadya* from *Bartenura* answers that the reason is that before *Sukkot* everybody is worried about building a *Sukkah* and buying the *Arba'a Minim* and has no time to buy and slaughter meat. While it seems strange that this would mean that the *Halacha* does not apply for *Sukkot*, certainly there are places where the *Halacha* takes account of *torach hatzibbur*, the inconveniencing of the public. Similarly, to answer the question of why the *mitzvah* exists for *Shmini Atzeret* but not for the last day of *Pesach*, the *Bartenura* states that *Shmini Atzeret* is considered an independent festival, while the last day of *Pesach* is still part of *Pesach* and so *Shmini Atzeret* has a stronger *mitzvah* of happiness.

## Chicken and Meat on the Table

Chulin (8:4)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

With the beginning of the eighth *perek* we start learning about the prohibitions of *basar b'chalav* – cooking and eating and gaining benefit from meat and milk cooked together. In the first *Mishnah* we learn about the scope of this prohibition as it begins defining the term “meat”. Later (8:4), as this definition becomes more distinct, we learn that chicken is not included in the biblical prohibition of *basar b'chalav*. Nonetheless as people do refer to chicken as meat, the *Chachamim* understandably included chicken as part of the prohibition on a rabbinic level.

With this knowledge in hand, the *Gemara* has a difficulty with the continuation of the first *Mishnah*. The *Mishnah* states that just as it is prohibited to cook meat and milk together, so is it also prohibited for meat and milk to be on the same table. This prohibition is a *gezeirah* (rabbinic decree) out of concern that one will eat milk and meat together. Yet we learn that it also applies to having chicken and milk on the same table; the prohibition of eating the two together itself is a *gezeirah*. Consequently the *Gemara* asks that extending the *gezeirah* that far, appears to be creating a *gezeirah l'gezeirah* (a decree to safeguard another decree) something which the *Chachamim* avoid.

The response (*Chulin* 104b) appears to be that in this case the *Chachamim* did not enact an extra *gezeirah*. They decreed once that chicken and milk should not be “raised” on the table in case meat and milk be “raised” together and placed in the cooking pot.

To fully understand this issue, perhaps it is best to ask a more basic question. Why is it prohibited to have meat and milk on the same table? If the concern is that meat and milk will be eaten together, the biblical prohibition of eating meat and milk is only if

they have been cooked together. Eating them, not having been cooked together, is a *gezeirah*. We can therefore ask a similar question by meat itself and milk – is this not a *gezeirah l'gezeirah*?

*Rashi* explains that by meat and cheese we are concerned that they will touch each other while on the same table and be eaten having absorbed one from the other. The *Maharam Shif* explains that the *Rashi* is concerned that having eaten in this manner he will place them together in one utensil, and if placed then together in a boiling pot he will transgress the biblical prohibition of *bishul*. Accordingly we once again have one *gezeirah*.

The *Ran* (32b *dapei HaRif*) however explains that this decree against placing meat and milk on the same table is out of concern that we will eat them together. The *Chachamim* were even stricter by this prohibition as milk and meat are both independently permissible. Similarly he explains that concerning chicken and milk, had the *Chachamim* permitted them being on the same table, the prohibition against eating them together would never have stood.

How do we understand the *Ran* in the case of placing chicken and cheese on the same table? Is it not still a *gezeirah l'gezeirah*? The *Melechet Shlomo* quoting the *Lavush* explains that since people put food on the dinner table for the express purpose of eating them, it is as if this prohibition is part of prohibition against eating them together.

The *Radvaz* (M'A 9:20) explains that the *Chachamim* strengthened their words to treat them like their biblical equivalent. The reason being that since all that is specifically mentioned is a “goat” as opposed to all meat, without such strengthening, very soon one would violate a biblical prohibition.

Alternatively we can utilise the explanation of the *Tosfot*. They explain that sometimes we find that indeed the *Chachamim* do



institute decrees to safeguard existing decrees. Each rabbinic enactment is unique and we cannot compare one with another unless the *Gemara* itself does so. Here, for the above stated reasons, the *Chachamim* felt it necessary.<sup>12</sup>

Using this we can once again return and explain the concern by meat and milk. We asked that if the concern is that they be eaten together, if they were not cooked together it would be a *gezeirah l'gezeirah*. Indeed the *Shulchan Aruch* states that the concern is that they will be eaten together. The *Taz* therefore explains that this too is an instance where the *Chachamim* decided to institute a *gezeirah* for an existing *gezeirah*.

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<sup>12</sup> To see an explanation about how these understandings fit in with the above quoted *Gemara* see the *Lechem Mishneh* (M<sup>7</sup>A 9:20).

## Gifts to Kohanim

Chulin (10-11)

Allon Ledder

The *Mishnayot* in chapters 10 and 11 discuss the *mitzvah* of giving certain gifts to the *Kohanim*:

- certain parts of every slaughtered domestic animal;
- certain parts of animals that are sacrificed;
- the firstborn of a cow, sheep or goat; and
- the first shearing of sheep.

There are a total of twenty-four gifts that are given to the *Kohanim* (*Baba Kama* 110b) many of which are listed in chapter eighteen of *Vayikra*.

What is the purpose of these gifts? The gifts allowed the *Kohanim* to focus on their role of working in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* and acting as the interface between *Bnei Yisrael* and *Hashem* without worrying about earning a living. Today, when we no longer have the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*, there are still many reminders of these gifts and the special role that the *Kohanim* play, such as:

- separating *challah* when baking bread.
- the blessing of the *Kohanim*.
- the various honours that we give to *Kohanim* such as the first *aliyah* and leading the *birkat ha'mazon*.

Whenever we are involved in any of these activities they should serve as a reminder to us of the proper role of the *Kohanim* and of how far we have fallen.

We can learn a powerful lesson from these gifts - a lesson which is very timely given that we have just entered into *Elul* and the lead up to *Rosh Hashanah*.

Many of the gifts that we give to the *Kohanim* involve the concept of ‘first’:

- the firstborn of our flocks
- the first of our crops
- the first shearing of our sheep

Many of our crops are forbidden *tevel* until we first give *trumah* to the *Kohanim*.

Most of these gifts become sanctified and must be consumed in a sanctified way:

- only by the holiest members of the people i.e. the *Kohanim* and in some cases their families
- only in the holiest place – e.g. some of the gifts must be consumed within the *Beit Ha’Mikdash*
- only in a state of purity – both the item itself and the person consuming the item must not be *tamei*
- only at certain times – e.g. gifts from sacrifices which must be consumed within a certain time period.

What is the connection between ‘first’ and ‘sanctified’?

Around the time of the high holydays, and in particular during the *Aseret Yemei Teshuva* we become more introspective and we focus on doing *teshuva*. Many have the custom of taking on an additional *mitzvah* or *chumrah*. For example, the *Shulchan Aruch* (603:1) suggests that one should be extra careful to only eat bread that was cooked by a Jew during the *Aseret Yemei Teshuva* – even if one is not so careful about this during the rest of the year.

At first glance, this custom appears somewhat hypocritical. As *Hashem* is about to judge us, it is as if we are telling *Hashem* how wonderful we are and asking Him to take into account this extra *mitzvah* that we are keeping. However we usually know, and *Hashem* certainly knows, that as soon as the *Yamim Noraim* are over we will very quickly give up this extra *mitzvah* and return to our old ways. Who are we trying to fool?

If we spend the first part of the year on a higher level we can spend the rest of the year trying to reach those heights once again. We may not make it but at least we are working in the right direction. By being extra careful around this time of year, we are demonstrating to *Hashem* and to ourselves where our priorities lie and the direction in which we are oriented. Our behaviour at the head of the year can be held up as an example of what we hope to achieve.

The same principle applies with the various gifts to the *Kohanim*. The first of our crops, the first born of our flocks, the first shearing of our sheep, etc, need to be elevated into a state of *kedusha*. They are devoted to *Hashem* by giving them to His representatives – the *Kohanim*. This can be held up as an example when we consume the rest of our flocks, crops etc. We do not have to consume the rest in a sanctified manner but at least we are reminded that we should be oriented towards *Hashem* and *kedusha*.

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### **A Gift Implies Responsibility**

How are we to respond to the gifts that we have received? What should our reaction be when we recognise that we been granted with talent or benefit over our peers?

The *Chovot Ha'Levavot* explains: “Whomever *Hashem* distinguishes from all others by means of some special favour must, in turn, distinguish himself from the others by accepting upon himself some special service, in addition to his efforts in the service which embraces them all.”

Put simply, the more we are given, the greater the sense of obligation and the greater responsibility one must bear toward his creator.

He use the *matanot kehuna* as the prime example of this: “You will therefore find twenty-four priestly commandments, corresponding to the twenty-four special benefits (gift) which the Creator has bestowed up the Priests.

## Sending Away the Mother Bird

Chulin (12)  
Yehuda Gottlieb

The final *perek* in *Masechet Chulin* deals with the laws of sending the mother bird away and then taking her eggs. The source for this ruling is the following *pasuk* (*Devarim* 22:6-7).

If a bird's nest happens to be before you on the road...and the mother is roosting on the young birds or the eggs, you shall not take the mother with the young. You shall surely send away the mother and take the young for yourself.

The *Chovat Yair* (67) deals with an interesting question on this *mitzvah*. Is the *mitzvah* of sending away a *chiyuv* on a person *lechatchila* i.e. if one sees a mother bird nesting on eggs, does he have an obligation to send the bird away (even if he does not require the eggs). Alternatively, do we say that this *mitzvah* only applies when one has a want or need for the eggs? It seems from the answer of the *Chovat Yair* that it is an obligation to send away the mother bird and take the eggs, even in a case where you do not have a need or use for them. This answer also fits with the literal meaning of the *pasuk* in *Devarim* (“*shaleach tishalach*”).

The *Torah Temimah* disagrees with the *Chovat Yair*. He mentions that the whole purpose behind the *mitzvah* of sending away the mother bird is to teach us not to be cruel. The *Torah Temimah* maintains that it is of the utmost cruelty, to take a young chick or egg away from its mother right in front of her. Indeed, one should not be taking these chicks from the mother at all. However at the end of the day all of creation was only created for Man. Man is given permission to undertake practices that may seem ‘cruel’ but have been allowed by the *Torah*. A perfect example of this is *shechita*. Although, slaughtering an animal could be seen as a ‘cruel’ and inhumane practice, since all was created for Man, the *Torah* provided him a specific way in which to slaughter animals. In the same vein, the *Torah* allowed Man to capture chicks and

eggs in a certain way, a way which demonstrates a heightened sensitivity to the mother. However, this would only be the case if one actually wanted to use the offspring for a purpose – to send the mother bird away with no use for the eggs would be cruelty – the exact opposite of the *mitzvah* one was trying to fulfil!

The *Mishnah* in *Brachot* (33b) mentions that if a *chazzan* was leading davening and mentioned “[As far as] the bird’s nest your mercy (*rachamim*) reaches” – we remove him from leading the congregation. *Rashi* there states the reason he cannot be a *chazzan* is because his words imply that the *mitzvot* of *Hashem* were ordained solely in order to be merciful – however in reality all the laws of *Hashem* are decrees (*gezeirot*).

This *Gemara* poses a challenge to the opinion of the *Torah Temimah*. It seems from the *Gemara* in *Brachot* that the reason behind sending away the mother bird is not in order to avoid cruelty, but rather because all the laws of *Hakodesh Baruch Hu* are a decree. Therefore, it is conceivable that the opinion of the *Chovat Yair* should be accepted as it would be a decree from *Hashem* to send away the mother bird even if one did not need the eggs.

The *Torah Temimah* however, answers the challenge. He states that this *Gemara* is talking about our attitude to the performance of the *mitzvot*. It is not enough for one to do a *mitzvah* if one sees a purpose and reason behind the fulfilment. Having this type of attitude can lead one to over rationalise the reasons behind the *mitzvah* and then come to a transgression. This attitude was demonstrated to a degree by *Shlomo HaMelech* who rationalised that the reasons behind the limitations of wealth, wives and horses for Kings did not apply to him (see *Sanhedrin* 21b). The *Torah Temimah* leads us to understand that the real motivation required for doing every *mitzvah* is solely because it is a decree from *Hashem*. Even if one can see a purpose and reason behind a *mitzvah*, the ultimate fulfilment is to observe each and every *mitzvah* as if it was a *gezeirah*.

## Bechorot

### Kohanim, Keep Out

#### Bechorot (4:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

In the beginning of the fourth *perek* of *Masechet Bechorot* we learn that one is obligated to care for and raise the *bechor* (first born domesticated *kosher* animal) prior to handing it over to the *kohen*. The exact time of this care is the subject of debate and varies with the type of animal. We also learnt that if a *kohen* volunteers to care for the animal within this time period, his offer is rejected. Why?

The *Gemara* (26b) explains that if a *kohen* were to take care of the animal during this time, it would be comparable to the case where a *kohen* helped the field-owner at the threshing floor. The *Beraita* explains that in such a case the *kohen* is not given *trumah*. If one however does so it is considered as if he “desecrated” the gifts.

The difficulty with the above quoted *Beraita* is that it also includes the *Levi* in this prohibition. In other words, the *Levi* is likewise not allowed to help the field-owner at the threshing floor and then consequently be given *ma’aser*. The difficulty is the expression that one who gives the *kohen* or *levi* the *trumah* or *ma’aser*, is considered as having desecrated the gifts. *Ma’aser* has no inherent sanctity; so it is puzzling why this specific expression is used in this context.

A more basic question is - why does the prohibition exist at all? It should be seen as a positive gesture of gratitude that the *kohen* or *levi* wants to be able to assist the owner. Surely acknowledging the good benefited from others is a fundamental principle of our faith.



*Rashi* explains that the problem is that it appears that the *kohen* or *levi*, is paying the field-owner to give it to him and no one else. We can understand this firstly, on a simple level, that it is unfair to other *kohanim*. Secondly the protocol by which the *kohen* and *levi* receive these gifts is that they are indeed just that – gifts. By helping out, this idea of ‘giving a gift’ is shattered. Nonetheless the term used to describe this (“desecrate”) needs more explanation.

Rav Nebenzahl answers differently by explaining why the *kohanim* and *levi'im* receive this gift. We wrongly perceive them as being “gifts”. These gifts should rather be seen as their payment. He explains, essentially all of *Am Yisrael* were chosen to be engaged in *Avodat Hashem*. Yet the *Torah* decreed that twelve tribes should receive inheritance and settle throughout the land, while one tribe would be free to work in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. This tribe, the *levi'im* would be effectively working in their stead. The work was not a privilege that could be enjoyed. The *Rambam* writes that a *Levi* refusing to work would be forced to do so, as the work in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* was a personal obligation.

Rav Nebenzahl continues and says that when a field worker comes to pick up his pay check, it would not cross his mind to start doing extra work. He worked and he should get paid. If a *kohen* or *levi* would help out, despite his good intentions, he is perceived as saying that his work, his *avodah* in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*, is not enough to warrant the *trumah* or *ma'aser*. He is “only” involved in spiritual matters and feels he needs to contribute a bit more. This is a *chilul* of the highest order.

With this understanding, our perception of the *avodah* and *trumot* and *ma'asrot* is drastically changed. On the one hand great responsibility and weight is given to the *kohen* and *levi's* work in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* as “employees”. On the other hand, the *ma'asrot* given are not given out of the kindness of our hearts, but rather as paying them their dues.

## Proper Judgment

Bechorot (4:4)

Alex Tsykin

Our *Mishnah* provides us with a number of related *halachot*:

1. If a *bechor* animal was slaughtered under the supervision of someone who was not appointed by *Beit Din* to oversee the slaughtering of a *bechor*, that person must pay for the *bechor* as the owners cannot now receive benefit from the carcass.
2. If a person who was not appointed by *Beit Din* to pass judgement on a monetary matter but did so in any case and made a mistake, he must pay the injured party for the mistake
3. If a person who was appointed by *Beit Din* to pass judgement on a monetary matter and made a mistake, he is not obligated pay the injured party for the mistake

The *Mishnah* here is seemingly quite difficult to explain. Justice would seem to demand that a person be obligated to pay for their mistakes, irrelevant of who appointed them, for they were not forced to take upon themselves that duty. However, here we see that the process of appointment, seemingly a technicality, is important in the final result.

The *Bartenura* explains that the reason for this distinction is because ‘if he were an expert appointed by *Beit Din*... he is exempt [from paying] for we may not say to him: “Why did you rule in this matter for you were not knowledgeable in the *Halacha*?”’ It would appear from here that the problem is one of a lack of due process. While the *Bartenura* does seem to emphasise the aspect of a lack of expertise, he states earlier that this *Halacha* applies even in the case of one knowledgeable in the *halachot* in question. Also the *Rambam* states in *Hilchot Sanhedrin* (6:3):

If the one [who made the judgement] was an expert and he did not receive permission [to make the judgement]... if he took

from one and gave to the other, what is done is done and he must pay from his property.

From here it is clear that even if the person who made a mistake was an expert in the *Halacha*, we would still obligate him to pay. Therefore it must be that the reason he is not obligated to pay is like the simple meaning of the *Mishnah* –he was not appointed to make this judgement.

However, there remains a question as to why judicial process would be so important that we penalise someone for making a mistake only if the process were not followed. The answer is one of public confidence. A problem which greatly worried *Chazal* was that people might because of rabbinical mistakes come to treat the prohibitions of the Rabbis lightly. This sentiment is strongly expressed in the *Mishnah* in *Avot* (1:11):

Avtalyon said: “Sages, be careful of your words, for you might cause the imposition of an obligation of exile, and you will be exiled to the place of the bad waters, and the students who come after you will drink and die, and it will be that *Hashem*’s name will be desecrated.”

It is noted by the various commentators there that the bad waters mentioned are an incorrect teaching, and the students drinking them are those who learn the mistake as though it were correct, and this in turn leads to the desecration of G-d’s name. Also, the *Bartenura* there notes that the Sages should “be careful of their words so as to not give any opportunity to the heretics to mistake your meaning.” Even more strongly, *Rashi* in his commentary on *Rosh Hashanah* (17a) equates one who ridicules the sages to a heretic.

Because of the enormous importance place on the words of the sages, if they are found to act incorrectly, people may come to ridicule them, and this in turn will “destroy the entire structure of *Torah*” (*Ma’amarei HaRa’ayah* page 56). As such the sages insisted on due process when passing judgements, because the

process that has been crafted acts to prevent one who would be likely to make mistakes from passing any judgement at all. However, because it is important that Rabbis will feel comfortable making a ruling, and be prepared to do so, it was decided that if they made a mistake however the correct process was observed, they would not be liable, for in this way the risk is minimised without introducing a disincentive to rule on *halachic* matters.

## External Blemishes

### Bechorot (6) Yehuda Gottlieb

The sixth *perek* of *Masechet Bechorot* discusses the various blemishes that would render a *bechor* fit for slaughtering. The *perek* begins by discussing those blemishes that occur in the ear, then moves on to those in the eye and only then begins discussing those blemishes which are found in the nose and the mouth. Following on from the theme of blemishes the seventh *perek* focuses on the various blemishes that render a *Kohen* unfit for service in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*.

This period of time in the Jewish calendar is specifically designated for Man to undertake a *cheshbon hanefesh* and rid himself of any “blemishes” that may be tainting him. One of the essential requirements of doing *Teshuva* is undertaking *vidui* (confession). In the *nusach* of our *Tefillot* this process is done by striking our heart and mentioning the passages beginning with “*Al Chet SheChatanu Lefanecha.*”

R' Moshe Rosenshtein, quoted in the *sefer Darchei Mussar* proposes an interesting idea. He explains that the *ikar* of our *vidui* is that we mention that we have sinned in front of G-d (*Lefanecha*). The only reason why we are able to enumerate all our sins in detail is due to this fact that we find ourselves in a position of having accepted upon ourselves the concept of serving G-d. In our *vidui* we are admitting that we wish to come close to G-d for that is what we were created for, however, due to our shortcomings, we have slipped along the way. It is through this *vidui* that we are able to come closer to *Hashem*. This is the idea of mentioning the sins that we have done “*lefanacha*” – in front of G-d. For if we were distant from *Hakodesh Baruch Hu* - then there would be no advantage of mentioning any details as we

would only be guilty of one general sin – that of being distant from *Hashem*!

This idea can be compared to that of a soldier who is serving in the army of the king. All the while that he is in the king's service he must be careful to wear his full uniform. If he is missing even a button or his shoes are not shined, he will be punished. However, if he flees from the army and takes off the uniform – he will not be penalised for this minor detail. This is because in this instance he will be punished for the more serious charge of abandoning the army – the details of his minor charges are insignificant in the face of his main transgression. This parable mirrors the relationship between man and G-d. If he understands and feels that he is standing before *Hashem* and accepts the yoke of heaven upon himself then there is reason for him to list his sins in detail. However, if he is distant from *Hashem* there is no purpose to him detailing his sins because he is guilty of the far greater sin of abandonment.

In his *vidui*, *Rabbeinu Nissim Gaon* states:

*Ribbono shel Olam*, if I were to stand here and enumerate my sins, the time would run out, however my sins would not run out.

How could *Rabbeinu Nissim* have so many sins? According to this *understanding* in the *Darchei Mussar*, the fact that *Rabbeinu Nissim* was constantly involved in the service of *Hashem* and was so close to Him, was the exact reason why he could go into such detail about his sins. However, for those people who are not on that level must first get to the point where they feel “*lefanacha*” – ‘*in front*’ of *Hashem*. This means that first a person must feel that they are close to *Hashem*, only afterward can they go into the details of their sins. This is the effect of *Yom Kippur*. On *Yom Kippur* we are on the level of *Malachim*, and since we have come close to *Hashem*, it is only fitting that we then begin to mention our sins in detail and with the *nusach* “*al chet shechatanu lefanecha*.”

*Gmar chatima tova.*

## Erchin

### Introduction to Erchin

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

*Masechet Erchin* begins by discussing the laws which give name to the *masechet*. The *Mishnah* immediately teaches that an *erech-vow* is very different to regular *nedarim* (vows), which we learnt about some time ago. There, if one wished to make *nedarim* thereby donating the monetary value (*d'mei*) of a person or himself, this value would need to be calculated. Put simply, the value of this person if he were to be sold as a slave in the market place. An *erech-vow* is very different, since the value pledged of any person is listed in the *Torah* and determined by one's age alone. Consequently the first *Mishnah* lists those people whose *erech* is not stipulated in the *Torah* and thereby cannot be the subject of an *erech-vow* but nonetheless can be the subject of a *neder*.

Considering the above stated difference between a *neder* and *erech-vow*, further probing may help us better understand *erchin*. The *Minchat Asher* explains that there are two possible ways to view *erchin*. The first is that an *erech-vow* is no different to any other *neder*. The *Torah* provides fixed values for when a person uses the term "*erech*" when making a vow. With the *Torah* evaluation in hand, the person will then follow the normal requirements of any *neder*. The second understanding however is that the *erchin* is a completely new topic in *Halacha* with its own obligations not stemming from ordinary *nedarim*. If so, we do not care whether a person knew the obligatory *erech* when he stipulated the *neder*. Since it embodies a new obligation independent of a regular *neder*, the concept of a mistaken *neder* (*neder ta'ut*) does not apply.

The *Minchat Asher* feels that the latter of the two understandings is indeed the true perception on *erchin* and brings a number of

proofs in support of his position. The first is that the *Rambam* lists *erchin* as an independent *mitzvah*. The *Minchat Asher* reasons that if *Torah* was only revealing the monetary value for an *erech*-vow then it would not warrant being listed as an independent *mitzvah* but rather as part of the *mitzvah* of *nedarim*.<sup>13</sup>

The second is from the language of the *Chazon Ish* (*Kodshim*, 29:1):

It appears that the matter of *Erchin* is not an obligation stemming from *Nedarim* with a fixed value, but rather one is bound by the *mitzvah* of *erchin* similar to that of *nezirut*, and one is bound by the *mitzvot ha'Torah* in fulfilling the *erchin* [vow]. And if one does not... he violates the *mitzvah* of *erchin*.

A number of differences in *Halacha* also strengthen this point. Firstly, with *erchin* one is also responsible to pay even if the allocated funds go missing. This is not the case by *nedarim* in the case where the person states “*harei ze*” (“this is what I volunteer”).<sup>14</sup> Secondly the *Rambam* (*Erchin* 1:21) rules that if one makes an *erech* vow, he is only obligated once the stipulation has been formally assessed (*ha'amadah b'din*). If a person dies before this assessment his heirs are not obligated to fulfil the *erech*-vow.<sup>15</sup> Finally, the concept of *heseg yad*, whereby if the person making the *erech*-neder is poor then we assess him according to his status is unique to *erchin*. The *Ra'avad* who agrees here with the *Rambam* explains that this is because *erchin* is more similar to a *knas* (fine) than monetary payment (which is a closer model for *nedarim*).

The *Minchat Asher* raises a challenge from the *Rambam* (*Erchin* 1:1) who writes:

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<sup>13</sup> See the *Minchat Asher* (*Vayikra*, 67) for a possible rejection of this proof based on the language of the *Rambam* and his response to this challenge.

<sup>14</sup> This is learnt from the *pasuk*: “*ve'natan et ha'erkecha*”.

<sup>15</sup> See the *Kesef Mishnah*, *Radvaz* and *Chazon Ish*. The *Ra'avad* however disagrees with this ruling.



*Erchin* are included as part of *nidrei hekdesh* as it states: “When a person expresses a vow (*neder*) pledging evaluation (*b’erkecha*) of souls to *Hashem*”. Therefore one is bound [when making them] on the obligation of “you shall not delay your word”...

The *Minchat Asher* answers that indeed there is a connection as the term *neder* is used when mentioning *erchin*. Consequently such obligations like “you shall not delay your word” also apply to *erchin*. They are similar as well in that one obligates himself with the spoken word alone. Nonetheless the binding nature *erchin* is still novel and its foundation very different to that of *nedarim*.

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### **There is Giving And There is Giving**

The section that discusses the laws of *Erchin* immediately follows the section that mentions the blessings and curses. The *Kli Yakar* understands that there is significance in this juxtaposition. His sentiments are strengthened, as he cites the *Ba'al Ha'Turim* who states that the *shekalim* listed by the laws of *Erchin* is equal to the total of number curses, 143.

The *Kli Yakar* explains that unfortunately, it is the nature of *Am Yisrael* to donate only in times of *tzarah*, difficulty. It is only through tribulations that we reflect, regret and do *teshuva*. However, the *Kli Yakar* closes by saying if however one wilfully gives then it is considered “*yom ratzon Hashem*” – performing the will of *Hashem*.

”...יהי לרצון אמרי פי”

## Speaking Erchin (3:5) Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

With all the learning about the legal implications of speech in the context of *erech*-vows, it is not surprising that the *Mishnah* turns its attention to the devastating power of speech in general. Despite the comments almost appearing reflective on an apparently tangential topic, its wisdom and appropriateness to this *Masechet* is clear.

The third *perek* discusses a number of laws where the *Torah* outlines the fixed redemptive value or components of compensation. Doing so it compares these laws to similar ones where the price is determined by its real value. Consequently the fixed values attributed to these laws, are sometimes more or less, stricter or more lenient, when compared to the real values.

Of the last two listed the first is the fine given to a person guilty of rape or seduction as part of his overall punishment and compensation. The second is the fine given (as part of the overall punishment) to the *motzi shem ra*, a man who falsely accuses his wife of adultery when she was engaged to him, bringing false witnesses in support. In the first case the guilty party has committed a crime by performing an action, while in the latter, the person's crime is his spoken word. It is therefore noteworthy that the fine for the first case is fifty shekel while the second is one-hundred shekel.

*Rashi* explains that the above contrast led the *Mishnah* (3:5) to comment as follows:

We find that someone who speaks [wrongly] is [punished] more than someone who acts [wrongly].

The *Mishnah* then continues:

For we find that the judgement was only sealed for our fathers in the desert [forbidding them from entering *Eretz Yisrael*] due to

*lashon ha'rah*, as it states, "They tested me, this (*ze*), ten times and did not listen to my voice."<sup>16</sup>

There are two versions of the above *Mishnah* that differ in how they connect the two above quoted sections. One is the way it is written above, where the *Mishnah* writes "For we find..." (*sh'chen*). The implications being that the punishment due to the incident of the spies further illustrates the point. Another version however found in the *Gemara* reads, "And we find" (*v'chen*) which applies that a further point is being made over-and-above the already stated.

The *Sfat Emet* explains that indeed more is learnt from the case of the Spies. We find that one that simply listens to *lashon ha'rah* is also treated very harshly. By the sin of the spies, it was only the spies that actually spoke *lashon ha'rah* (about *Eretz Yisrael*). The rest only accepted what they said. Nevertheless all were punished.

But why is the spoken word treated so harshly. Perhaps we can suggest some contributing factors. In *Parashat Bereishit*, the *Torah* describes the creation of man, "And Hashem formed man from the dust of the ground, and He blew into his nostrils; and man became a living being (*nefesh chaya*)" (*Bereishit* 2:7). *Onkelos* translates *nefesh chaya* to mean a "speaking spirit". Consequently *Rashi* explains that Man's intelligence and power of speech are unique and separates him from the beast. It is not just that with this great power comes great responsibility, but also great accountability. It is far more than just a shame when these two capacities, intelligence and speech are not used in tandem. The *Chafetz Chaim* explains further from this *pasuk* that speech itself stems from a person's *nefesh chaya*; it is rooted deeply within a person. Consequently we can understand how severe it is when harm is committed from such a source.

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<sup>16</sup> While one may be tempted to reject this proof claiming that the sin of the twelve-spies might have simply been "the last straw", the *Gemara* as explained by *Rashi* explains that the superfluous word "*ze*" implies that it was for this sin alone that the judgement was decreed.

A final understanding can come from *Rabbeinu Yona*. *R' Yishmael* teaches that one who speaks *lashon ha'rah*, his sins increase to be equivalent to the three major sins for which one is to give up their life rather than transgress (*Erchin* 15b). *Rabbeinu Yona* takes this quite literally explaining exactly why *lashon ha'rah* is so severe. Firstly one who speaks *lashon ha'rah* is likely offend repeatedly on a daily basis amassing large amounts of sin. This frequency also makes *teshuva* extremely difficult as such speech become almost innate. *Teshuva* is further complicated as the speaker is rarely aware of the extent of the damage done or the seriousness of his crime. Further difficulties arise as *teshuva* demands that one ask forgiveness from the person they hurt. One will likely lose track of those he affected. Regardless, *lashon ha'rah* spreads out of control very often affecting generations to come, preventing any real resolution. Finally, as *Rabbeinu Yona* quotes the *pasuk* from our *Mishnah*, he explains that one who speaks *lashon ha'rah* very often turn his attention to *Hashem* – the consequences of which are grave indeed.

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### Just Sing a Little

The *Tosfot* question the long-winded language of the first *Mishnah* in the fourth *perek* suggesting different ways in which it could have been condensed. They leave this question open. The *Tifferet Yisrael* answers (based on the *Gemara Beitzah* 24a) that *Mishnayot* should be learnt with a tune, and a unique tune given to each *Mishnah*.

He understands that tunes were given in order to assist in memorising the *Mishnayot*. So important was this tool that sometimes *Mishnayot* appear wordy or even lacking. The *Gemara*

often corrects the overly brief *Mishnah* by bringing contradicting texts if it was misunderstood in its brief sense. Nonetheless, the *Tifferet Yisrael* maintains that it was done so because of the importance of committing it to memory – for fitting the tune.

(Compare to *Yair Kino*, *Kinim* 1:3)

## The Value of a Corpse

Erchin (5:4)  
Allon Ledder

The *Mishnah* (5:4) discusses the case of a person (*Reuven*) who makes a vow to pay the worth of another person (*Shimon*) to the treasury of the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. The *Beit Din* needs to assess the 'worth' of *Shimon* in order to determine how much *Reuven* must pay. If *Shimon* dies before his worth has been assessed by the *Beit Din* then *Reuven* does not need to pay anything. Since the subject of the vow is dead, no assessment can be made and the vow is no longer payable.

There are two explanations for the reason why no worth can be assessed after death:

- A person's 'worth' is assessed by their value as a slave. After death, a person has no worth as a slave (*Tiferet Yisrael*); or
- After death, the only possible measure of worth is the value of the corpse and since we are forbidden from deriving benefit from a human corpse the person no longer has any worth (*Tosfot Yom Tov*).

This position seems to be inconsistent with the *Mishnah* (3:3) which refers to a *mu'ad* ox (an ox that has previously killed three people) that kills a free person. The owner of the ox must pay *kofer* – an atonement payment – to the heirs of the victim. According to the majority opinion, the *kofer* represents the value of the victim just prior to death. We see from this *Mishnah* that an assessment of worth can be made retroactively after death. Why then can we not assess the value of *Shimon* before their death in our case of the vow?

*Rashi* (*Gemara Erchin* 20a) explains that in the case of the *kofer* payment, the obligation to pay becomes effective from the time the damage was caused, which is prior to the death of the victim.

The *Beit Din's* task is to assess the amount of that earlier obligation. However in our case of the vow, the obligation to pay only takes effect once the *Beit Din* have made their assessment. Therefore, an assessment of what *Shimon* was worth in the past (before his death) is not relevant because the obligation to pay cannot be made retroactively.

The explanation given by *Tosfot Yom Tov* (that we are forbidden to derive benefit from a human corpse) seems to be inconsistent with the *Mishnah* (1:4) which states that if a woman is executed we may derive benefit from her hair. The *Gemara* (*Erchin* 7b) is puzzled by this statement because it is inconsistent with the principle that it is forbidden to benefit from a human corpse. The *Gemara* gives two explanations:

- The *Mishnah* is limited to the case of a foreign hair piece and only where the woman had stated before her death that she wished to give the hair piece away (*Rav*); or
- Hair is an exception to the rule that it is forbidden to benefit from a human corpse (*Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak*).

The *Shulchan Aruch* (*Yoreh Deah* 349:2) rules in accordance with *Rav* while *Rambam* rules in accordance with *Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak*.

*Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak's* opinion that we can derive benefit from human hair after death would suggest that a human corpse does have some worth posthumously. Therefore, it would seem that those who hold by this opinion would disagree with the reasoning of *Tosfot Yom Tov* (i.e. a corpse has no worth because we are forbidden from deriving benefit) and would be more likely to hold by the opinion of *Tiferet Yisrael* (i.e. after death a person has no worth as a slave).

Alternatively, even those who hold that we can derive benefit from human hair after death might still agree with the reason given by *Tosfot Yom Tov*. They might argue that the value of hair

cannot be a replacement for the value of a person. This would be supported by the principle stated in the *Mishnah* (5:2) in relation to *erech* vows – anything upon which one’s life depends (such as the head or the heart) can be treated as a replacement for the entire self; however anything that is not essential to life (such as an arm or a leg or hair) cannot be a replacement for the entire self. The *Gemara* (*Erchin* 20a) establishes an analogy between vows of worth and *erech* valuations and therefore derives that this principle applies in both cases.

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The main article discussed the rule that no monetary assessment of the value of a person can be made after their death. The fact that a person’s worth disappears with their death may serve as a reminder of the importance of our time in *Olam Hazeih*.

The *Mishnah* in *Pirkei Avot* (4:22) states that one hour of repentance and good deeds in *Olam Hazeih* is better than the entire life of *Olam Habah*. It is only in this world that we can perform *Mitzvot* and earn reward. Let us take advantage of that opportunity while we can.



## Batei Arei Choma Erchin (9:4) Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

In the ninth *perek* we learnt about the sale of *batei arei choma* – houses of walled city (that were walled in the times of *Yehoshua*). The *Torah* writes (*Vayikra* 25:29-30):

If a man sells his house in a walled city, its redemption can occur up to a year from the sale. If he does not redeem until a full year, then the house in the walled city shall belong to the purchaser for generations and will not return in the *yovel* year.

One may ask, why is the time frame for redemption so short compared to other periods that we have learnt about? The *Sefer HaChinnuch* explains that a house in a walled city in Israel should be very dear to its owner. If the owner does not make every effort to buy it back then he is penalised such that it now completely belongs to the new owner.

The *Mishnah* (9:4) teaches that due to this time limit, purchasers of such houses made a habit making themselves unavailable on the last day for redemption thereby ensuring that they achieved full and permanent ownership of the house. To avoid this problem, *Hillel* instituted that the original owner deposit the money at the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*, “break down the door” and take possession of his house.

A question that arises from this *Mishnah* is what if there was some other circumstance out of the owner’s control (*ones*) that prevented the original owner from redeeming his house on the final day. Is it his “bad luck”? Does he lose his house? Answering this question will reveal a deeper understand of *batei arei choma*.

The *Minchat Chinnuch* writes that it initially seems that since *Hillel* had to institute the decree for a case that appears to be *ones*,

it would imply that in any other case of *ones* the original owner would lose his house.

The *Minchat Chinnuch* mentions those opinions that reject this proof, since this is an instance of *ones* on the final day alone. Since the person had plenty of time during the rest of the year to redeem the house, the law might be stricter than normal. According to these opinions if the *ones* extended for the entire period then the original owner would still be able to redeem his house.

The *Magen Avraham* (*Orach Chaim*, 108:11) however argues that no proof can be brought from this case and in general (except for *Gittin*) *ones* even on the final day would be considered. Here however, the sale of the house is not considered a formal sale. Instead it is viewed as a loan (the price paid by the purchaser) with the house as a guarantee and if the “borrower” does not pay back the loan in the “allotted time” (the year) the house belongs to the “lender”.<sup>17</sup> In the laws of loans, if the loan is not paid in the allotted time then the guarantee changes hands even if the face of *ones*. This is an exception to the general rule of *ones rachmana patrei* (the *Torah* exempts a person due to *ones*).

The *Ktzot HaChoshen* (*Choshen Mishpat* 55:1) has a different understanding of the mechanism by which the laws of *batei arei choma* operates. Consequently he writes that in this case even if the seller endured an *ones* for the entire period he would lose his ability to redeem the house. He explains that the house actually belongs to the purchaser at the time sale. The *Torah* however made the sale on the condition that if the owner wishes to redeem

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<sup>17</sup> The *Netivot* brings a proof to support this understanding from the fact that *Gemara* deals with the issue of *ribbit* (interest) attached to the laws of *Batei Arei Chomah*. (See the *Gemara* and *Netivot* for more detail.)

it he may do so. If it does not, even due to ones, the right of redemption is lost.<sup>18</sup>

The *Minchat Chinnuch* writes that the difference between these two understandings is the requirement placed on the original owner when he wishes to redeem his property. According to the first understanding, since the initial transaction was only a loan, then only the money needs to be returned. However if we understand that initially a formal sale was made with the option of redemption made available, then the original owner would be required to enact a form acquisition (*kinyan*).

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### The Sold “House”

If a man sells his house of dwelling in a walled city, its redemption can occur up to a year from the sale.

In line with his interpretation of the previous verses, the *Ohr Ha’Chaim* explains that this verse, on a deeper level, explains how it could be possible that *Hashem* destroyed the *Beit Ha’Mikdash*. The “man” in the *pasuk* refers to *Hashem* as the *pasuk* states “*Hashem ish milchama*”. The “house of dwelling” (*beit moshavo*) is to be understood as referring to the *Beit Ha’Mikdash*, while the “walled city” as referring to *Yerushalaim*.

The *Ohr Ha’Chaim* explains that the “walls” is the very reason why “redemption can occur”. Citing the *Midrash (Tehillim 79:1)* he explains that *Hashem* took his “anger” out on the bricks and mortar as opposed to the inhabitation. Had it not been so, *chas v’shalom*, then there would be no one left, no future redemption and no rebuilding of his “house”.

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<sup>18</sup> The *Netivot* disagrees arguing that that explanation is the same as any sale made with a time-bound condition where *ones* would certainly be considered. (See inside for his proofs.)

## Temurah

### Introduction to Temurah

#### Temurah (1:2)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The new *masechet*, *masechet Temurah*, deals with the laws relating to one attempting to exchange an animal for an animal set aside as a *korban*. Other than violating a negative prohibition, the outcome is that both animals are sanctified. The first, the *korban*, retains its sanctity and the second becomes a *temurah*. As learnt in the first *Mishnah* this is the case whether the second animal is better or worse than the first. Analysing a particular debate will provide a better understanding of this law.

The *Mishnah* taught (1:2):

*Temurah* can be caused by stating: one [animal] in place of two [*korbanot*]; two [animals] in place of one [*korban*]; one in place of one-hundred; one-hundred in place of one. *R' Shimon* says: *Temurah* can only [be caused when trying to exchange] one in place of one, as it states, “and it shall be that **it** and the exchanged [animal shall be sanctified]”. Just as “it” (*hu*) implies one, so too the exchanged is [understood as being] one.

The above *Mishnah* describes the debate regarding whether the law of *Temurah* applies also in a one-to-many and many-to-one relationship or only in a one-to-one way.

A further debate ensues in the *Gemara* regarding the later opinion, the opinion of *R' Shimon*. *Reish Lakish* argues that even though *R' Shimon* maintains that *temurah* is only effective in a one-to-one way this is only in one instance. He would however agree that many animals can become a *temurah* from one *korban*. He explains that this is possible when someone attempts to exchange a *korban* with other single animals in multiple instances. *Reish Lakish* reasons that after the first *temurah* is performed the sanctity of the original *korban* has not been

affected (“*kedusha rishona de’hekdesch le’heichan halcha*”). Consequently the next time one attempts to exchange an animal for that *korban* it is like starting for the beginning. Despite this rationale *R’ Yochanan* argues that *R’ Shimon* would maintain that as soon as *temurah* has been performed once from a *korban* it could not be performed again. What is the rationale of *R’ Yochanan*? Why does he disagree with *Reish Lakish*’s understanding?

The *Minchat Asher* explains that this debate is indicative of the broader question of what is the novelty (*chiddush*) of this law of *temurah*. One way to understand it is that were it not for the law of *temurah*, the declaration of the person attempting to exchange the animals would be meaningless. The *korban* would remain a *korban* and the second animal remains a normal animal. The *chiddush* is that this second animal is also sanctified. Another way to understand this is that were it not for the laws of *temurah*, the declaration would have been effective and the second animal would have taken the place of the *korban*. The *chiddush* is that the original animal is remains sanctified.

The *Minchat Asher* uses these two understandings to explain the debate between *Reish Lakish* and *R’ Yochanan*. *Reish Lakish* reasoned that the *korban* could be used again to create another *temurah* because the sanctity had not been affected – the *korban* was unchanged. This reasoning seems to be aligned with the first understanding that the *chiddush* of *temurah* is that the second animal is sanctified and it is clear the declaration made had no affect on the *korban*. *R’ Yochanan* however rejects this rationale. According to the *Minchat Asher* this is because he follows the second understanding that really the sanctity is transferred and the *chiddush* of *temurah* is that the original animal is also sanctified. Since the *korban* has been affected it can no longer cause another *Temurah*.

## Temurah vs. Redemption

Temurah (5:5)

Alex Tsykin

The *Mishnah* (5:5) discusses the words used to make an animal *temurah* contrasting it with the procedure for redeeming a blemished animal unfit for a *korban* with another (unblemished) animal:

... [If one said:] “This [animal] is to be undedicated through this [animal]”, the second animal is not *temurah* [meaning the laws of *temurah* do not apply to that animal]. And if the initially sanctified animal had a blemish, it is undedicated and one must pay [the difference between the prices of the two animals if the animal used to redeem the blemished one was worth less than the blemished one].

In the *Gemara* (*Temurah* 27a), *Rabbi Yochanan* comments: “It is undedicated according to the *Torah* and one must pay the difference according to the Rabbis” meaning that the requirement to pay the difference is of rabbinic and not *Torah* origin. The commentaries on our *Mishnah* explain that one may redeem an animal which has become blemished with any unblemished animal even if it is worth less. The Rabbis however later added the qualification that the second animal must worth at least equal value otherwise one must pay the difference.

To explain the origin of the *Halacha* expounded by *Rabbi Yochanan*, the *Gemara* states that *Shmuel* said that “if a person undedicated an animal worth [a great deal of money] through one worth [very little] money, it has been undedicated [successfully]”. *Rashi* (*Kiddushin* 11b) comments (based on the *Gemara* in *Temurah*):

[That is] because there is no fraud in sanctified objects... and *Shmuel* teaches us that just as they are excluded from the *halachot* of fraud, so too they are excluded from the *halachot* of the reversal of a transaction [in a situation of fraud, consequently the redemption is affective].

While this explanation seems to be initially quite satisfying, the *Kehillot Ya'akov* asks: (*Bechorot*, 8):

This [logic] can be said about when the treasurer of the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* who bought or sold [something] and was defrauded. You could easily say that the transaction will be upheld [despite the fraud] according to those who hold the treasurer functions like an owner. However, the one who redeems a sanctified object intentionally – an [expensive] *object* for a [cheap] one – here there is no fraud at all, for who has been defrauded? Is not everything revealed before *Hashem*? And the redeemer also knows that he is not giving the worth of the [sanctified] object, and there is no fraud. It is simple that he just wants to buy for less than the object is worth, and what is the relevance of [the issue of] fraud and sanctified objects (to say that it will not prevent the transaction from being upheld)?

To answer the question of the *Kehillot Ya'akov*, the *Kodshei Yehoshua* (309) explains that one must consider the technical process of redeeming an object. He presents two possibilities to explain the exact mechanism. The first is that when one buys a sanctified object, the money or object given in trade acquires holiness by virtue of being in the ownership of G-d and the one which is sanctified loses that sanctity as a result of the trade. The second is that a transfer of sanctity occurs directly from one to the other. The difference between the two possibilities is that the first proposes that the mechanism of the transfer of holiness is a trade, whereas the other supposes that the transfer and trade are two separate and parallel processes. He writes that he feels the second possibility is correct. As a result, there is no fraud with regard to sanctified objects (which could result in a transaction being reversed) not because of a special exemption, but rather because fraud requires a transaction to take place and the transfer does not involve a transaction.

While the explanation appears to be cogent, it fails on one point. *Rashi* stated that there is no fraud which can be used to reverse the transaction. It is implicit in this statement that a

transaction has indeed taken place. Consequently it is difficult to argue that there can be no fraud during the redemption of sanctified objects because there is no transaction (at least according to *Rashi's* commentary). Another explanation must be found.

A possible alternative explanation is that there can be no fraud in the transaction of redeeming a sanctified object because as the *Kehillot Ya'akov* noted, both parties to the transaction know what is being exchanged. *Hashem*, allowed this when he wrote the *Torah*, meaning that He accepts the legitimacy of this transaction. Such a suggestion would mean that the question of the *Kehillot Ya'akov* is indeed the underlying rationale presented by *Rashi* for why the laws of fraud does not apply to *kodshim*.



## Keritut

### Introduction to Keritut

Keritut (1:1)

Allon Ledder

The first *Mishnah* in *messechet Keritut* gives a list of the various sins which incur the punishment of *karet* - a spiritual punishment which also relates in some way to premature death. *Karet* is only incurred if the sin was deliberate and was committed without a warning or the presence of witnesses. If the sin was committed in the presence of two proper witnesses who gave a proper warning then the perpetrator is punishable by the *Beit Din*, in most cases with capital punishment or *malkut* (lashes) and *karet* is avoided (*Makkot* 3:15). Why does the same sin have a different punishment merely because of the presence of witnesses and a warning?

Perhaps we can shed some light on this question by analysing the distinction between a *ganav* (a thief who steal clandestinely) and a *gazlan* (a robber who takes openly and with force). The *ganav* has to pay back double to the victim and in some instances also has to pay a four of five-fold penalty. The *gazlan* only has to return the object or its equivalent in cash. This is difficult to understand – in the secular legal system, a robbery (which is often more violent) is punished more harshly than a theft. The *Gemara* (*Baba Kama* 79b) explains the difference: fear of *Hashem* must be above everything else. A *gazlan*, by acting openly, steals without fear or shame, his attitude to *Hashem* is the same as his attitude to his fellow man. The *ganav* hides himself from his fellow man but not from *Hashem* – thus demonstrating that he fears man more than he fears *Hashem*.

The same analysis might apply in the case of *keritut*. The transgressor who sins brazenly in public – in front of two witnesses after receiving a clear warning, demonstrates that his

fear of man and his fear of *Hashem* is the same. The transgressor, who sins surreptitiously and out of the public eye, demonstrates that his fear of man is greater than his fear of *Hashem*.

This analysis suggests that the one who sins in private should be treated more harshly than the one who sins in public. This is in fact the case for those sins that are punishable with *malkut*. The one who sins in public receives the far less severe punishment of lashes and manages to avoid *karet*. However how can we explain those sins that are punishable by the *Beit Din* with capital punishment? One who sins in public is put to death whereas one who sins in private is allowed to live – and therefore has a chance to do *teshuva* and gain forgiveness. It seems that the one who sins in public is treated more harshly - the opposite to the conclusion that we reached above. How can we reconcile the two?

We can understand this by looking at the case of *Arei Miklat* – the cities of refuge to which an inadvertent killer would be exiled. There are actually three cases of inadvertent killing (*Makkot* 8a):

1. A killing which is totally unforeseeable – there is no culpability and the killer does not need to go into exile;
2. A killing due to negligence – there is some degree of culpability, the killer would need to go into exile; and
3. A killing due to gross negligence with a high degree of culpability – this killer would not go into exile and also would escape punishment from the *Beit Din* due to the lack of witnesses and warning.

The second category of killer has some degree of culpability and needs atonement for that. The mere fact of going through exile provides some form of atonement for this killer. The third category of killer is so culpable that they do not deserve the opportunity of obtaining atonement through exile. It may seem as though they have avoided punishment but their punishment will come in *Olam Haba*. The third category of killer can do *teshuva* but this is much more difficult to do without the atonement that is

obtained through going into exile. Such a person may spend the rest of their life wondering if they have done sufficient *teshuva*.

We can now explain those sins that are punishable by capital punishment. One who sins in public is put to death and this death penalty provides a form of atonement for their sin. This seems counter-intuitive from our perspective. However this person's *neshama* will experience the spiritual benefit of this atonement in *Olam Haba*. One who sins in private is allowed to live. It may seem as though he has avoided punishment however this is not the case – he does not have the opportunity to gain the atonement that results from the death penalty. Such a person does have a chance to do *teshuva* for his sin and avoid the punishment of *karet* (*Rambam Hilchot Teshuva* 1:4). However it is much more difficult to do *teshuva* without the atonement that is obtained through the death penalty. We therefore see that the one who sins in private is in fact treated more harshly than the one who sins in public.

## Perfect Timing

Keritut (1:7)

Yehuda Gottlieb

The last *Mishnah* of the first *perek* of *Masechet Keritut* mentions the case of a woman that has had numerous births or numerous instances of *zava tum'ah*. The law is that such a woman is obligated to bring one *korban*, and only then is she permitted to eat from *kodshim*. However, following this, she still is obligated to bring *korbanot* for each of times she gave birth (or each of times she became *tameh*)<sup>19</sup>.

The *Mishnah* brings a case following this where the price of birds in *Yerushalaim* increased to a gold dinar (twenty-five silver *dinarim*). *Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel* responded by entering the *Beit Midrash* and teaching the opposite of the *Tana Kama* – after a woman has had a number of births (or *zavot*) she is only obligated to bring one *korban* to permit her from eating *kodshim* and she has no other obligatory *korbanot* to offer. The point of this ruling was to soften the demand for birds fit for *korbanot* and therefore ease prices. Following this ruling the price of birds went down to a quarter of a silver *dinar*!

The question is asked: How could *Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel* issue a decree that blatantly disregarded the *Torah* law? *Rabbi Ovadya MiBartenurah* states that he was able to do this because of a *pasuk* in *Tehillim* (119:126), “*Et la'asot L'Hashem, heferu Torah'techa*” (“It is a time to act for Hashem; they have nullified your law”). The *Gemara* in numerous places<sup>20</sup> discusses this concept whereby in order to fulfil *Hashem's* will, the *Chachamim* are able to permit (at certain times of great need) acting in a manner which brings about a nullification of His Laws. Thus, in this instance, *Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel* felt it appropriate to

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<sup>19</sup> This is a *D'oraita* law (see *Vayikra* 12:7).

<sup>20</sup> *Gittin* 60a; *Yoma* 69a; *Brachot* 54a, 63a.

nullify the *Halacha* of bringing supplementary obligatory bird offerings, since he felt that the prices were so high that it led to women being unable to bring even the first obligatory *korban*. Subsequently, these women would be at risk of eating *kodshim* in a state of *tum'ah*.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* provides another explanation. The general rule is that *Chachamim* have the authority to override a *Torah* law if deemed necessary at the time. It is debated in what exact cases they have this authority. All agree however that they are able regarding a law that is a “*shev v'al ta'aseh*”<sup>21</sup>, where the *Chachamim* instruct one to remain passive. This is indeed the case here for the woman and her *korbanot*.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* however argues, in this case there was no requirement to override a *Torah* law at all. This is because we have a separate concept of “*Ones Rachmana Patrei*” (‘The *Torah* makes an *Ones* exempt’). In other words, one who is restricted from doing a *mitzvah* by something out of his control is exempt from that performing that *mitzvah*. Therefore in this case, since the bird offerings are currently too expensive there should be no *chiyuv* on the woman at all! By the letter of the law, the woman should be *patur* until the prices of the birds begin to fall, and then her *chiyuv* would return.

The *Tiferet Yisrael* answers that theoretically, that would be the case. Ideally, *Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel* did not have to make a decree which overrode the *Torah* law as the woman would be *patur*. However, had *Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel* not made his decree, then the forces of supply and demand would still drive the prices. That is, there would still be people in the market that could afford to pay for the numerous bird offerings that they would have been obligated to bring at the higher price. Therefore had *Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel* not made his decree, the prices would have stayed high. It is only due to his ruling that caused the easing of

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<sup>21</sup> See *Gittin* 90a.

demand for bird offerings which led to his intended outcome - cutting prices.

We see from here the extreme lengths that the *Chachamim* will go to in order to ensure that a person does not transgress a serious *aveirah*. *Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel* issued a ruling that effectively cancelled a *mitzvat asseh* (the obligation for the woman to bring the remainder of her sacrifices) in order to save the woman from incurring possible *karet* (eating *kodshim* in a state of *tumah*).

## The Importance of “What, Where and When?”

Keritut (3:7)

Rabbi Ben-Zion Hain

The last four *mishnayot* of the third *perek* of *Keritut* have a great deal in common. Two of the most obvious similarities are the fact that all four try to use a “*kal vachomer*” (an inference from minor to major) to derive a specific *halacha* and that all four *mishnayot* are based on questions that *Rabbi Akiva* asked of other great *Torah* scholars such as *Rabban Gamliel*, *Rabbi Eliezer* and *Rabbi Yehoshua*.

However, a slightly deeper analysis will show that although all of these *mishnayot* are based on the questions of *Rabbi Akiva*, only one of them, the seventh *Mishnah* of the *perek*, gives the exact time and place of the question. The *Mishnah* states:

*Rabbi Akiva* said: I asked *Rabban Gamliel* and *Rabbi Yehoshua* in the animal market of *Ama'om* as they were going to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of *Rabban Gamliel's* son...”

What is the relevance of this seemingly superfluous information? Why is it mentioned in this *Mishnah* and not in any of the following three?

*Tosfot* answer that even though all parties involved were pre-occupied with the preparation of a wedding feast and its many intricate details, they were still busying themselves with learning *Torah*. Clearly this is an important message for all of us. On this point, I remember walking home from *shul* with the *Rabbi Abranok ZTz"l* and listening to him expound on the *parsha* and other aspects of learning throughout the entire journey.

The *Tiferet Yisrael* learns a number of other lessons from this episode. Looking at the place where the question was asked – the market place – we notice that it was not a private home or a *Beit Midrash* but rather a very public place filled with many people. *Tiferet Yisrael* explains that despite this fact and despite the fact

that *Rabban Gamliel* was the *Nasi* and *Rabbi Yehoshua* the *Av Beit Din*, they were not embarrassed to admit that they did not hear of any *Halacha* relating to *Rabbi Akiva's* question.

Finally, the *Tiferet Yisrael* explains that the place and time are in fact very relevant to the question being asked. In the seventh *Mishnah*, *Rabbi Akiva* asks about *arayot* (forbidden relationships) and as we know from the timing of the question, *Rabban Gamliel* and *Rabbi Yehoshua* were preparing for a wedding feast – a feast in which we say the *bracha* “and that we were commanded about the *Arayot*” as part of the *Sheva Brachot*. In addition, *Rabbi Akiva's* second question, in the eighth *Mishnah* deals with animals and as we know from the place of the question, all three Rabbis were in a marketplace specifically dedicated to the sale of animals. *Rabbi Akiva's* questions were therefore somewhat related to the matter at hand.

We see from these explanations that we should not only learn from the words of our Rabbis and teachers, but also from their deeds and actions. From where they go, why they go there and what they do when they are there.



## Meilah

### Introduction to Meilah

Shmoiki Berkowitz

The prohibition of *meilah* corresponds to the prohibition against using property sanctified for the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* for personal benefit.

The scriptural source for this prohibition appears in *parashat Vayikra* (5:15). On this *pasuk* Rav Shimshon Rephael Hirsch notes that the word “*ma'al*” (the act of *meilah*) and the word coat, “*me'il*”, share the same root (*shoresh*). He identifies a similar connection between the words treachery, “*bagad*”, and clothing, “*beget*” which also have a common root.

In understanding these associations, Rav Hirsch explains that clothing can serve as a representation of a person's character. By the same token, clothing can also conceal a sinister ulterior motive by displaying a façade. The prohibition of *meilah* underscores an abandonment of the values of sanctity and holiness in the pursuit of physical desire, blanketed by a cover of innocence. The act of *meilah* is a major divergence of the standard of behaviour expected from a person sanctifying his property.

The concept represented by the prohibition of *meilah* is not exclusive to this behaviour in the context of sanctified articles. Later in *parashat Vayikra* (5:21), the term “*ma'al*” appears in the matter of commercial deceit. Rav Hirsch extends on the idea of *meilah* that even in a commercial context, improper dealings constitutes *meilah*, as “*Hashem* is present to oversee the fairness of the dealing”. Accordingly, any attempt at dishonesty constitutes a departing from the representation he is making.

Rav Hirsch reinforces his expanded view on *meilah*, that it is not restricted to our private dealings with *Hashem*, when the term “*ma'al*” reappears in the contexts of fraud (*Bamidbar* 5:6) and rebellious wife (5:12). On these *p'sukim*, Rav Hirsch reiterates that the notion of acting truthfully before *Hashem*, manifests itself in both our social and commercial interactions.

The term “*ma'al*” also appears in *Hashem's* rebuke of *Moshe* for hitting the rock (*Devarim* 32:51). Rav Hirsch there explains that *Moshe* had committed a *meilah* by not meeting the level of *emunah* (belief) expected of him – adding a further element to the understanding of the term *meilah*.

The explanation of Rav Hirsch appears to parallel *Onkelus'* understanding of the term “*ma'al*” who consistently translates it as “lying” in all the *p'sukim* mentioned above. The façade presented to evade responsibility is simply an escape from truth.

While sanctioning for *meilah* is restricted to misuse of sanctified articles, the idea it represents as expressed by Rav Hirsch and within the translation of *Onkelus*, covers all elements of daily life.

## A Nazir's Money

### Meilah (3:2)

### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

At the end of a person's self-imposed *nezirut*, he must bring three sacrifices – *chatat* (sin-offering), *olah* (burnt-offering) and *shlamim* (peace-offering). The first two sacrifices fall under the category of *kodshei kodshim*, while the third is *kodshei kalim*. We have already learnt in this *masechet* that the laws of *meilah* apply differently to these two categories of *korbanot*. For *kodshei kodshim* the prohibition applies from the moment of dedication, while for *kodshei kalim* the prohibition of *meilah* only applies to the sacrificial parts and only once the blood of sacrifice has been cast by the *mizbeach*.

A *Mishnah* (3:2) deals with a sum of money that has been set aside for the *korbanot* of a *Nazir*. The *Mishnah* rules that if the money has been set aside as a lump sum, without specifying which coins will be used for each *korban* then the prohibition of *meilah* does not apply to these coins, “because [the coins] are all able to be used for a *korban Shlamim*.”

There are two explanations in the *Rishonim* for why the prohibition of *meilah* does not apply to any of the coins. *Rashi* (*Meilah* 11a) explains that since one could say that any of the coins used were the ones set aside for the purpose of a *Shlamim* and, as explained above, *meilah* does not apply to *kodshei kalim*, consequently the law of *meilah* does not apply. He then pre-empts the question that one could equally argue that each of the coins could be used for a *korban Olah*. Nonetheless the money of a *korban Shlamim* is mixed amongst these coins. Therefore if we do not consider the possibility that the coins used could have been for a *Shlamim* and rule that the person has violated the prohibition of *meilah*, then it is possible that that person then brought an unsanctified animal and slaughtered it in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*, as

he would really not have violated the prohibition and not being obligated to bring the *korban*.

The *Tosfot* (ibid. Nazir 24b) however understands the reason provided by the *Mishnah* differently. The prohibition of *Meilah* does not apply because all of the coins may be used for a *korban Shlamim*. The rest of the funds for the remaining *korbanot* can be added at a later time.<sup>22</sup>

The *Tosfot Yom Tov* provides a practical difference between these two opinions. According to *Rashi*, who reasons that the exemption is based on a doubt, if one used all the coins for personal use, then there is no longer a doubt that he has violated the prohibition. However according to the *Tosfot*, since all the coins can be used for a *korban Shlamim*, the exemption applies even if all the coins were used.<sup>23</sup>

The continuation of the *Mishnah* presents a possible problem for the understanding of the *Tosfot*. The *Mishnah* explains that if this *Nazir* dies after separating the coins in the manner described above, then they are all used for public voluntary offerings. The *Gemara* (*Nazir* 25a) questions this ruling. How can the money be used for any purpose if mixed in with this money are coins set aside for the purpose of a *korban chatat* whose owner has passed away. Normally such money cannot be used for any purpose. *R' Yochanan* responds that the ruling for this case is a *Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai*.

Implicit in the *Gemara's* question is the understanding that the coins included a mixture of all three *korbanot*. How then can the

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<sup>22</sup> From the starting verses (*diburei ha'matchil*) it appears that *Rashi* and *Tosfot* (both in *Meilah* and *Nazir*) had different versions of the *Mishnah* which would also explain their opinions. *Rashi's* version is "לפי שהן ראויין להביא בכולן שלמים" ("in all of them *Shlamim*") while *Tosfot's* is "כולן שלמים" ("all of them *Shlamim*").

<sup>23</sup> See the *Shoshanim Le'David* who disagrees with the *Tosfot Yom Tov's* understanding of *Rashi*.

*Tosfot* reason that they can all be used for the purpose of a *Shlamim*? The *Tosfot Yom Tov* provides a few answers. One is that the owner may only add to the funds and decide that the money currently set aside should be used for one *korban* only while he is alive. Once he however passes away, then what ever funds have been set aside are now for all three *korbanot*. Alternatively, the difference between the two cases stated in the *Mishnah* is what the *Nazir* stipulated at the time he separate the money. The first case is where he separates the money stating that they were “for my *korbanot*”. In such a case there is flexibility as to how the coins will ultimately be used. The latter case is where he stated that the money is to be used for “my *korbanot Nazir*” (or “obligatory *korbanot*”). In that case, the money is fixed and must be used for all three *korbanot* and we have a mixture of three.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> See the *Tosfot Yom Tov* who prefers this latter explanation as he feels that it fits the wording of the *Mishnah* better.

## Meilah after Meilah

### Meilah (5:3)

#### Rav Yonatan Rosensweig

The *Mishnah* in *Meilah* (5:3) states the following:

There is no *meilah* (commission of sacrilege) after a *meilah* with respect to consecrated objects, except with animals and service vessels... *Rabbi* says: Whatever cannot be redeemed does allow *meilah* after a *meilah*.

*Rabbi* is actually echoing the words of the first opinion in the *Mishnah* (and the *Gemara* discusses what he adds).

Let us try and understand the rule being stated in the *Mishnah*. Generally, the rule is that *meilah* in an object that suffers deterioration through its use – such as clothing – does not occur until the deterioration occurred. The usage itself is not enough (see 5:1). However, objects which do not suffer deterioration – such as gold vessels or animals – are desecrated by the mere usage of them. Let us ask: what does *meilah* mean?

*Meilah* refers to the use of something consecrated, for a mundane purpose. So long as the object has some holiness in it, sacrilege can occur. Now, let us examine what occurs when one does so. Roughly, we can divide the items consecrated to the *Mikdash* into two kinds: those which their body is consecrated to the *Mikdash*, also known as holding *kedushat ha'guf*; and those whose value only is consecrated to the *Mikdash*, also known as holding *kedushat damim*.

In the first case, the item is consecrated because it has a designed purpose within the *Mikdash*, and it is now an integral and inseparable part of the *Mikdash*. Its holiness can never be nullified, and only objects which can be used in the *Mikdash* can achieve such a level. In the second case, the item itself, essentially, is not consecrated at all; rather, it retains a level of holiness simply due to its monetary value belonging to the

*Mikdash*. The object is consecrated because it is currently in holy hands. This is why even rocks can be consecrated, as it is only their value which belongs to the *Mikdash*, so that even though rocks have no use within the *Mikdash* their value can be turned into some other object which does have a use within the *Mikdash*.

Now we are better equipped to understand what the *Mishnah* is telling us. If one takes an object which is consecrated simply because it belongs to the *Mikdash*, he commits sacrilege of that object if he uses it for a mundane purpose. However, from that point on the object is no longer consecrated. Since the only reason it retained a level of holiness was its belonging monetarily to the *Mikdash*, at the moment that a person used that object for his own purposes he effectively stole it from the *Mikdash*, and by doing so the object changed hands and now belongs to that person, thus losing its level of holiness. In such an object, *meilah* can only happen once.

However, if the object has an internal-essential quality of holiness which cannot be nullified by a simple change of hands, *meilah* in such an object can occur repeatedly. This is why the *Mishnah* states that in animals or vessels of service – which are examples of objects which retain an essential holiness – one can commit sacrilege over and over again.

Let us add one more understanding to the difference between these two different objects. In essence, the difference between the two is that an object consecrated simply as a function of its monetary status draws its holiness from its **source**, while an object consecrated as a function of its essential status draws its holiness from its **goal**. An object belonging to the *Mikdash* is consecrated due to an action in its **past**, while an object essentially consecrated is so due to an action which it will fulfil in the **future**. These are two very different kinds of holiness.

## Tamid

### Shmirah in the Beit Ha'Mikdash

#### Tamid (1:1)

Yisrael-Yitzchak Bankier

*Masechet Tamid* deals with the daily activity in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. The first item discussed is *shmirah* - “guard duty”. While we learn elsewhere that the *levi'im* also performed *shmirah* at other locations, the *Mishnah* here lists the three locations that the *kohanim* stood watch. What was the purpose of this duty? When was it performed?

The *Rambam* (amongst many others) explains that this duty, a positive commandment<sup>25</sup>, does not stem from fear of bandits or enemies, but rather out of respect to the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. Citing the *Mechilta* he explains that a palace without guards cannot be compared to a palace with guards.

The *Sefer HaChinnuch* continues that *Hashem* clearly does not need this honour. Instead the display is meant to have an impact on those that come to the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*, instilling a sense of awe in their hearts. When they therefore enter, their hearts will be softened thereby hastening their *teshuva*.

There is a debate however regarding when *shmirah* had to be performed. The *Rambam* (*Hilchot Beit Ha'Bechirah* 8:2) explains

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<sup>25</sup> *Bamidbar* 18:4. The *Gra* explains that the purpose of *shmirah* is clear from the *p'sukim*; it was to ensure that non-*kohanim* would not enter the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. However the *Gemara* nonetheless questions its source. The *Gra* explains that the practical motivation alone is not reason enough. Firstly there would be no need for *shmirah* at night as the doors were locked. Secondly, why should *shmirah* be performed specifically by the *kohanim* and *levi'im*? Any agency would do. Consequently the *Gemara* asks for the source of what must be a positive commandment on the *kohanim* and *levi'im*.



that *shmirah* was performed only at night.<sup>26</sup> The *Mefaresh* on the other hand understands that it was performed both day and night.

The *Mishnah LeMelech* finds the *Mefaresh* difficult. The *Minchat Chinnuch* however defends the *Mefaresh* arguing that the difficulty lies with the *Rambam*. He explains that the *Rambam* does maintain that *shmirah* was performed for respect, not out of fear. Consequently why should *shmirah* only be performed at night? The *Minchat Chinnuch* argues further, that if one visits those palaces that have guards stationed for their honour; they will see the guards both night and day!

The *Tifferet Yisrael* (*Boaz* 1) explains that even though the *shmirah* was for the honour of the place, it was unnecessary during the day. The simple reason being that during the day the *kohanim* were busy rushing back and forward with the regular *avodah* in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. That is honour enough.

Perhaps then we can take the question of the *Minchat Chinnuch* and the explanation of the *Tifferet Yisrael* to develop an important idea. One can respond to the *Minchat Chinnuch* that there is stark difference between the honour shown to a king and the honour demanded by the King of Kings. Respect shown by the guards of an earthly king is demonstrated by their inactivity. Every sinew in his body is locked to his station. *HaKadosh Baruch Hu* however demands activity, movement – the performance of *mitzvot*. It is perhaps this image, according to the *Rambam*, of non-stop action, of *kohanim* performing the will of *Hashem* that has far more of an impact on those entering the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* than the inanimate, motionless guard.

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<sup>26</sup> *Tifferet Yisrael* understands that *shmirah* was performed in three or four shifts correlating with the three or four “watches” during the night discussed in *Brachot* (3a).

## Ninety-Three Utensil

Tamid (3:4)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

As part of the morning service, the *Mishnah* (3:4) teaches that after the *kohanim* were told to bring the lamb to slaughter for the morning *tamid*, they then went to the chamber to take out ninety-three *keilim* from the *avodah*. The animal was then given water to drink from one of these *keilim* and then brought to the slaughter site. A number of questions may be asked. Is there any significance to the number of *keilim* that were removed explaining why the *Mishnah* stated this figure explicitly? Why were all the *keilim* removed at this point if only one was required? Recall also that only one *kli* was made available earlier for *trumot ha'deshen*.

The *Rambam* writes that this number was simply the sum-total of the *keilim* required throughout the day. The *Bartenura* notes however, it is not explained why this number of *keilim* were indeed required. Both however cite the *Yerushalmi* (*Chagigah* 3:8) that explains that the number ninety-three corresponds to the number of *azkarot* (names of *Hashem*) listed in the prophecies of *Chaggai*, *Zechariah* and *Melachi*.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> The *Tosfot Yom Tov* however argues that the *Yerushalmi* should read “the prophecies of *Chaggai* and *Melachi*” otherwise there are too many *azkarot*. (The *korban eidah* also shares this version). The “math” only works with his version. (He also maintains that it fits in with the entire discussion in the *Yerushalmi* – see the *Tosfot Yom Tov* and *Yerushalmi*). The *Tosfot Yom Tov* adds that even though a higher number could have been achieved by adding those in *Zechariah*, it would have unnecessarily burdened the *kohanim*.

The *Tosfot Chadashim*, however defends the version of the *Rambam* explaining that the total number of *azkarot* in all three prophecies that relates specifically to the second *Beit Ha'Mikdash* equal ninety three. There are more; however those prophecies relate to the future and not the second *Beit Ha'Mikdash*, the subject of *Masechet Tamid*.

R' Eliyahu Gutmacher from Graditz however offers a different association. He explain that the number of *keilim* corresponds to the number of letters in the *pasuk* that mentions the preparation of the *mizbeach* for *Akeidat Yitzchak* – another sacrifice, like the *Tamid*, performed early in the morning (*Bereishit* 22:9):

They arrived at the place of which *Hashem* had spoke to him; Avraham built the *mizbeach* there and arrange the wood; he bound *Yitzchak* his son, and he placed him on the *mizbeach* on top of the wood.

The idea of making reference to *Akeidat Yitzchak* or remembering the merit of the forefathers is common in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. We learnt that when confirming that dawn had arrived, they would ask if the light of the sun had reached *Chevron* (the burial place of the *avot*). Also the *Tamid* was bound in unique manner (*Akeidah*), similar to the way that *Yitzchak* was bound in the above *pasuk*.<sup>28</sup>

A reminder of the *Akeidah* would be reason enough, however one could suggest that there was importance even to the details of the *pasuk*. The *Midrash* explains that *Yitzchak* requested that his father bind him. At the time he was thirty-seven years old and he was concerned that he might instinctively jerk from fear of the knife and invalidate the slaughter. Perhaps this *pasuk*, recalled prior to engaging with the animal, was a reminder for the *kohanim* to subject not only their actions and emotions but even their very instincts to the *avodah* to eagerly fulfil the will of *Hashem* (see also previous article).

This association may also work in the other direction to answer a complexity in the *pasuk*. A difficulty highlighted by the *mefarshim* is why was *Yitzchak* bound prior to being placed on

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<sup>28</sup> Note that this is according to *Rashi's* understanding (*Shabbat* 52a). The *Rambam* explains that they did not bind the *Tamid* at all. The *Lechem Mishnah* explaining another *Rashi* (*Bereishit* 22:9) understands that they bound the *tamid* in a manner unlike *Akeidat Yitzchak*. See the *Minchat Yitzchak* for an explanation on *Rashi's* two understandings.

the *mizbeach*? Why was *Avraham*, at the time quite elderly, burdened with hoisting his son, a grown man, onto the *mizbeach*?<sup>29</sup> The *pasuk* in isolation however correlates nicely with the order in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. The *kohanim* “arrive at the place”, then clean the *mizbeach* and “arrange the wood”. The *tamid* is then “bound” and after slaughter it is placed on the *mizbeach* “on top of the wood”. If so then this would be another instance of “*ma'aseh avot siman le'banim*”, where the actions of the forefather represent a directive for future generations.

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<sup>29</sup> *R' Yehoshua Leib Diskin* explains that *Avraham* was commanded to place *Yitzchak* on the *mizbeach* (22:2). Had *Yitzchak* not been bound it would have been considered as if *Yitzchak* aided him in this task due to the principle “*chay noseh et atzmo*” (*Shabbat* 93b).

## Midot

### Burning Clothes

Midot (1:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

*Masechet Midot* begins in a similar manner to *Masechet Tamid* discussing *shmirah* (guard duty) in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*.<sup>30</sup> Here however, it elaborates further discussing the *shmirah* performed by the *levi'im* as well as the following detail:

*Ish Har Ha'Bait* would go between watch posts with a lit torch in his hand. [If he found] any guard who would not stand [when he approached] he would say “*Shalom* to you”. If it became clear that the guard was asleep he would strike him with a stick. He also had permission to light his clothes...

The *Tifferet Yisrael* writes that this measure served not as a punishment, but rather as a strong deterrent for the other *shomrim* as the screams of the now awake *shomer* would resonate throughout the *Mikdash*.

A question that arises from this disciplinary action is how was he allowed to set light to the sleeping *shomer's* clothes? There is a prohibition of “*ba'al tashchit*” – simply translated as not causing undue waste. The *Torah* (*Devarim* 20:19) prohibits cutting the fruit trees surrounding a city under siege at a time of war. The

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<sup>30</sup> Why does this *Masechet*, that deals with a description and dimensions of the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*, open with a discussion about *shomrim*? The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that the entire purpose of learning this *masechet* is so that we can guard in our hearts the form and design of the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* so that we can know how it will be built in the future whether built by man (*Rambam*) or whether it comes done from heaven (*Rashi*). We must therefore “guard” in our hearts, even now, all its details. He uses this understanding to explain the *pasuk* “On your walls *Yerushalaim* I have placed watchmen all day [while the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* is built] and all night [during the time the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* is destroyed.]”

*Chachamim* extended this prohibition to other items as well (*Rambam Melachim* 6:10). How then can the clothes be lit? <sup>31</sup>

The *Tifferet Yisrael* answers that the burning was defined as a *knas* (a fine). Consequently it served a purpose and no longer is the subject of *ba'al tashchit*. The *Ramban* (*Hashmatot Le'Sefer Hamitzvot, Aseh* 6) explicitly rules that the prohibition only applies when wasting for no reason.

The *Rosh* however writes that in this case there is no *ba'al tashchit* because "*hefker beit din hefker*". This concept relates to *Beit Din's* power to cancel one's monetary ownership of property. According to the *Rosh* inflicting a fine in this manner is clearly not enough to allow burning the clothes. Yet, how does *hefker beit din hefker* relate to the prohibition of *ba'al tashchit*? The question is further sharpened as *ba'al tashchit* appears to apply also to *hefker* (ownerless) items. <sup>32</sup>

The *Shut Yehuda Ya'ale* understands that the *Rosh* simply disagrees; rabbinic *ba'al tashchit* does not apply to ownerless property. Since the *Chachamim* expanded the prohibition they can limit it just the same. (One could suggest in a similar manner that as it is a rabbinic prohibition they deemed that it did not apply in this situation. Such a suggestion would not help to understand the *Rosh* as he specifically employs *hefker beit din hefker*.)

Alternatively the *Node Beyehuda* (*Mehadura Tanina, Yoreh Deah* 10) however suggests an important distinction. While he understands that *ba'al tashchit* applies to *hefker* property it does

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<sup>31</sup> Another question relating to lighting the *shomer's* clothes is how a physical punishment can be given without prior warning, especially in a case where the *shomer* is likely to have been overcome by tiredness and did not deliberately sleep at his post. An answer to that question can be found in the *Shut Yehuda Ya'ale* (*Chelek A, Yoreh Deah* 164).

<sup>32</sup> See the *Shut Dvar Avraham*. The *Shulchan Aruch Ha'Rav* (*Hilchot Shmirat Ha'Guf Ve'Hanefesh*) explains that since *ba'al tashchit* applies to the property of the enemy at a time of war, it must certainly apply to ownerless items.

not apply to items that have no loss to any person. Perhaps one could suggest that in this case, the *hefker beit din hefker* is stronger than normal *hefker* in that it makes it perpetually ownerless and therefore of no value to anyone.

## Har Ha'Bayit Midot (2:1) Yehuda Gottlieb

The first *Mishnah* of the second *perek* in *Masechet Midot* discusses the dimensions of *Har Ha'Bayit* (500 x 500 *amot*) which was much larger than the area required for the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. The *Mishnah* then discusses how the additional space surrounding the *Mikdash* was distributed. The majority of the area was in the South, followed by the East, North and West. The *Mishnah* outlines that the South side received most of the area as this was the area most widely used.

The *Tosfot Yom Tov* cites a practical reason that the South side of *Har Ha'Bayit* was the largest. This is because most of the buildings in Jerusalem and the ways in which most people travelled to *Har Ha'Bayit* were by way of the South. This is based upon a *pasuk* in *Yechezkel* (40:3), "...and set me upon a very high mountain, upon which was something like the structure of a city to the south". Therefore, since most traffic was through this area, it was the largest and most inhabited area. The *Tosfot Yom Tov* follows his line of reasoning to explain why the East was the second largest area. This is because we learn in the next *Mishnah* that all that enter into *Har Ha'Bayit* must go to the right. If one was walking from the South and turned right, the next direction he would come to is the East. Since the crowd would be flowing in this direction, there needed to be a larger space to accommodate them.

The *Tosefet Yom Tov* adds another reason as to why the South side was the largest which was stated by the *Shiltei Gibborim*. This is due to the fact that aside from the Temple chambers that are listed in this *Masechet*, there were a number of other chambers required for the Temple and those that served in it. These additional chambers (that are not listed in the *Mishnah*)



were all located on the Southern side on *Har Ha'Bayit*. These additional structures and chambers included a *Beit Knesset*, *Beit Midrash*, two *Batei Din*, and additionally in Herod's time he built a number of halls on *Har Ha'Bayit*.<sup>33</sup>

An interesting understanding is offered by the *Rosh*. The *Rosh* interprets the *Mishnah* as referring to the number of structures located on each side of *Har Ha'Bayit*. That is, the *Mishnah* is not referring to the *area* surrounding the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*, but rather the number of structures that were situated around this area. Following this explanation – the *Rosh* holds that most construction took place on the Southern side, followed by the East, North and West.

It can be seen that practically the *Rosh* does not necessarily disagree with the *Tosfot Yom Tov* and the *Shiltei Gibborim* on which side was larger. They differ in their interpretation of the *Mishnah*. Whereas the *Tosfot Yom Tov* and the *Shiltei Gibborim* interpret the *Mishnah* as referring to the physical area and space, the *Rosh* would hold that these words are in fact referring to the structures that are built in these areas.

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The room above the Eastern gate had a picture of *Shushan HaBira* on it. *Amoraim* argue over the reason behind this:

1. In order for the Jews to realise where they had come from (*Menachot* 95a)
2. To give praise to the Kingdom that allowed them to build the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* (*Rashi Menachot* 95a)
3. In order for the Jews to realise that they were exiled to Shushan because of their sins and in so doing they would

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<sup>33</sup> The *Mefarshim* all agree that there were additional structures built on *Har Ha'Bayit*. However, there is a disagreement over how many were built (see *Tosefet Yom Tov*).

remember their galut and the reasons for it (*Rabbeinu Channanel Pesachim* 86a)

4. In order to instil the fear of the Kingdom of Shushan into them to stop a possible rebellion.

## Grape Vines

### Midot (3:8)

### Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

The *Mishnah* (4:2) describes the entrance to the *Heichal* as the “great gate”. The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that it was given this name not for its size, but rather because it was the gate to the holiest part of the *Beit Ha’Mikdash*. The *Mishnah* (3:8) also explains that a grapevine made of gold was hung above the gate. People would donate golden grapes or leaves to the *Beit Ha’Mikdash* to add to the vine. What was the purpose of the vine?

The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that whenever funds were required for the upkeep of the *Beit Ha’Mikdash* or for supporting the *kohanim*, the funds would be collected for the vines which were donated for this purpose. Consequently it acted as a source of money when the regular more immediate sources were exhausted. However why was a vine used for this purpose?

The *Rosh* (*Tamid* 29a), citing the *Yerushalmi*, explains that in the first *Beit Ha’Mikdash*, *Shlomo* planted a golden vine that literally bore golden fruit each year from which the *kohanim* were supported. In the second *Beit Ha’Mikdash*, this vine, whose fruit were a product of donations, was constructed as a replacement.

Alternatively the *Rambam* notes that *Am Yisrael* is often compared to as a grapevine.<sup>34</sup> They were therefore placed above the *Heichal* in order to evoke heavenly blessings. But why are *Am Yisrael* compared to a grapevine and how would this image have such an effect?

The *Tifferet Yisrael* explains that like a grapevine, *Am Yisrael* is soft and weak, yet its fruit are sweet. *Rav Hirsch* (*Tehillim* 80:9)

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<sup>34</sup> Some examples *Yeshaya* 5:1-7, *Yechezkel* 15, *Tehillim* 80:9, *Gemara Chulin* 92a.

explains in a similar direction that a vine is only valuable when it produces fruit. The wood on its own is worthless. Similarly *Am Yisrael's* noble worth is a function of its fruit; when it fulfils its purpose.<sup>35</sup> Based on this understanding, perhaps then the vine serves as a reminder to *Am Yisrael* that if they fulfil their task engaging in *Torah* and *mitzvot*, then that will indeed evoke heavenly blessing.

The *Tifferet Yisrael* adds that *Torah* itself is also compared to a vine (*Gemara Chulin* 92a). He explains that just as a vine needs physical assistance and propping up to succeed, so too with those that engage in *Torah*. The association is strengthened as the *kohanim* who (aside from the few days they worked in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*) were the teachers and disseminators of *Torah*, were supported by this vine. Is there a relationship between these two motifs that the vine represents – *Torah* and *Am Yisrael*?

In the same *Gemara* cited by the *Tifferet Yisrael* as the source of the vine referring to *Torah*, the *Gemara* also mentions that the vine resembles *Am Yisrael*. One of the explanations for this association is as follows:

*R' Shimon ben Lakish* says, the nation is compared to a grapevine, the branches are the *ba'alei batim* (working men), the clusters [of grapes] are the *talmidei Chachamim*, the leaves are the *amei ha'aretz* (unlearned), and the small branches are the *reikanim* (empty people). This is what [the *Chachamim* of *Eretz Yisrael* sent], the clusters must pray for the leaves for without the leaves there will be no clusters.

In *R' Shimon ben Lakish's* description we find that the grapevine represents *Am Yisrael* and the vital relationship between all its parts in the upkeep of *Torah* and its study.

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<sup>35</sup> *Rav Hirsch* also provides another explanation. The grape is the most crushed and beaten of the fruit. Yet this crushing (to make wine) only serves to strength it to the extent that it eventually overpowers the one who crushed it. The same is true with *Am Yisrael* and its enemies.

One can perhaps draw some beautiful conclusions from this relationship. Firstly the vine served as a reminder to the *kohanim* entering the *Heichal* to pray for every part of *Am Yisrael*. Secondly, it gave great respect to those wishing to support *Torah* in that their funds would adorn the holiest gate until they were needed. Finally, the appearance of the well loaded vine at the entrance to the *Heichal*, a testament to the fulfilment of this great relationship within *Am Yisrael*, between those who teach *Torah* and the ones that support it, would certainly evoke heavenly blessing.

## Kinim

## Kinim

### Kinim (3:1)

Yisrael Yitzchak Bankier

*Masechet Kinim* deal with cases where *kinim* (pairs of bird sacrifices) are mixed together. A *ken chovah* consists of *olah* and *chatat* bird offerings that must be offered in very different manners (see 1:1). Consequently there is no way to remedy a mixture of two such birds (see *Ra'avad*, *Bartenura* and *Menachot* 12:1). A *ken chovah* can be brought as a *ken stumah* where each bird in the pair has not yet been designated as a *chatat* and *olah*. In such a case, it is left to the *kohen* to designate the birds.

The first *Mishnah* in the third *perek* deals with mixtures of many *kinei chovah* (*stumah*) that belong to two different people. It rules that if the two groups of birds in the mixture (belonging to the different people) are of the same size, and half the birds were offered in the manner of the *chatat* and the other half as *olot*, then half are valid and half are invalid (see the *Mishnah* for the full explanation). A question discussed in the *Rishonim* is how such a case should be remedied.

The *Mefarsh* and *Razah* explain that whether they each initially had one, two or three *kinim* each they must now together bring the remaining birds to substitute those that have been declared invalid. When they bring them, they stipulate between them that the birds offered as *chatat* offerings will be offered for she that requires it and likewise for the *olah* offerings. Since the requirement to bring these birds is based on a doubt, the *chatat* offerings are not consumed.

The *Rosh* differs in the case where each of the women brought three *kinim*. In such a case, each woman must bring one *chatat* and two *olah* offerings.

The *Yair Kino* explains that the *Rosh* finds this case similar to the *Mishnah* at the end of the first chapter of *Keritut*. The *Mishnah* there teaches that if a woman has many instances of giving birth where it is doubtful whether she is required to bring a *korban*, she can bring just one *chatat* (thereby completing her purification process). Consequently here too, one *chatat* for each woman should suffice. Multiple *olah* offerings however can be brought since *olah* offerings can be offered voluntarily and one can stipulate that if they are not required to bring the *olah* offerings then it should be considered as a voluntary offering. (See the *Yair Kino* inside for a full explanation regarding the opinion of the *Rosh* in the other cases listed in this *Mishnah* and how this case differs.)

The *Yair Kino* however explains that the *Mefaresh* would argue that the case in *Keritut* is different. There the obligation to bring a *korban* is doubtful. Here, the obligation to bring the *korbanot* was certain. The doubt only relates to whether the women released themselves from that obligation. Consequently there is a *chazakah* (presumption) that the women are required to bring up to three *chatat* offerings and must do so, albeit based on a doubt.

The *Yair Kino* (1:2) further explains the opinion of the *Mefaresh* that even though a *chatat* cannot be brought together by two people using the above describe condition (even if it is only for *mechusarei chapara*, see also *Bartenura Keritut* 5:8) in this case such a condition can be made. Ordinarily, when only one of the two women are obligated to bring a sacrifice, then we are concerned that the woman that is truly exempt will not be completely resolved to forfeit her share. In this case however both women are obligated to bring *chatat* or *olah* offerings. Consequently the concern is no longer as strong.





## Revision Questions

## Zevachim

- What is the law if a *korban* was slaughtered, but not for its intended purpose (e.g. a *korban olah* that was slaughtered as a *korban shlamim*)? (א: א)
- Which two sacrifices are exceptions to the above rule? (א: א)
- What other sacrifice does R' Eliezer add and why? (א: א)
- What two cases does Yosi ben Choni add? (ב: א)
- What is Shimon achi Azarya's general rule regarding this issue? (ב: א)
- What case does ben Azai add? (ג: א)
- What are the two opinions regarding what is considered the "time" of the *korban pesach* regarding this issue? (ג: א)
- What are the four *korban*-related activities that if performed with the intent of another *korban* invalidate the *korban*? (ד: א)
- Which activity does R' Shimon discount? (ד: א)
- How does R' Elazar present an intermediate opinion? (ד: א)
- What did the *kohen* forget to do prior to engaging in the *korban* if he invalidated the *korban*? (ב: א)
- Who maintains that if a *kohen* accepted the blood of a *korban* using his left hand is the *korban* valid? (ב: א)
- List two ways in which a *korban* can become invalid relating to the blood of the *korban*? (א: ב)
- What two intentions during *shechita* relating to what will be done with *korban* later invalidate the *korban*? (ב: ב)
- Relating to the previous question, which of the two is punishable with *karet* if the person later eats from the *korban*? (ב: ב)
- Complete the following rule: (ב: ג)
 

כל \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_  
 לאכול דבר ש \_\_\_\_\_ לאכול, להקטיר \_\_\_\_\_, חוץ למקומו,  
 \_\_\_\_\_ ובלבד \_\_\_\_\_ חוץ לזמנו \_\_\_\_\_
- Provide some examples of the end of the above rule. (ד: ב)

- Explain the debate regarding a “mixture” of *pigul* and *machshevet chutz le'mekomo*. (ב' ה:י)
- Which *avodah* can be done by a non-*kohen* and what is the implication of this law? (ג' א:י)
- When is the blood of a *korban* still *kosher* if it spilt on the floor? (ב' א:י, ג' ב:י)
- How can a *korban* be remedied if the blood was sprinkled on the wrong location? (ג' ב:י)
- Is a *korban* invalid if a person slaughtered it with the intention to eat half a *kezayit* and burn a half a *kezayit* outside its allotted time? (ג' ג:י)
- What three prohibitions punishable with *karet* are not applicable to hooves? (ג' ד:י)
- To what other parts of the animal do these prohibitions not apply? (ג' ד:י)
- Does *pigul* apply to the milk of a sacrifice? (ה' ז:י)
- If one slaughters an animal with the intent to sprinkle the blood in the incorrect location, does this invalidate the *korban*? (ג' ו:י)
- What are the only three thoughts that invalidate a *korban*? (ג' ו:י)
- What does *R' Yehuda* add? (ג' ו:י)
- *B'dieved*, according to *Beit Hillel*, what is the minimum number of locations that the blood must be sprinkled in order for the *korban* placed on the outer *mizbeach* to be valid? (ד' א:י)
- About which *korban* do they argue with *Beit Shammai*? (ד' א:י)
- Give two examples of the importance of this law? (ד' א:י)
- How does the above law differ for *korbanot* whose blood is sprinkled on the inner *mizbeach*? (ב' ד:י)
- What is the law if a person had *machshevet chut le'z'mano* during only one of the sprinklings of blood? (ב' ד:י)
- Complete the following general rule: (ד' ג:י)  
 "כל \_\_\_\_\_ בין \_\_\_\_\_ בין \_\_\_\_\_ - חייבין עליו משום פיגול."
- For what is the blood of an *olah* a *matir*? (ד' ד:י)

- What is *R' Shimon's* rule regarding *pigul*? (ד':ד')
- Explain the debate regarding whether *pigul* applies to *kodshei nochrin*. (ד':ה')
- To what thing that *pigul* does not apply (ד':ג') does *notar* and *tameh* also not apply? (ד':ה')
- To what six things must the person that slaughters a *korban* have *kavanah*? (ד':ו')
- What does *R' Yosi* add regarding this issue? (ד':ו')
- Where were *korbanot* that were defined as *kodshei kodshim* slaughtered? (ה':א')
- Where was the blood sprinkled from the:
  - *Par* and *se'ir* of *Yom Kippur*? (ה':א')
  - *Parim* and *se'irim ha'nisrafim*? (ה':ב')
- What are the communal sin offerings? (ה':ג')
- Explain how the blood from a sin offering was sprinkled. (ה':ג')
- Explain how an *olah* was offered. (ה':ד')
- What are the six different *asham* offerings? (ה':ה')
- Where were the *shalmei tzibur* slaughtered? (ה':ה')
- What are the two *kodshei kalim* that had to be consumed within the day and the following night? (ה':ו')
- What was different about the parts of these two *korbanot* that were given to the *kohanim*? (ה':ו')
- What was the time limit for consuming a *shlamim* offering? (ה':ז')
- Where was the *shlamim* consumed? (ה':ז')
- How do the *bechor*, *ma'aser* and *pesach* offerings differ from a regular *shlamim* offering? (ה':ח')
- What are the two opinions regarding a *kodshei kodshim* offering that was slaughtered on the *mizbeach*? (ו':א')
- Who consumed (part of) the *mincha* offering? (ו':א')
- Where was the *chatat ha'ohf* slaughtered? (ו':ב')
- What is the law if it was not slaughtered in that location? (ו':ב')

- What three things were performed at the south-western corner of the *mizbeach*: (יב: ז)
  - At the foot of the *mizbeach*?
  - On top of the *mizbeach*?
    - What was different about the way in which they were brought to that location (as opposed to anything else that was performed on the *mizbeach*)? (יג: ו)
- Explain how the *chatat ha'ohf* was offered. (יד: ו)
- Explain how the *olat ha'ohf* was offered. (יד: ו)
- Regarding the previous question what part, if left out, would not invalidate the *korban*? (יד: ו)
- Which of the two bird offerings, if offered for the sake of another *korban* is valid? (טז: ו)
- Can bird offerings become *pigul*? (טז: ו)
- When is a *chatat* bird-offering always invalid regardless of how it was performed or the intent when performing it? (יז: ז)
- When is an *olah* bird-offering always invalid regardless of how it was performed or the intent when performing it? (יז: ז)
- What is special about the bird-offerings that were invalid in the previous two *Mishnayot* and what is the exception? (יז: ז)
- Explain the ensuing debate regarding an *olat ha'ohf* that was performed exactly like a *chatat ha'ohf* and for the purpose of a *chatat ha'ohf*. (יד: ז)
- Complete the following rule and give examples for each side of the rule: (יד: ז)
 

\_\_\_\_\_ מטמאה - \_\_\_\_\_ אינה מטמאה  
 כל שהיה \_\_\_\_\_  
 לא היה \_\_\_\_\_ מטמאה
- Explain the ensuing debate regarding a bird offering that had *melika* performed, yet the bird was found to be a *treifah*? (Include all opinions.) (יז: ז)
- What is the law regarding a mixture of: (יח: א)
  - *Korbanot* and *chata'ot metot*?
  - *Korbanot* and animals that are forbidden to be used as *korbanot*?
  - *Korbanot* and regular animals? (יח: א)
  - Like *korbanot*?

- Different *korbanot*?
- *Korbanot* and *Ma'aser behema*? (ח: ב'י)
- Meat (to be consumed) from *kodshei kodshim* and *kodshei kalim*? (ח: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding a mixture of a *shlamim* and *asham* offerings. (ח: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding a mixture of the sacrificial parts for *chatat* and *asham* offerings. (ח: ד')
- What are the two opinions regarding a mixture of the sacrificial parts including parts from animals that had blemishes? (ח: ה')
- What is the law regarding a mixture of blood to be sprinkled on the *mizbeach* and: (ח: ו')
- Water?
- Wine?
- Other animal blood? (ח: ו')
- Blood from a *pasul korban*?
- *Dam ha'tamtzit*? (Explain what this is.) (ח: ז')
- Blood from *korban* that had a blemish? (ח: ח')
- What are the two opinions regarding a mixture of:
  - Cups of blood? (ח: ט')
  - Blood to be sprinkled on the top half of the *mizbeach* with blood to be sprinkled on the bottom half? (ח: ט')
  - Blood that requires one sprinkling with blood that requires “four”? (Explain the ensuing debate.) (ח: י')
- What is the law regarding a mixture of blood that was to be sprinkled on the outer alter with blood to be sprinkled on the inner alter? (ח: י"א')
- Regarding the previous question, what is the law if the *kohen* went ahead a sprinkled the blood first inside then outside? (ח: י"א')
- There is a debate regarding the previous question; regarding which sacrifice does everyone agree? (ח: י"א')
- If blood from a *Chatat* was collected in two bowls and one was taken outside the *Azarah*, what is the status of the inner one? (ח: י"ב')

- If one of the bowls was taken inside the *Heichal* – what is the status of the bowl in the *Azarah* according to:
  - *R' Yosi Ha'Glili* and *Chachamim*? (ח"י: ב)
- What type of *pesul* does the *Tzitz* effect acceptance for? (ח"י: ב)
- What is the difference between the opinions of *Rabban Gamliel* and *Rabbi Yehoshua* with regards to sacrifices that must come down from the *mizbeach*? (ט: א)
- What must be taken down from the *mizbeach*, according to *R' Shimon*, if a *zevach pasul* and *nechasim p'sulim* were offered? (ט: א)
- What type of sacrifices that are *p'sulim* must be taken down from the *mizbeach* according to *R' Yehuda*? (ט: ב)
- Name three types of *p'sulim* that would have occurred outside the *Mikdash*? (ט: ג)
- How did the father of *R' Channinah Segan Ha'Kohanim* act with regards to the offering of *korbanot* that were *ba'lei mumim*? (ט: ג)
- Name three parts of an animal, which, if they are removed, should not be brought up on the *mizbeach*? (ט: ה)
- If sacrificial parts came off the *mizbeach* before *chatzot*, is one *chayav meilah* for their inappropriate use? (ט: ו)
- What else (besides the *mizbeach*) consecrates that which is contained in/on it? (ט: ז)
- Can a vessel which is used to hold liquid measures, consecrate a dry measure? (ט: ז)
- In the following cases, which offering takes precedence, and why? (י: א)
  - *Tamid* and *Mussaf*?
  - *Mussaf* of *Rosh Chodesh* and *Mussaf* of *Shabbat*?
  - *Mussaf* of *Rosh Hashanah* and *Mussaf* of *Rosh Chodesh*?
- In the following cases, which offering takes precedence, and why? (י: ב-ד)
  - The blood of a *chatat* and the blood of an *olah*?
  - The sacrificial parts of a *chatat* and those of an *olah*?

- *Chatat* and *asham*?
- *Todah* and *asham*?
- *Ma'aser* and *bechor*?
- *Ma'aser* and bird offerings?
- *Menachot* and bird offerings?
- *Minchat choteh* and *minchat nedava*?
- Bird *olah* and bird *chatat*?
- What is the difference between a regular *asham*, and an *asham* of a *nazir* or *metzorah*? (י: טז)
- Does the ruling of precedence end upon sacrifice or continue until consumption? (י: טז)
- Explain the *machloket* of *R' Meir* and *Chachamim* regarding the order of consumption of a day old *shlamim* and a current day's *Chatat* offering. (י: טז)
- Are there any restrictions on how the *kohen* is allowed to cook the part of the sacrifice he is given to eat? (י: טז)
- Regarding the previous question, which additives does *R' Meir* argue cannot be added and why? Who does he argue with? (י: טז)
- If oil is being distributed to the *kohanim* for consumption, from what is its source? (י: טז)
- If oil is being burnt on the *mizbeach*, from what is its source? (י: טז)
- Regarding the previous question, what other option does *R' Tarfon* add? (י: טז)
- If blood hit clothing, from which offering did it come such that it requires laundering? (י: טז)
- What cases does the *Mishnah* bring for an invalid sacrifice that: (י: טז)
  - Was never *kosher*? (Four cases)
  - Had a moment when it was *kosher*? (Three cases)
- If blood ricocheted off the *mizbeach* and landed on clothing does it require laundering? (י: טז)
- Explain the debate regarding whether the hide from a *korban* requires laundering? (י: טז)



- How much of a garment that had blood on it requires laundering? (ג: א"י)
- What must be done to an earthenware utensil in which a *korban chatat* was cooked? (ד: א"י)
- What must be done to a metal utensil in which a *korban chatat* was cooked? (ד: א"י)
- Considering the last two questions is there any restriction on where it must be performed? (ד: א"י)
- What must be done if a garment that requires washing was taken out of the *azarah* and became *tameh*? (ה: א"י)
- What must be done with a copper utensil used for cooking a *korban chatat* that was taken outside the *azarah* and became *tameh*? (ו: א"י)
- What is *merikah*? (ו: א"י)
- What is *shetifah*? (ו: א"י)
- Explain the debate regarding whether utensils used for *kodshei kalim* require *merikah ve'shetifah*. (ו: א"י)
- Explain the debate regarding the requirement for *merikah u'shetifah* during a festival. (ו: א"י)
- What is the law regarding a utensil in which both *chulin* and *kodshim* were cooked? (ז: א"י)
- What is the law regarding the food? (ז: א"י)
- What is the law regarding hot pieces of *chulin* and *kodshim* that touched? (ז: א"י)
- Can a *tevul yom* receive a share of the *korbanot* for him to eat that night (when he becomes *tahor*)? (א: י"ב)
- Do *ba'alei mumim* receive a share in *korbanot*? (א: י"ב)
- In what case where a *korban* was slaughtered incorrectly do the *kohanim* still receive the hide from that *korban*? (ב: י"ב)
- Explain the *kal vachomer* from which we learn that the *kohanim* receive the hides from all *korbanot*. (ג: י"ב)
- Explain the debate about a *korban* that became invalid prior to the hide being removed, regarding whether the *kohanim* still receive that hide. (ד: י"ב)

- Where are the *parim ha'nisrafim* burnt if they are performed correctly and where are they burnt if performed incorrectly? (י"ב:ה')
- Regarding the previous question, is there another difference? (י"ב:ה')
- What are the two opinions regarding when the clothing of the people engaged in the *parim ha'nisrafim* become *tameh*? (י"ב:ו')
- How many *korbanot* is one obligated to bring if they slaughtered and offered a sacrifice (*be'shogeg*) outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (י"ג:א')
- What is *R' Yosi Ha'Glili's* opinion regarding the previous question and how do the *Chachamim* respond? (י"ג:א')
- What other case is debated in a similar manner to the previous question? (י"ג:ב')
- What is the punishment for someone who is *tahor* that ate from *tameh kodshim*? (י"ג:ב')
- In what way are the laws pertaining to the slaughter of sacrifices stricter than the laws pertaining to their offering and in what way are they lenient? (י"ג:ג')
- Explain the debate regarding how many times one is obligated to bring a *korban chatat* if he offered many limbs outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (Hard: What are the two ways that the *Gemara* understands this debate?) (י"ג:ג')
- If one offers which invalid sacrifices outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* has he still transgressed the prohibition? (י"ד:א')
- Explain the debate regarding a person that offered up part of a *kometz* outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. (י"ד:א')
- What other “offerings” are part of this debate? (י"ד:א')
- When does *R' Elazar* agree? (י"ד:א')
- Is one *chayav* if he offered a *mincha* outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* if the *kometz* has not been separated? (י"ד:ה')
- Explain the debate regarding a case where only one of the *kometz* and *levonah* were offered outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*. (י"ד:ה')
- What other cases are argued in a similar manner? (י"ד:ו')

- Is one *chayav* if he performed *melika* and offered a bird offering outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? What if he performed *shechita* instead? (י"ג: י"ג)
- How is *R' Shimon* arguing with the *Tana Kama*? (י"ג: י"ג)
- Is one *chayav* if they collected the blood of a *chatat* and:
  - Sprinkled once inside then once outside?
  - Sprinkled once outside then once inside?
- Regarding the previous question, what if the blood was collected in two cups? (י"ג: י"ג)
- Regarding which two *korbanot* is one exempt if he offered them outside their allocated area? (י"ד: י"ד)
- What rule is learnt from the following *pasuk*: "לפני משכן ה'" (י"ד: ב')
- Regarding which flaw of a sacrifice does *R' Shimon* argue that one who offers it outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* has transgressed a negative commandment? (י"ד: ב')
- Which people are considered *mechusar zman*? (י"ד: ג')
- Regarding which of their sacrifices, if offered outside, are they *chayav*? Are *patur*? (י"ד: ג')
- Is one *chayav* if they performed *kemitza* outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (י"ד: ג')
- Who offered sacrifices prior to the assembly of the *Mishkan*? (י"ד: ד')
- When *Am Yisrael* arrived at which location where the *bamot* once again permitted? (י"ד: ה')
- What location was described as "*menucha*"? (י"ד: ו')
- When the *Mishkan* was in that location, where was *ma'aser sheni* consumed? (י"ד: ו')
- After the *Mishkan* was in *Shilo* where was it located when the *bamot* were once again permitted? (י"ד: ז')
- What term refers to "*Yerushalaim*" in the *pasuk* refer to the prohibition against sacrificing on *bamot*? (י"ד: ח')

- What are the prohibitions transgressed and their punishment if one offered a sacrifice outside, if he: (י"ט: ט"ו)
  - Sanctified the sacrifice when the *bamot* were prohibited and offered when the *bamot* were prohibited?
  - Sanctified the sacrifice when the *bamot* were prohibited and offered when the *bamot* were permitted?
  - Sanctified the sacrifice when the *bamot* were permitted and offered when the *bamot* were prohibited?
- What is the difference between a *bamat yachid* and a *bamat tzibur*? (י"ט: ט"ו)

## Menachot

- What is the law if *kemitza* was performed on a *mincha* offering for the purpose of a different *mincha* offering? (י"א: י"א)
- Which two *mincha* offerings are the exceptions to the previous question? (י"א: י"א)
- Which three other action relating to the *mincha* offering share the same law? (י"א: י"א)
- Can anyone perform *kemitza*? (י"ב: י"א)
- What does *Ben Beteira* say can be done to a *mincha* offering that had *kemitza* performed with the *kohen*'s left hand? (י"ב: י"א)
- How should *kemitza* be performed? (י"ב: י"א)
- Is a *mincha* offering invalid if too much oil was added? (י"ג: י"א)
- Is a *mincha* offering invalid if too much *levonah* was added? (י"ג: י"א)
- Provide some examples of how *pigul* applies to *mincha* offerings? (י"ג: י"א)
- Does having a *pigul* thought definitely mean the *korban* will become *pigul*? (י"ד: י"א)
- Explain the debate regarding a “mixture” of *machshevet chutz le'zmano* and *machshevet chutz le'mekomo*. (Where else have we seen this debate?) (י"ד: י"א)

- Explain the debate regarding one who performs *kemitza* with the intention of offering the *levonah* outside its specified time. (ב' א:)
- Which two other cases are debated in a similar manner? (ב' ב:)
- Explain how a *korban todah* can cause *pigul* to *lachmei todah*, but *lachmei todah* cannot cause *pigul* to a *korban todah*. (ב' ג:)
- What two other cases share a similar ruling? (ב' ג-ד')
- Explain the debate regarding one who had *machshevet pigul* when burning the *kometz* but not when burning the *levonah*. (ב' ה:)
- What other case is debated in a similar manner? (ה' ה:)
- What is the law if when slaughtering one of the *kivsei atzeret*, a person had *machshevet pigul* regarding the other? (ה' ב:)
- Explain the debate regarding one that performs *kemitza* with the intent to eat it the next day. (א: ג')
- What is the minimum size that one has in mind with *machshevet pigul* in order to make the *mincha* offering *pigul*? (א: ג')
- What is the law if one forgets to mix the flour of the *mincha* offering with its oil? (ב' ג')
- What is the law if one forgets to add salt to the *mincha* offering? (ב' ג')
- What is the law if the *kometz* from different *mincha* offerings gets mixed together? (ב' ג')
- With respect to which three *mincha* offerings does *R' Yehuda* argue? (ב' ג')
- What is the law if two *mincha* offerings that had not had *kemitza* performed to them, got mixed together? (ג: ג')
- What is the law regarding a *kometz* that became *tameh* and was nonetheless offered on the *mizbeach*? (ג: ג')
- What if the *kometz* was taken outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (ג: ג')
- Explain the debate regarding a *mincha* offering whose *shirayim* became *tameh* before the *kometz* was offered. (ד' ג')
- Explain the debate regarding a *mincha* offering whose *kometz* was not first placed in *kli sharet* prior to its offering. (ד' ג')

- Can the *kometz* be offered bit-by-bit? (ג': ד')
- Regarding what four things: מעוטו מעכב את רובו? (ג': ה')
- In connection to *mincha* offerings, regarding what two pairs: מעכבים זה את זה? (ה': ג')
- What other seven pairs: מעכבים זה את זה? (ג': ו')
- Can one have *tefillin* missing a *parasha*? (ג': ו')
- Explain the debate regarding a *tallit* with *tzitzit* on only three corners. (ג': ו')
- Can one put on a *tefillin shel rosh* if he cannot put on a *tefillin shel yad*? (ד': א')
- Explain the debate regarding how the sacrifices of *Shavuot* should be brought if they were short of funds. (ד': ב')
- Explain the debate regarding which of the *shtei halechem* and *kivsei atzeret* could be brought without the other. (ד': ג')
- The sacrifices mentioned in which *sefer* were offered in the desert? (ד': ג')
- Explain the debate regarding what should be done in the afternoon if the morning: (ד': ד')
  - *Tamid* was not offered.
  - *Ketoret* was not offered.
- Explain how the *minchat chavitin* of the *kohen gadol* was offered. (ד': ה')
- Regarding the previous question, what would happen if the *kohen gadol* died at midday? (ד': ה')
- What baked *mincha* offerings were brought as *matzah*? (ה': א')
- Does the prohibition against allowing a *mincha* offering to become *chametz* also apply to the *shirayim*? (ה': ב')
- How many transgressions would one violate if he baked a *chametz mincha* offering that was meant to be *matzah*? (ה': ב')
- Which *mincha* offerings requires: (ה': ג')
  - Both oil and frankincense?
  - Only oil?
  - Only frankincense?
  - Neither?

- How many transgressions would one violate if they included both oil and frankincense in a *mincha* that did not require it? (ה': ד')
- Regarding the previous question, do these prohibitions apply to the *shirayim*? (ה': ד')
- Which *mincha* offerings requires:
  - Waving and *hagasha*?
  - Only Waving? (ה': ו')
  - Only *hagasha*? (ה': ה')
  - Neither? (ה': ו')
- Of the three *mitzvot* (*semicha*, *tenufah shechutim* and *tenufah chayim*) which apply to: (ה': ז')
- *Shalmei yachid*?
- *Zivchei shalmei tzibur*?
- *Asham metzora*?
- What is the difference between a *minchat machavat* and a *minchat marcheset*? (ה': ח')
- Explain the debate regarding what method can be employed to a bake a *minchat ma'afeh tanur*. (ה': ט')
- On which *menachot* is *kemitza* performed and the remainder given to the *kohanim*? (ה': א')
- From which *menachot* do the *kohanim* not receive anything? (ה': ב')
- From which *menachot* is nothing placed on the *mizbeach*? (ה': ב')
- How many times is oil added regarding a *minchat marcheset*? (ה': ג')
- Explain the debate regarding when the *minchat ma'afeh tanur* is mixed with oil? (ה': ג')
- Explain how *petitah* is performed for both a *minchat Yisrael* and a *minchat kohen*? (ה': ד')
- What two processes are required to be performed to the wheat of all *mincha* sacrifices? (ה': ה')
- According *R' Yehuda* which *mincha offering* are brought in numbers of ten and how does *R' Meir* argue? (ה': ו')

- How much flower was required for the following sacrifices and how were they refined: (י:יג)
  - *Omer*?
  - *Shtei Halechem*?
  - *Lechem Ha'panim*?
- How many sieves were used to sift: (י:יג)
  - The barley for the *omer*?
  - The flour for the *shtei halechem*?
  - The flour for the *lechem ha'panim*?
- What constituted the *lachmei todah*? (יג:יג)
- How did the *lachmei miluim* and the *lachmei nazir* differ from the *lachmei todah*? (יג:יג)
- Considering the following cases, in which cases are the *lachmei todah* sanctified and which case is debated: (יג:יג)
  - They were outside the *choma* when the *korban todah* was slaughtered.
  - One of the *lachmei todah* had not crusted when the *korban todah* was slaughtered.
  - The *korban todah* was slaughtered with *machshevet pigul*.
  - The *korban todah* was slaughtered and found to be a *treifah*.
  - The *korban todah* was slaughtered and found to be a *ba'al mum*.
- What should be done with the *nechasim* that have been sanctified in a *kli* and the *korban* found to be *pasul*? (Provide two cases.) (יד:יג)
- Does a *vlad todah* require *lachmei todah*? (יד:יג)
- If someone makes the following declarations, from where should the *korban* and *lachmei todah* be brought: (יד:יג)
  - “I wish to bring a *korban todah*.”
    - What is the source of this law? (יג:יג)
  - “I will bring a *todah* from *chulin* and its *lechem* from *ma'aser*.”
  - “I will bring a *todah* from *ma'aser* and its *lechem* from *chulin*.”
  - “I will bring both the *todah* and its *lechem* from *ma'aser*.”



- Can one bring the flour from a *mincha* offering from outside Israel? (ח:א')
- Considering the previous question, what if it was a communal offering? (ח:א')
- How does one produce the finest flour? (ח:ב')
- On inspection, what two things would invalidate the use of sifted flour? (ח:ב')
- Which place produced the best oil? (ח:ג')
- Oil produce from which four olives are invalid? (ח:ג')
- What were the first, second and third grade olive oils used for from the first, second and third crops of olives? (ח:ד')
- How did each of the grades from the different crops compare? (ח:ה')
- Which three types of wine are invalid? (ח:ו')
- How many different types of measuring utensils for dry goods were in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (Provide both opinions.) (ט:א')
- How many different types of measuring utensils for liquids were in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (Provide both opinions.) (ט:ב')
- Regarding the previous question, what were each of the measures used for? (ט:ג')
- If the *nechasim* of which two *korbanot* got mixed up would they be invalid? (ט:ד')
- What is special about the *keves* that came along with the *Omer*? (ט:ד')
- What is the difference in the status of the contents of a dry and wet measure that spilled over the top of the utensil? (ט:ה')
- Regarding the previous question, what are the two reasons brought for this difference? (ט:ה')
- Which five sacrifices do not require *nesachim*? (ט:ו')
- Regarding the previous question, which specific *korban* is the exception to that rule? (ט:ו')
- Which communal sacrifices require *semicha*? (ט:ז')
- Which private sacrifices do not require *semicha*? (ט:ז')
- Explain how *semicha* is performed. (ט:ח')
- Which seven people do not perform *semicha*? (ט:ח')

- How is *semicha* stricter than *tenufah*? (ט"ט: ט"ט)
- How is *tenufah* stricter than *semicha*? (ט"ט: ט"ט)
- What are the two debates regarding the difference between the harvesting for the *Omer* if the sixteenth of *Nisan* fell on a *Shabbat* or weekday? (י"א: י"א)
- From where should the *Omer* ideally be brought? (י"ב: י"ב)
- Describe how they harvested the barley for the *Omer*. (י"ג: י"ג)
- Describe how they prepared the *Omer* once it reached the *azarah*. (י"ד: י"ד)
- What was done with the excess barley? (י"ד: י"ד)
- Describe how the *Omer* was offered? (י"ה: י"ה)
- What was permitted once the *Omer* was offered? (י"ה: י"ה)
- What was decreed (with respect to this law) once the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* was destroyed? (י"ה: י"ה)
- What was permitted once the *Omer* was offered? (י"ו: י"ו)
- What was permitted once the *Shte'i Halechem* was offered? (י"ו: י"ו)
- Which five grains are obligated to have *challah* removed? (י"ז: י"ז)
- What other law listed in this *Mishnah* applies to these grains? (י"ז: י"ז)
- Grain found in which field could be cut prior to the *Omer* being cut? (י"ח: י"ח)
- What condition is added to the previous rule? (י"ח: י"ח)
- Which people did not heed to this condition? (י"ח: י"ח)
- For what three purposes could new grain be cut prior to the *Omer*? (י"ט: י"ט)
- What are the three conditions regarding the cutting of the *Omer*? (Hint: Where, what and when?) (י"ט: י"ט)
- What is the law if these conditions are not fulfilled? (י"ט: י"ט)
- Regarding the laws of kneading and baking the *shte'i halechem* and *lechem ha'panim*, what laws do they share and when do they differ? (י"א: י"א)
- Explain how the *lechem ha'panim* was baked? (י"א: י"א)
- Can they be baked on *Shabbat*? (י"ב: י"ב)

- Where were the *chavitei kohen gadol* prepared and baked? (ג: א"י)
- Which processes in their preparation would override *Shabbat*? (ג: א"י)
- What is *R' Akiva's* general rule regarding the previous question? (ג: א"י)
- What were the dimensions of the *shte halechem* and the *lechem ha'panim*? (ד: א"י)
- How does *R' Yehuda* suggest we remember these dimensions? (ד: א"י)
- Explain how the *lechem ha'panim* was placed on the *Shulchan*. (ה: א"י)
- According to *Abba Sha'ul* where were spoons of frankincense placed? (ה: א"י)
- Describe the *Shulchan*. (ו: א"י)
- What were the two tables in the entrance hall to the *kodesh* used for and what was the difference between them? (ו: א"י)
- Describe how the *lechem ha'panim* was changed? (ו: א"י)
- How was the *lechem ha'panim* distributed if *Yom Kippur* fell on *Shabbat*? (ו: א"י)
- What is the law if the *lechem ha'panim* and *bazichin* were placed on the *Shulchan* on *Shabbat* but the *bazichin* were only burnt after *Shabbat*? (ז: א"י)
- What should be done if the *lechem ha'panim* and *bazichin* were placed on the *Shulchan* after *Shabbat*? (ז: א"י)
- Explain how the *shte halechem* would have been eaten two and three days after baking? (ט: א"י)
- Explain how the *lechem ha'panim* would have been eaten nine, ten and eleven days after baking? (ט: א"י)
- From what point onward, can *menachot* that became *tameh* no longer be redeemed? (א: ב"ב)
- Regarding which four sanctified items does redemption not apply? (א: ב"ב)

- If someone articulated that he wished to bring a *mincha machavat* and brought instead a *mincha marcheshet* when is that offering valid and when is it invalid? (י"ב: ב')
- What other case is brought similar to the one in the previous question? (י"ב: ב')
- What is the law if one volunteered to bring a *mincha* offering made of barley? (י"ב: ג')
- What is the law if one volunteered to bring a *mincha* offering from one and half *esronim* of fine flour? (י"ב: ג')
- Who argues with the previous two laws? (י"ב: ג')
- What is the maximum size of a *mincha* offering that can be brought in one utensil? (י"ב: ד')
- What are the two reasons giving for this limit? (י"ב: ד')
- What volumes of wine is one not able to volunteer as *nesachim*? (י"ב: ד')
- Explain the debate regarding whether one can volunteer oil. (י"ב: ה')
- What restriction to the volunteering of a *mincha* offering does not apply to any other offerings? (י"ב: ה')
- What is the law regarding one that volunteered to bring a *mincha* offering but:
  - Does not remember the size he specified?
  - Did not specify which type? (Provide both opinions.) (י"ג: א')
  - Does not remember which type specified? (י"ג: ב')
- What is the law regarding one that volunteered to bring "*menachot*"? (י"ג: ב')
- What is the minimum that one must bring if he volunteers to bring:
  - Wood? Frankincense? (י"ג: ג')
  - Gold? Silver? Copper? (י"ג: ד')
  - Wine? Oil? (י"ג: ה')
- What are the "five *kematzim*"? (י"ג: ג')
- What is the law if one volunteered to bring a specific amount of gold but did not remember the amount? (י"ג: ד')

- What other case shares the same law? (י"ג: ה')
- What must one bring if they volunteered to bring a *korban olah*? (י"ג: ו')
- Regarding the previous question, what must he bring if he specified the type, but forgot? (י"ג: ו')
- If someone volunteered to bring a *korban shlamim* what would have occurred if he is required to bring four different animals? Eight different animals? (י"ג: ו')
- What must one bring if they volunteered to bring a calf worth five *sla'im*? (י"ג: ח')
- Explain the debate regarding whether one has fulfilled his obligation if he volunteered to bring a small ox and brought a large one? (י"ג: ח')
- When is there a debate regarding what can be done with two oxen that were volunteered to be offered as an *olah* and both developed blemishes? (י"ג: ט')
- What other debate is similar to the previous one? (י"ג: ט')
- Explain the debate regarding *nedarim* involving *beit chonyo*. (List the cases.) (י"ג: י')
- Can *kohanim* that served in *beit chonyo* serve in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (י"ג: י')
- To what other *kohanim* are they compared? (י"ג: י')
- What does the *Mishnah* learn from the fact that the *Torah* writes “אשה ריח ניחוח” by animal, bird and *mincha* offerings? (י"ג: י"א)

## Chulin

- When is *shechita* performed by a minor acceptable? (י"א: א')
- Can a *nochri* perform *shechita*? (י"א: א')
- What is the law regarding *shechita* that was performed on *Shabbat*? (י"א: א')
- Why can one not perform *shechita* with a saw? (י"א: ב')

- Explain the debate between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* regarding the use of a *magal katzir* for *shechita*. (ב'י:א)
- Explain the debate regarding how much of the *shechita* must be performed within the *taba'at* before the knife may deviate towards the head of the animal. (ג'י:א)
- Can *shechita* be performed from the side of the neck? (ד'י:א)
- Explain how, for the following pairs, what is valid for one is invalid for the other and vice versa:
  - *Shechita* and *melika*. (ד'י:א)
  - *Torin* and *Bnei Yona*. (ה'י:א)
  - Cow and calf.
  - *Kohanim* and *Levi'im*. (ו'י:א)
- Explain how, for the following pairs, what is *tahor* for one is *tameh* for the other and vice versa: (ו'י:א)
  - Earthenware and other utensils.
  - Wooden and metal utensils.
- At what point will *temed* not invalidate a *mikvah* and what other *halachic* implication does it have at this point? (ז'י:א)
- When are two brothers required to contribute a *kalbon* and how does it relate to their obligation to separate *ma'aser behema*? (ח'י:א)
- What other two rules, relating to a *ketanah*, raised in the *Mishnah* resemble the last two? (ט'י:א)
- What would occur in the *Beit Mikdash* between *Yom Tov* and *Shabbat* would not occur between *Shabbat* and *Yom Tov*? (י'י:א)
- What must the *shechita* knife cut to constitute a *kosher shechita* for animals? For birds? (יא:ב)
- What is *R' Yehuda's* opinion regarding the previous question? (יא:ב)
- Can one *shecht* two animals at once? (יב:ב)
- Can one use a chopping action to perform *shechita*? (יג:ב)
- When is *shechita* performed with one slice acceptable? (יג:ב)
- Can a person come and complete a *shechita* begun by another? (יד:ב)

- What is the status of animal where the windpipe was cut but the oesophagus snapped? (ב' ד') (ב' ד')
- Is an animal who had *shechita* performed without any blood coming out *kosher*? (ב' ה') (ב' ה')
- What other implication is there for such a *shechita*? (ב' ה') (ב' ה')
- What would qualify a slaughter of a gravely ill animal as being acceptable? (Include four opinions.) (ב' ו') (ב' ו')
- Are these qualifications also required for a healthy animal? (ב' ו') (ב' ו')
- Explain the debate regarding one that slaughters for a *nochri*. (ב' ז') (ב' ז')
- What is the law if one slaughter “for the sake of the mountains”? (ב' ח') (ב' ח')
- What is the law if two people performed *shechita* together and one had the intention described in the previous question? (ב' ח') (ב' ח')
- Is one allowed to perform *shechita* in manner that the blood collects in a utensil? (ב' ט') (ב' ט')
- In what manner is one allowed to perform *shechita* on a boat? (ב' ט') (ב' ט')
- In what manner can one perform *shechita* in his garden such that the blood collects in a hole? (ב' ט') (ב' ט')
- What is the law if one slaughters a regular animal for the sake of: (ב' י') (ב' י')
  - An *Olah*?
  - A *Chatat*?
- What is the general rule regarding the previous question? (ב' י') (ב' י')
- Which of the following would render an animal *treif*: (ב' יא'-ב') (ב' יא'-ב')
  - A perforated oesophagus?
  - A perforated windpipe?
- How many broken ribs render an animal *treif*? (ב' יא') (ב' יא')
- What problem related to the spinal cord would render an animal *treif* and what problem would not? (ב' יא'-ב') (ב' יא'-ב')

- A crack in the windpipe in which direction renders an animal *treif*? (ג:א-ב)
- Which organs, if missing, do not render an animal *treif*? (ב:א)
- If a bird fell into a fire, when is it considered *treif*? (ב:ג)
- If a bird was trampled upon, when is it not considered *treif*? (ב:ג)
- What are the two opinions regarding how damaged the *zefek* can be and not render a bird *treif*? (ב:ד)
- If an animal ate poison and was slaughtered is it considered *treif*? Can one eat it? (ב:ה)
- What signs did the *Chachamim* provide to determine whether a bird is a kosher type? (ב:ו)
- What are the signs indicating that a *chagav* is kosher? (ב:ז)
- What are the signs indicating that a fish is kosher? (ב:ז)
- If a baby calf extends which limb outside its mother is it considered born and for what law is this important (ג:א)
- How is an animal foetus different from the animal's other limbs? (ג:א)
- What is one advised to do if a *beheimah* is having severe difficulty in delivering its first offspring? (ג:ב)
- What are the two opinions regarding when a miscarried animal foetus is a *nevelah* and regarding which animals do they argue? (ג:ג)
- What is the law regarding an animal foetus that extended its limb outside the mother and was severed prior to the mother being slaughtered? (ד:ד)
- Explain the debate regarding the previous question when the limb was severed after the mother was slaughtered. (ד:ד)
- What is the law regarding a foetus found inside a slaughtered animal? (ד:ה)
- Regarding the previous question, which specific case is debated? (ד:ה)
- When does a severed leg render an animal a *treifah*? (ד:ו)
- What is an *ever meduldal* and when is it *kosher* (after *shechita*)? (ד:ו)



- When is a placenta found in slaughtered animal able to become *tameh*? (ד: יז)
- What is the law regarding a placenta expelled from an animal that had not yet give birth? (ד: יז)
- What is the law regarding the animals and the people who slaughter a cow and its offspring on the same day:
  - When they are regular animals?
  - When they are *kodshim* and slaughtered outside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*?
  - When they are *kodshim* and slaughtered inside the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (ה: יז)
  - When the first is *chulin* and the second is *kodshim*, slaughtered inside? Outside?
  - When the first is *kodshim* and the second is *chulin*, slaughtered inside? Outside?
  - When they are both:
    - *Chulin* and the first is slaughtered inside and the second outside?
    - *Kodshim* and the first is slaughtered inside and the second outside?
    - *Chulin* and the first is slaughtered outside and the second inside?
    - *Kodshim* and the first is slaughtered outside and the second inside? (ה: יז)
- Does the law of *oto v'et b'no* apply today? (ה: יז)
- What is the law regarding the prohibition of *oto v'et b'no* when: (ה: יז)
  - One of the animals was a *treifah*?
  - One of the *shechitas* was invalid?
- How many sets of lashes does one receive if they: (ה: יז)
  - Slaughtered the mother animal and then its two children?
  - Slaughtered its children first?
- At what times in the year is a seller required to inform the buyer that he also sold the mother animal? (ה: יז)
- What other law applies to these times in the year? (ד: יז)

- What is the definition of one day for the law of *oto v'et b'no*? (ה: 'ה)
- To what animals does the law of *kisui ha'dam* apply? (א: 'י)
- Does *kisui ha'dam* apply to an animal that was found to be a *treifah*? (ב: 'י)
- Does *kisui ha'dam* apply to an animal that had a faulty *shechita*? (ב: 'י)
- With respect to which case is there a debate whether the ruling is the same for *oto v'et b'no* and *kisui ha'dam*? (ג: 'י)
- If someone sees that another did not perform *kisui ha'dam* is he obligated to do it himself? (ד: 'י)
- If one slaughters many animals is one required to perform *kisui ha'dam* after each slaughter and can it be performed once at the end? (ד: 'י)
- When is blood that is mixed with water still required to have *kisui ha'dam*? (ה: 'י)
- What is the law if it is mixed with other blood that does not require *kisui ha'dam*? (ה: 'י)
- Is one obligated to perform *kisui ha'dam* to the blood found on the slaughter knife? (ה: 'י)
- What general rule does *Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel* state regarding what can be used for *kisui ha'dam*? (ו: 'י)
- To which animals does the prohibition of *gid hanasheh* apply? (א: 'ג)
- Explain the debate whether the prohibition of *gid hanasheh* applies to a foetus. (א: 'ג)
- Can a butcher be trusted to say that they removed the *gid hanasheh*? (א: 'ג)
- Can one gain benefit from the *gid hanasheh*? What case is brought as an example of this law? (ב: 'ג)
- Is one liable to lashes if he ate a complete *gid hanasheh* that was less than a *kezayit* in size? (ג: 'ג)
- Why does *R' Yehuda* maintain that if one eats the *gid hanasheh* from both legs of the animal is he liable to only one set of lashes? (ג: 'ג)

- What is the law if a thigh was cooked with the *gid hanasheh*? (יז: יד)
- What is the law regarding a piece of *neveilah* that was cooked with other pieces of meat? (יז: יח)
- Regarding the previous question, what is the law regarding the sauce? (יז: יח)
- Explain the debate regarding whether the prohibition of *gid hanasheh* applies to non-kosher animals. (יז: יח)
- Meat from which animals does the prohibition of *basar b'chalav* apply? (יח: יא)
- Regarding which two other laws does this definition of meat apply? (יח: יא)
- What debate relating to *basar b'chalav* does *Beit Shammai* take a lenient stance? (יח: יא)
- In what manner is one allowed to wrap meat and cheese in the same napkin? (יח: יב)
- Regarding whom does *Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel* allow to eat meat and milk at the same table? (יח: יב)
- What is the law regarding a drop of milk that falls onto a piece of meat in a boiling pot? (יח: יג)
- What is the exception to the rule in the previous question? (יח: יג)
- What must one do in order to cook and eat the udder of a cow? (יח: יג)
- Does the prohibition of *basar b'chalav* apply to non-kosher animals? (יח: יד)
- What is the law regarding cheese that was made using the stomach of an animal? (יח: יח)
- How is the prohibition of *cheilev* stricter than blood? (יח: יח)
- How is the prohibition of blood stricter than *cheilev*? (יח: יח)
- For which type of *tumah* can the hooves combine with the meat to make up the minimum *shiur*? For which type of *tumah* do they not combine? (יח: ט)
- What other case is brought where there is a similar difference between these two forms of *tumah*? (יח: ט)

- What part of the hide of an animal has the status of meat? (ט: ב') (ט: ב')
- For all the skins/hides listed in the *Mishnah* that have a status of meat, when can they lose that status? (ט: ב') (ט: ב')
- What does *R' Yochanan ben Nuri* add to this list? (ט: ב') (ט: ב')
- At what point is the hide of an animal not considered attached to the flesh and why is this important? (Provide the three different cases) (ט: ג') (ט: ג')
- If a hide of a *neveilah* had a *kezayit* of meat attached and one touched the hair on the other side of the hide, would they become *tameh*? (ט: ד') (ט: ד')
- Explain the debate where two half-*kezayitim* of meat were still attached to the hide of a *neveilah*. (ט: ד') (ט: ד')
- What general rule is stated regarding the relationship between *tumat magah* and *tumat masah*? (ט: ה') (ט: ה')
- What forms of *tumah* are transferred from a complete bone that has marrow if touched and which forms of *tumah* are not transferred? (ט: ה') (ט: ה')
- What other case is brought similar to the previous question? (ט: ו') (ט: ו')
- What are the two debates between *R' Meir* and *R' Shimon* regarding *ever/basar ha'meduldal* and in what case do they agree? (ט: ו') (ט: ו')
- What is the status of an *ever* or *basar meduldal* of a human? (ט: ח') (ט: ח')
- Regarding the previous question, what if that person then dies? (ט: ח') (ט: ח')
- What parts of a slaughtered animal (*matanot*) must be given to a *kohen*? (י: א') (י: א')
- Does this law apply today? (י: א') (י: א')
- Does this law apply to *kodshim*? (י: א') (י: א')
- What are the differences if an animal had a blemish, was sanctified and then redeemed or if an animal was sanctified, then developed a blemish and was then redeemed? (List seven.) (י: ב') (י: ב')

- Which cases are the exceptions to the previous question? (י: ב')
- What is the law regarding the *matanot* if a *bechor* got mixed with one hundred other animals? (Provide both cases.) (י: ג')
- If person slaughters for which two people is he exempt from separating the *matanot*? (י: ג')
- In what two ways would a *Yisrael* be exempt from separating the *matanot*? (י: ג')
- If a *Goi* had a cow and converted, when would he be exempt from separating the *matanot*? (י: ד')
- What is the *zro'ah*? (י: ד')
- What is the *lechi*? (י: ד')
- How is the obligation of the *matanot* stricter than *reishit ha'gez*? (י: א')
- How much wool must be sheared to obligate the separation of *reishit ha'gez*? (י: א')
- How much must be separated? (י: א')
- What has happened to the wool if one is no longer obligated to separate *reishit ha'gez*? (י: א')
- When is the seller required to separate and when is the purchaser required to separate? (י: א')
- Does the *mitzvah* of *shiluach ha'ken* apply to *kodshim*? (י: ב')
- To which birds does this *mitzvah* apply? (י: ב')
- To which of the following cases does *shiluach ha'ken* apply:
  - A non-kosher bird sitting on a kosher bird's eggs?
  - A kosher bird sitting on a non-kosher bird's eggs?
  - A male bird sitting on eggs? (י: ב')
  - If there is only one egg?
  - If the eggs will not produce chicks? (י: ב')
- Once the eggs have hatched till when does the *mitzvah* apply? (י: ב')
- What is the law of the mother bird returns? (י: ב')
- Can one take the mother and shoo away the children? (י: ב')

- What is the law if the eggs were taken, returned to the nest and the mother bird returned? (י"ב:ג')
- Explain the debate regarding the punishment for one that takes mother bird. (י"ב:ד')
- Can one take the mother bird for the purpose of purifying the *metzarah*? (י"ב:ה')
- What does the *Mishnah* learn from this *mitzvah* and its reward? (י"ב:ה')

## Bechorot

- List the five ways, through dealing with a *Nochri*, one can be exempt from *peter chamor*? (From where is this law learnt?) (א':א')
- Are *Levi'im* obligated in *peter chamor*? (א':א')
- What principle does the *Mishnah* lay down for a kosher animal that gives birth to what appears to be a non-kosher animal and vice versa? (א':ב')
- Does that principle apply to the law of *peter chamor*? (א':ב')
- What is the law if a donkey's first birth is: (א':א')
  - Twin males?
  - A male and female?
- What is the law if the product from two donkeys' first births was a total of a male and female? (א':ג')
- Regarding the previous case, what if one of the donkeys had given birth before? (א':ד')
- What animal is used to redeem a *peter chamor*? (א':ד')
- If this animal has a *mum* can it be used? (א':ד')
- If this animal is slaughtered can it be used? (א':ה')
- Explain the debate if the animal that was used for *peter chamor* was redeemed. (א':ו')
- Explain the debate if the *peter chamor* died after it was redeemed but before the *seh* was given to the *kohen*. (א':ו')

- What must one do if they do not wish to redeem the *peter chamor*? (א:יג)
- Which option takes precedence? (א:יג)
- Which three other *mitzvot* also have “options” and what is the precedence? (א:יג)
- List the five ways, through dealing with a *Nochri*, one can be exempt from *bechor*? (From where is this law learnt?) (א:יג)
- Are *Levi'im* obligated in *bechor*? (א:יג)
- What are the differences if an animal had a blemish, was sanctified and then redeemed or if an animal was sanctified, then developed a blemish and was then redeemed? (List seven.) (א:יג-יז)
- Which cases are the exceptions to the previous question? (א:יז)
- What is the law regarding a first born animal from an animal sanctified for a *korban* but then developed a *mum*? (א:יז)
- In which case does the *Tana Kama* and *R' Shimon ben Gamliel* argue whether the offspring from “iron sheep” belonging to a *Nochri*, has the status of a *bechor*? (א:יז)
- To what extent does the offspring need to appear like the mother in order to have the status of a *bechor*? (א:יז)
- What are the three (or four) opinions regarding the law if the head's of two offspring of an animal (that had not given birth yet) exited the mother at the same time? (א:יז)
- Regarding the previous case explain the debate if one of them died? (א:יז)
- What is the law if the offspring consisted of a male and female? (א:יז)
- What is the law if the offspring from two animals that had not given birth yet, consisted of: (א:יז)
  - Two males?
  - A male and female?
  - Two males and a female?
- Regarding the first case in the previous question, what is the law if one of the mothers had already given birth? (א:יז)

- Explain the debate regarding the first two offspring of an animal with the first was delivered by means of caesarean section. (ב'ט: ט')
- According to *R' Yishmael*, if one purchased an animal from a *Nochri* and is not aware if it had given birth, what is the difference if this animal is goat, sheep or cow? (א': ג')
- Explain the opinion of *R' Akiva* regarding the previous question. (א': ג')
- Regarding the previous case, what is the opinion of *R' Shimon ben Gamliel* if the purchased animal was feeding? (ב': ג')
- If a *bechor* has a *mum* can its hair be removed to analyse the *mum*? (ג': ג')
- Explain the debate regarding hair that fell off a *bechor ba'al mum*, and then the animal was slaughtered. (ג': ד')
- According to *R' Yosi*, to what cases was the debate really referring? (ג': ד')
- For how long must a *yisrael* take care of the *bechor* before giving it to the *kohen*? (א': ד')
- In which two cases could one give the *bechor* to the *kohen* immediately? (א': ד')
- How is the first year of the *bechor* calculated and why is it important? (ד': א'-ב')
- Explain the debate regarding a *bechor* that had a *mum* and was slaughtered and only then shown to an expert to examine? (ד': ג')
- What is the law if a non-professional: (ד': ד')
  - Ruled that a *bechor* had a blemish and it was slaughtered on his word?
  - Ruled incorrect in a monetary law?
- Regarding the previous question what is the law if he was a professional? (ד': ד')
- Can a professional “blemish-checker” for *bechorot* accept a salary? (ד': ה')
- Can a judge receive a salary? (ד': ו')
- Can witnesses receive payment to testify? (ד': ו')



- In what situation would one be obligated to feed a *kohen* “blemish-checker”? (ד:יג)
- What is one not allowed to purchase from:
  - A *kohen* that is suspected of inflicting blemishes on *bechorot*? (ד:יג)
  - A person suspected of planting during the *shmittah* year? (ד:יח)
  - A person suspected of selling *trumah* as if it was *chulin*? (Provide both opinions.) (ד:ט)
- If one is suspected of planting crops during the *shmittah* year is he then also suspected of selling *ma'aser sheni*? (ד:יז)
- What else is one suspected of transgressing if they are suspected of performing both actions described in the previous question? (ד:יז)
- What is the difference between the way *kodshim* that had a blemish and was redeemed is sold and how a *bechor* or *ma'aser beheimah* that had a blemish is sold and why? (ה:יא)
- Can a *kohen* invite a non-*kohen* to partake in a meal involving a *bechor* that had a blemish? (ה:יב)
- Can bloodletting be performed on a *bechor*? (ה:יב)
- Explain the debate regarding a *bechor* whose ear was slit by its owner. (ה:יג)
- What two cases occurred where the *Chachamim* ruled that even though a blemish was inflicted deliberately it was *mutar* to the owners, yet later had to change the ruling and why? (ה:יג)
- What is the law if a person inflicted a blemish to a *bechor* in “self-defence”? (ה:יד)
- What are the three opinions regarding the trustworthiness of a shepherd regarding a blemish on a *bechor* that could have been inflicted by a human? (ה:יד)
- Is a *kohen* trusted to say that he showed the blemish to an expert checker? (ה:יד)
- Explain the debate regarding the required proficiency of those required to check a *bechor* whose front leg was severed. (ה:יד)

- What is the law if one purchased a slaughtered *bechor* (that had a blemish), consumed some, and then it was discovered that the *bechor* was never shown to an expert? (ה' ר:)
- What other case is brought that is similar to the previous question and what is the law regarding that case? (ה' ר:)
- A wound to which part of the ear of a *bechor* would render it a *ba'al mum*? (א' ר:)
- What are the two opinions of the definition of a “dried ear” that is defined as a *mum*? (א' ר:)
- Name three types of *mumin* of the eyelid? (ב' ר:)
- What is the meaning of the term *tevalul*? (ב' ר:)
- According to *R' Channinah ben Antiglos*, how many times must a watery eye be examined in an eighty day period? (ג' ר:)
- What food must be eaten in order to prove that water in the eye is a lasting blemish? (ג' ר:)
- Is a pierced nose on an animal considered a blemish? (ד' ר:)
- Explain the *machloket* between *Tana Kama* and *R' Channinah ben Antiglos* regarding inspecting the gums for blemishes? (ד' ר:)
- If the tail of an animal is mutilated between the joints is that considered a blemish? (ה' ר:)
- If the top end of the tail is mutilated and bone is showing, is that considered a blemish? (ה' ר:)
- Is the following considered a blemish –
  - Five legs?
  - Three legs? (ו' ר:)
- Explain the term *shahul*? (ז' ר:)
- Explain the term *kasul*? (ז' ר:)
- What blemish did *Ila* enumerate which the *Chachamim* agreed with? (ח' ר:)
- What three blemishes did *Ila* enumerate which the *Chachamim* had not heard? (ח' ר:)
- If the ear of a kid is doubled and has one bone, is that considered a blemish? (ט' ר:)

- If the tail of a kid is like that of a pig or does not have three segments is it a blemish? (ט: ה)
- Name three things that are blemishes and need not be measured? (י: ה)
- To which part of the animal's body must the tail reach to not be considered a blemish? (יא: ה)
- Name three blemishes that are not permanent and when found in an animal do not permit its slaughter? (יב: ה)
- Explain the following blemishes in human beings
  - *Kilon*
  - *Laftan*
  - *Makavan*
  - *Shakua*
  - *Shekifas*? (יג: ה)
- How does the *Mishnah* define someone who is termed 'bald'? (יד: ה)
- What is a *harum*? (טו: ה)
- If one's eyelashes have fallen out is this considered a blemish? (טז: ה)
- How big or small are one's eyes if they are considered a *mum*? (יז: ה)
- What is a *tzimeah*? (יח: ה)
- What is a *tzimem*? (יט: ה)
- What are some problems with one's lips that would be defined as a *mum*? (כ: ה)
- What are the three definitions given for *mro'ach ashech*? (כא: ה)
- What is an *ikel*? (כב: ה)
- What is a *pika*? (כג: ה)
- When is an additional finger considered a *mum*? (כד: ה)
- Which case of additional fingers is subject to debate? (כה: ה)
- Explain the debate regarding one who is ambidextrous. (כו: ה)
- What nine *mumim* listed are not considered *mumim* for animals? (כז: ה)

- What five blemishes are considered *mumim* for animals but not for humans? (יג: יא)
- Till when is a *kohen* that married a divorcee invalid for service in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (יג: יא)
- Provide the cases for the following situations – a person is considered:
  - A *bechor* for inheritance, but not for the *kohen* (i.e. does not require *pidyon bechor*)?
  - A *bechor* for the *kohen* but not for inheritance? (יא: ח)
- Explain the debate regarding the case where the first son was born via caesarean section and the second son was born naturally? (בי: ח)
- What is the law regarding a case where a person gave birth to twin boys and but we are not sure which was born first? (ג: ח)
- Regarding the previous question what is the law if one of the children passed away prior to *pidyon bechor*? What is the law if the father passed away? (Provide both opinions.) (ג: ח)
- What other two cases are similar to the ones in the previous question? (ד: ח)
- In what similar cases would the *kohen* receive nothing? (ד: ח)
- What two cases involving the children of two fathers are similar to the cases already provided and in which specific detail is the law different? (ה: ח)
- If a *bechor* is old enough such that he is obligated to redeem himself, which takes preference: redeeming himself or redeeming his son? (ו: ח)
- Who much money is used for *pidyon bechor*? (ז: ח)
- Which other payments use this currency? (ז: ח)
- Which is the only “redemption” that cannot be performed with something of value and must use money? (ז: ח)
- What other items cannot be used for *pidyon bechor*? (ח: ח)
- From what items does the *bechor* not receive double? (ט: ח)
- What transactions are not returned in the *yovel* year? (י: ח)
- Explain the debate regarding whether a gift is considered a sale regarding *yovel*. (י: ח)

- Does *ma'aser beheima* apply outside *Eretz Yisrael*? (ט: א')
- To which animals does *ma'aser beheima* apply? (ט: א')
- Which of the following is allowed: (ט: א')
  - Taking *ma'aser* from this year's animal for last year's animals.
  - Taking *ma'aser* from sheep for goats.
- What is the maximum distance between two herds that would still combine them to require the separation of *ma'aser beheima*? (ט: ב')
- Under what circumstance could two herds still combine beyond that distance? (ט: ב')
- In which two circumstances would one be exempt from separating *ma'aser beheima* from his herd? (ט: ג')
- When would two brothers, heirs to their father's estate, be exempt from separating *ma'aser beheima*? (In such a case, what would they be obligated to do regarding *machatzit ha'shekel*?) (ט: ג')
- Which five animals born to the herd are not included in the group for separating *ma'aser beheima*? (ט: ד')
- What are the three opinions regarding the three times (*geranot*) during the year that one must separate *ma'aser beheima*? (ט: ה')
- What are the two opinions regarding the “*Rosh Hashanah*” for *ma'aser beheima*? (ט: ה')
- What does *ben Azai* rule as a result of this debate? (ט: ה')
- Do ten animals born on each side the “*goren*” combine to obligate on to separate *ma'aser beheima*? (ט: ו')
- Why were the *geranot* instituted? (ט: ו')
- Describe how one would separate *ma'aser beheima*. (ט: ז')
- Explain the debate regarding one who simply selected ten animals from one hundred as *ma'aser*. (ט: ז')
- What is the law if a *ma'aser beheima* got mixed with the untithed animals? (ט: ח')
- What is the law if one called the ninth, tenth or eleventh animal as the tenth? (ט: ח')

- Explain the debate how the eleventh animal (described in the previous question) is dealt with. (ח: ט)
- What is the law if one called to the ninth, tenth and eleventh animal as the tenth? (ח: ט)

## Erchin

- What is the difference between making an *erech*-vow and a vow to donate another's value? (א: א)
- Who can make an *erech*-vow but cannot be the subject of one? (א: א)
- Who can be the subject of an *erech*-vow but not make one? Why? (א: א)
- Explain the debate regarding a *Nochri*. (ב: א)
- Explain the debate regarding a *goses*. (ג: א)
- If a pregnant woman is guilty of a capital offence when do we delay execution till the baby is delivered? (ד: א)
- What is the maximum and minimum *erech*? Provide an implication of the minimum amount. (א: ב)
- What law has a range of seven to seventeen days? One to two weeks? (א: ב) Four to eight months? Two to three days? Eight to twelve days? (ב: ב)
- What was the range between how many times the *shofar* was blown each day in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? Explain. (ב: ג)
- What was the range of how many lyres were played by the *levi'im*? (ג: ב)
- When was the flute played in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (ב: ג)
- How many flutes were there? What were they made of? And who played them? (Include all three opinions.) (ב: ג-ד)
- At least how many sheep (inspected for blemishes) had to be in the specially allocated storeroom and why? (ב: ה)
- In the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* what was the minimum and maximum number of:
  - Trumpets?

- Harps?
- Cymbals? (ב' :ה')
- *Levi'im* in the choir? (ב' :ו')
- How could the young *levi'im* contribute in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (ב' :ו')
- Describe how in there is both a leniency and stringency in the following legal categories:
  - *Erchin* as opposed to *Nedarim*. (ג' :א')
  - *Sde Achuza* as opposed to *Sde Mikneh*. (Include both opinions) (ב' :ג')
  - A *Shor Mu'ad* that killed an *eved* as opposed to another person. (ג' :ג')
  - *Ones U'Mefateh*. (ד' :ג')
  - *Motzi Shem Ra'ah*. (ה' :ג')
- What example is brought to demonstrate that the punishment for the spoken word is greater than a physical act? (ה' :ה')
- How is an *erech*-vow ordinarily calculated both in terms of value and timing? (ד' :א')
- What is the case of *heseg-yad* and how is the value determined? (ד' :א')
- In what way is the calculation of an *erech*-vow different to one that vowed to bring a *korban* obligated to be brought by another (a *metzora*)? (ב' :ד')
- About which case is there a debate about *heseg yad* for one whose financial status changed in between the time of making an *erech*-vow and fulfilling it? (ב' :ג')
- What is the law in the other cases? (ד' :ב')
- How does the law in the previous question differ compared to the law of *heseg yad* by *korbanot*? (ד' :ג')
- What is the law if someone made an *erech*-vow and the subject's age then changed before it was fulfilled, placing the subject in a different age bracket? (ד' :ד')
- What age bracket does an exactly twenty year old fit into: 5-20 or 20-60? (ד' :ד')

- What is the objection to the ruling in the previous question and based on what is the ruling confirmed? (ד: ד')
- What is the law if the person vows to volunteer his “weight” to the *Beit Ha’Mikdash*? (ה: א')
- If a person volunteers to donate the weight of his hand how is it determined? (Provide both opinions.) (ה: א')
- If someone volunteers to donate the value of their hand how is the value determined? (ה: ב')
- In what way are the laws of *erchin* stricter than *nedarim* and in what way are they more lenient? (ה: ב')
- What is the law if someone volunteers to donate the *erech* of their head? (ה: ב')
- What is the difference if the person volunteers to donate using the following language: (ה: ג')
  - “Half my *erech*” or “the *erech* of half of me”?
  - “Half my value” or “the value of half of me”?
- If someone made an *erech*-vow to donate the *erech* of another person, and both he and that person died, do the heirs need to pay? (ה: ד')
- If someone volunteered to donate the value of another person, in what case would the *neder* not be paid? (ה: ד')
- If a person made a *neder* and stated that “this house is a *korban*” and the house collapsed, when would they need to donate the value of the house and when would they be exempt? (ה: ה')
- As opposed to sin offerings, why do *Beit Din* not forcefully take a collateral until one offers a *korban olah* as they promised to do? (ה: ו')
- With respect to which three areas of law can *Beit Din* force one to act? (ה: ו')
- For how long is the sale of property announced for the following cases: (ה: ז')
  - When collecting a debt from the property of orphans?
  - For the sale of a field of *hekdes*?



- Explain the debate regard one who sanctifies his field, but must pay his wife her *ketubah*. (י:א)
- What other case is debated in a similar manner? (י:א)
- How are the previous two cases dealt with in practice? (י:ב)
- When *Beit Din* forcibly takes a collateral to ensure payment of an *erech-vow*, what must the leave behind? (י:ג)
- If one sanctifies his possessions, does this include his *tefillin*? (י:ד)
- What items are not included such a *neder*? (י:ה)
- If an item made *hekdesh* would improve in value with time, do we wait? (What three examples are brought?) (י:ה)
- How close to the *yovel* year can one sanctify a *sde achuzah*? (י:ו)
- How close to the *yovel* year can one redeem a *sde achuzah* and why? (י:ו)
- How is the value of a *sde achuzah* calculated? (י:ו)
- How shallow must a pit (of water) be in the field to be included in this calculation? (י:ו)
- Who can redeem a sanctified *sde achuzah* and what is the difference between these two groups of people in terms of the value to be paid? (י:ז)
- What other difference is there between these two groups of people? (י:ז)
- Who gets ownership of the *sde achuzah* if a *kohen* redeems the field and the *yovel* year arrives? (י:ז)
- Explain the debate regarding the processes if one does not redeem his *sde achuzah* by the *yovel* year. (Include all three opinions.) (י:ז)
- Explain the debate relating to a field that was purchased from one's father, sanctified and then the father passed away. (י:ח)
- Which people are able to redeem their field even after *yovel*? (י:ח)
- What happens if someone sanctifies a field when the laws of the *yovel* year do not apply and how does it differ from when *yovel* does apply? (י:ח)

- When *hekdesh* sell a field, what is the law if they receive offers of 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 but then , in reverse order, each of the parties take back their offer? (ח: ב')<sup>1</sup>
- In the bargaining process of the sale of a *hekdesh* field, what is the law if both the original owner and another person offer \$20? (ח: ב')<sup>2</sup>
- In the continuing bargaining, what must the owner offer to an offer of: \$21, \$22, \$23, \$24 and \$25? (ח: ג')<sup>3</sup>
- What are the two types of *charamim* and what type of *cherem* is referred to in the eight *perek*?
- According to *R' Elazar* what is the law if someone is *machrim* his entire property? (ח: ד')<sup>4</sup>
- From where does *R' Elazar ben Azarya* learn that one should not *machrim* all his possessions? (ח: ד')<sup>5</sup>
- Can one *machrim* their child? (ח: ה')<sup>6</sup>
- Explain the debate regarding who are unable to *machrim*. (Include all three opinions.) (ח: ה')<sup>7</sup>
- What is the difference between the two types of *charamim*? (ח: ו')<sup>8</sup>
- If someone declares something *cherem* which type of *cherem* has he employed? (ח: ו')<sup>9</sup>
- Can a person *machrim* an existing *korban*? (ח: ז')<sup>10</sup>
- If someone was *machrim* a *bechor* how is it redeemed? (ח: ז')<sup>11</sup>
- If someone sells their (ancestral) field during a time when *yovel* applies, what is the time limit before which he cannot redeem the field? (ח: ז')<sup>12</sup>
- What incidents would extend the time limit described in the previous question? (ח: ז')<sup>13</sup>
- If someone sold their ancestral field and then it was sold again, if he wishes to redeem it, when does he deal with the first purchaser and when does he deal with the second? (ח: ז')<sup>14</sup>
- In what three ways is redeeming an ancestral field from *hekdesh* more lenient than redeeming it from another purchaser? (ח: ז')<sup>15</sup>

- If someone sells their house in a walled city, what is the time limit before which he cannot redeem the house? (ג: ט)
- What is the limit after which he cannot redeem the house? (ג: ט)
- If the purchaser sold the house, how is the time limit described in the previous question calculated? (ג: ט)
- What would happen if the house was not redeemed by the end of this time limit? (ד: ט)
- What did *Hillel* institute with regards to the law described in the previous question? (ד: ט)
- What is the subject of debate whether it is defined as a “house” in a walled city? (ה: ט)
- Is a city whose houses constitute the walls of the city considered a walled city? (ו: ט)
- What is the minimum size of walled city to be considered as an *ir choma*? (ו: ט)
- In what way are *batei chatzerim* similar to *batei arei choma* and in what way are they similar to regular fields? (ז: ט)
- When are houses of a walled city considered *batei chatzerim*? (ז: ט)
- How did the laws relating to the sale of the houses in walled city differ from the houses in a walled city of the *Levi'im*? (ח: ט)
- Explain the debate regarding a *Yisrael* that inherited a house in a *Levi* city. (How could such a case occur?) (ח: ט)
- What restrictions were placed on the development of the cities of the *Levi'im*? (ח: ט)

## Temurah

- What is a *temurah*? (א: א)
- What is the punishment for one that is *me'mir*? (א: א)
- Can a *kohen* perform a *temurah* on a *Yisrael's korban*? (א: א)

- Regarding the previous question, which *korban* is a subject of debate? Explain the debate. (א: א')
- What is law is learnt from the following *pasuk*: (ב: ב')  
 "לא יחליפנו ולא ימיר אתו, טוב בָרַע או רע בטוב"
- Explain the debate regarding whether *temurah* applies if one attempts to exchange many animals for one. (א: ב')
- In which case does R' Yosi maintain that *temurah* applies to limbs? (א: ג')
- What are the three cases of "איין ה... אלא לפי חשבון"? Explain. (א: ד')
- Is there "temurah after temurah"? Explain. (א: ה')
- What other cases are brought similar to the one in the previous question? (א: ה')
- Explain the debate whether *temurah* applies to the offspring of a *korban*. (א: ה')
- Does *temurah* apply to bird offerings? (א: ו')
- Does *temurah* apply to public sacrifices? (א: ו')
- What are the opinions regarding the source of why *temurah* does not apply to *korbanot bedek ha'bai*? (א: ו')
- What three laws apply to private *korbanot* that do not apply to public *korbanot*? (א: ב')
- What applies to public *korbanot* that does not apply to private *korbanot*? (א: ב')
- Explain the debate regarding whether the rule of *chatat met* applies to public sacrifices and what is the case that is debated? (ב: ב')
- In what three ways is *kodshim* stricter than *temurah*? (א: ג')
- In what two ways is *temurah* stricter than *kodshim*? (א: ג')
- Regarding the previous question, what case does R' Yehuda add? (א: ג')
- What happened to a *korban* if, according to R' Elazar, it can no longer make a *temurah*? (א: ג')
- What is debated regarding the offspring of a *korban shlamim*? (א: ג')

- What is the difference between the offering of a *korban todah* and a *temurat todah*? (יג: יב)
- Explain the debate regarding the male offspring of a *korban olah*. (יג: יג)
- Explain the debate regarding one that separated a female animal for a *korban asham*. (יג: יג)
- Explain the debate regarding a *temurat asham*. What else is debated in a similar manner? (יג: יג)
- Regarding a *temurat asham* what is the difference between the opinions of the *Tana Kama* and *R' Elazar*? (יד: יד)
- What is the law regarding a *temurat bechor*? (יה: יג)
- What are the three differences between a *bechor behema* and *ma'aser behema*, and other *kodshim* animals? (יה: יג)
- According to *R' Shimon* why is a *bechor behema* not brought from outside Israel? (יה: יג)
- What are the five *chata'ot metot*? (יז: יא)
- Can one gain benefit from one of these animals? (יז: יא)
- Does the law of *temurah* apply to these animals? (יז: יא)
- What is the law if money that was set aside for a *chatat* was misplaced, another sacrifice was then offered instead and then the money was found? (יז: יב)
- Regarding the previous question, what if the money was found only after other money was set aside in its place? (יז: יב)
- What is the law if an animal that was set aside for a *chatat* got lost, money was set aside in its place and then the animal was found with a *mum*? (יז: יב)
- Regarding the previous question, what if an animal was set aside in its place and both were found to have developed *mumim*? What if both were *temimot*? (יז: יב)
- What is the law regarding an animal that had a *mum* that was set aside for a *chatat*? (יז: יב)
- When making what declaration is it possible for one to legally prevent a first born animal from becoming a *bechor behema*? (יז: יג)

- What is the law if one declared regarding the foetus of a an animal that had not given birth, that if it is male it is sanctified as an *olah* and if it is female it is sanctified as a *shlamim* and the animal gave bird to:
  - A male?
  - A female?
  - A male and female? : (הי:א')
  - A *tumtum*? (הי:ב')
- What is the law if one made a declaration regarding the foetus in a similar manner to the previous question and the animal gave bird to: (הי:ב')
  - Two males?
  - Two females?
- What is the law if one declares that the foetus shall be an *olah* and the animal a *shlamim*? (הי:ג')
- Explain the debate, regarding the previous question when it is the other way around. (הי:ג')
- Explain the debate regarding one that declared that an animal is a “*temurat olah* and a *temurat shlamim*”. (הי:ד')
- Is it considered *temurah* if one attempts to transfer the sanctity from one animal to another (using the language of *mechulelet*)? (הי:ה')
- Is it considered *temurah* if one says “this animal is in place of a *chatat*”? (הי:ו')
- What is the difference if one declares, regarding an animal unfit for a korban, that it is “an *olah*” (הרי אלו עולה) or it is “for an *olah*” (הרי אלו לעולה)? (הי:ו')
- List the eight animals that cannot be offered on the *mizbeach*. (הי:ז')
- What is the law if these animals are mixed with many others? (הי:ז')
- What is the case of an *etnan*? (הי:ח')
- Provide two examples of a *mechir kelev*. (הי:ט')
- What is the source for why a *mechir zonah* and *etnan kelev* are *mutar* to offer on the *mizbeach*? (הי:ט')
- What other law is learnt from that *pasuk*? (הי:י')

- Does the law of *etnan zonah* apply to money? (י:ד)
- What is the rule regarding to what items the law of *etnan zonah* applies? (י:ד)
- What is the source for why the law of *etnan zonah* applies to birds and why would we have thought otherwise? (י:ד)
- Explain the debate regarding whether a *vlad treifah* can be used as a *korban*? (י:ה)
- What does *R' Channinah ben Antignos* add to the list of animals that cannot be used as a *korban*? (י:ה)
- What is the law regarding a *korban* that became a *treifah*? (י:ה)
- What laws apply to *kodshei mizbeach* that do not apply to *kodshei bedek ha'bayit*? (י:א)
- What four laws apply to *kodshei bedek ha'bayit* that do not apply to *kodshei mizbeach*? (י:ב)
- What laws listed apply equally to both and which one is the subject of a debate? (י:ג)
- What are the *issurei hana'ah* that must be buried and which one is the subject of a debate? (י:ד)
- What are the *issurei hana'ah* that must be burnt? (י:ה-י:ו)
- How does *tameh trumah* differ from those items referred to in the previous question? (י:ה)
- Is one allowed to burn that which must be buried? (י:ו)

## Keritut

- How many prohibitions listed in the *Torah* are punishable with *karet*? (Hard: Can you list them?) (א:א)
- What must one do if they violated one of the prohibitions unintentionally? (ב:א)
- What must one do if they are unsure whether they violated one of these prohibitions? (ב:א)
- Explain the debate regarding the exception to the rule discussed in the previous question. (ב:א)

- When would a *yoledet* bring a *korban chatat* and:
  - It be consumed? (ג: א)
  - It not be consumed? (ד: א)
- When would a *yoledet* not bring a *korban* at all? (ה: א)
- Explain the debate between *Beit Shammai* and *Beit Hillel* regarding a woman that miscarries on the eighty-first night after giving birth to a girl. (ו: א)
- What is the law regarding a woman that has experienced multiple births and it is doubtful in each case whether she must bring a *korban*? (ז: א)
- What did *Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel* do to fight the inflated price of birds? (ח: א)
- What are the four *mechusarei kapparah*? (ט: ב)
- For which four prohibitions does one bring a *korban* whether it was transgressed *be'shogeg* or *be'meizid*? (י: ב)
- For which five prohibitions does one bring one *korban* for multiple transgressions? (יא: ב-ג)
- For which five prohibitions does one bring a *korban oleh ve'ored*? (יב: ב)
- What are the differences between a *shifcha charufah* and other prohibited relationships? (יג: ב)
- What is a *shofcha charufah*? (יד: ב)
- What is the law regarding forbidden relationships where: (טו: ב)
  - One party was a *katan*?
  - One party acted *be'shogeg* and the other *be'meizid*?
- What is the law of one person said that one ate *cheilev* and another said he did not? (טז: ג)
- Explain the debate where two witnesses testified that a person ate *cheilev* and he denied it. (יז: ג)
- In what way is transgressing multiple transgresses harsher than transgressing one multiple times? (יח: ג)
- Regarding the previous question, in what way is it less harsh? (יט: ג)



- How long has one waited between eating two half-*kezaytim* such that they do not combine to obligate him to bring a *korban*? (Include both opinions.) (יג: ג)
- What is the discussion regarding the minimum quantity of wine one drinks such that it is forbidden to enter the *Beit Ha'Mikdash*? (יג: ג)
- How is it possible that one can eat one thing and be obligated to bring four *chata'ot* and one *asham*? (יד: ג)
- How is it possible for a person to have one relationship and be obligated to bring six/seven *chata'ot*? (Provide more than one case.) (יז: ג)
- How can one person be prohibited in eight ways? (יז: ג)
- How is it possible for a person to have a relationship with one person who is their sister, father's sister and mother's sister and what is the law in such a case? (יז: ג)
- What case is brought from which the *tumah* status of an *eiver meduldal* is derived? (יח: ג)
- What are the two understandings of the question that *Rabbi Akiva* asked, which *R' Yehoshua* attempted to derive the answer from the case of "five *tamchui'im*"? Explain. (יט: ג)
- Regarding the previous question how did *R' Akiva* respond? (יט: ג)
- How did *R' Eliezer* answer *R' Akiva's* question regarding one that performs many *melachot (be'shogeg)* on many *Shabbatot* and how did *R' Akiva* respond? (יז: ג)
- When is one required to bring an *asham talui*? (יא: ד)
- What are the similarities regarding the obligation to bring a *chatat* and the obligation to bring an *asham talui*? (יב: ד)
- What are the four opinions regarding the debate between *R' Yehoshua* and *R' Eliezer* about the level of knowledge/intent that one must have in order to bring a *korban chatat*? (יב-ג: י)
- If one consumed which specific blood are they punishable by *karet*?  
(Hard: what is the law regarding the other bloods listed?) (יא: ז)

- Explain the debate regarding whether one is obligated to bring an *asham talui* for *safek meilot*. (ה' ב')
- What was R' Tarfon's argument to R' Akiva regarding the previous question? (ה' ב')
- How did R' Akiva respond? (ה' ג')
- What is the law regarding a piece of *kodesh* meat and a piece of regular meat where: (ה' ד')
  - One person ate both?
  - Two people ate one each but it is not known which person ate the *kodesh* piece?
- What other case is brought that is similar to the previous question? (ה' ה')
- What is the law regarding the previous question if one piece was *kodesh* and the other *cheilev*? (ה' ו')
- What is the law if one piece was *cheilev* and the other *cheilev kodesh*? (ה' ז')
- What is the law regarding a piece *cheilev* and a piece of *cheilev notar* where: (ה' ח')
  - One person ate both one after the other?
  - Two people ate one each but it is not known which person ate the *cheilev notar*?
- What are the opinions regarding one that brings an *asham talui* and the matter was clarified that he did not sin: (ה' ט')
  - Before the *korban* was slaughtered?
  - After the *korban* was slaughtered?
- Regarding the previous question, what is the comparable ruling for: (ה' י')
  - An *asham vadai*?
  - A *shor ha'niskal*?
  - An *eglah arufah*?
- According to who, can one bring an *asham talui* every day? (ה' יג')
- Who acted according to this ruling and which days was the exception? (ה' יג')
- Which sin-related offering does not need to be brought after *Yom Kippur*? (ה' יד')

- What two laws are taught regarding a *chatat ha'ohf* that is brought in a case of doubt? (י: ח')
- What is the minimum value of an *asham* offering? (י: ח')
- What is the law regarding one that separated this sum of money then purchased two animals for the purpose of *asham* offerings? (י: ח')
- What if the two animals were purchased for regular purposes? (י: ח')
- Are sin-offerings “transferable”? (י: ח')
- What is the law regarding an animal separated for a sin-offering whose owner died? (י: ח')
- In what circumstance can money separated for the purpose of an animal offering, be used for a bird offering? (י: ח')
- What is one difference between these two types of offerings? (י: ח')
- Is the ordering of animals listed by *korbanot* indicative of preference? Which two examples are brought? (י: ט')
- Why is the honour of a father prior to a mother? (י: ט')
- What other case brought is similar to the one in the previous question? (י: ט')

## Meilah

- Does *meilah* apply to *kodshei kodshim* that were slaughtered in the South section of the *azarah*? (א: א')
- What rule does *R' Yehoshua* provide regarding the previous question? (א: א')
- List some *p'sulim* that fall within the bounds of *R' Yehoshua's* rule and some that do not. (א: א')
- Explain the debate regarding *kodshei kodshim* that were taken outside the *azarah* prior to *zrikat ha'dam*. (ב: א')
- What else is debated in a similar manner to the previous question? (ג: א')

- Explain how *zrikat ha'dam* has both a leniency and stringency for *kodshei kodshim* but only a stringency for *kodshei kalim*. (א:ד')
- From when does the prohibition of *meilah* apply to a *chatat ha'ohf* (bird sin-offering)? (א:ב')
- In what way do the two bird offerings change from the time: (א:ב-ב')

  - They are sanctified?
  - *Melika* is performed?
  - The blood is sprinkled/squeezed on the *mizbeach*?

- Explain how the following sacrifices change (*halachically*) from when they are sanctified, slaughtered and their blood sprinkled on the *mizbeach*:
  - *Par Ha'Nisrafim*? (א:ג')
  - *Olah*? (א:ד')
  - *Chatat, Asham* and *Zivchei Shalmei Tzibur*? (א:ה')
- What are the comparable three stages for *shtei halechem*? (א:ב')
- What are the comparable three stages for *lechem ha'panim* and how does it change at each stage? (א:ב')
- What are the comparable three stages for *mincha* offerings and how does it change at each stage? (א:ב')
- What things only have two stages? Explain. (א:ב')
- What is the general rule relating to the previous question? (א:ב')
- What are the *chatat metot*? Where else was this *Mishnah* taught? Why is it taught here? (א:ג')
- Why does the prohibition of *meilah* not apply to money separated for the purpose of a *Nazir's korbanot*? (א:ב')
- What is done with this money if the *Nazir* dies? Provide both scenarios. (א:ב')
- In what way is the blood (of a *korban*) and the *nesachim* opposite from one another? (א:ג')
- What is the law regarding *meilah* for the ashes from the *menorah*? (א:ד')

- When does the law of *meilah* apply to the ashes from the inner altar? (ג: ד')
- What is the law regarding *meilah* for *Torin* that are too young to be offered and *bnei onah* that are too old to be offered? (ג: ד')
- About which of the above two cases does *R' Shimon* argue? (ג: ד')
- Regarding which form of *hekdesh* does *meilah* apply to the milk of the animal? (ג: ה')
- Can *meilah* apply to manure? (ג: ו')
- In what case would *meilah* not apply to the water in a designated water hole? (ג: ו')
- In what case is there a debate regarding whether *meilah* applies to the fruit of a *hekdesh* tree? (ג: ו')
- Can the off-spring of an animal set aside for a *korban* feed from its mother? (ג: ו')
- What is the law regarding spring water that has flowed from a *hekdesh* field into a regular field? (ג: ו')
- List the other three cases that are similar to the one in the previous question. (ג: ו')
- Which of those is the subject of debate? (ג: ו')
- What is the law regarding a nest in a *hekdesh* tree? An *asheira* tree? (ג: ח')
- To what “part” of *hekdesh* wood does *meilah* not apply? (ג: ח')
- To what four prohibitions can different sacrifices combine to make the minimum *shiur*? (ד: א')
- Do *kodshei ha'mizbeach* and *kodshei bedek ha'bait* combine together for the prohibition of *meilah*? (ד: א')
- What are the five parts of an *olah* that combine for the prohibition of *meilah*? (ד: ב')
- Regarding the previous question, how many parts are there for a *korban todah* and what are they? (ד: ב')
- Does *trumah* and *challah* combine? (ד: ב')
- Does *trumat ma'aser* and *bikurim* combine? (ד: ב')

- What general rule does *R' Yehoshua* provide for which types of *tumah* combine together and why is it important? (ד: ג')
- Do *pigul* and *notar* combine? (ד: ד')
- Do two *tameh* objects that are on different levels of *tumah* combine? Explain. (ד: ד')
- For what fives laws do “all food combine”? (ד: ה')
- For what two laws do “all drinks combine”? (ד: ה')
- Explain the debate regarding whether *orlah* and *kilei kerem* combine. (ד: ו')
- Which fabrics combine and for what law is it important? (ד: ו')
- When is the prohibition of *meilah* violated? (Which case is debated?) (ה: א')
- Regarding the previous question, do the two categories according to the opinion of the *Chachamim* combine? (ה: ב')
- For what items does *meilah* apply after *meilah*? Explain. (Provide both opinions.) (ה: ג')
- If the *gizbar* hands a *hekdesh* beam to another person when have each of them violated the prohibition of *meilah*? (ה: ד')
- How can the actions of two people combine for one prohibition of *meilah*? Provide some examples. (ה: ה')
- If someone inadvertently gave *hekdesh* money to a *shaliach* to purchase something, give an example when the sender has transgressed the prohibition of *meilah*. (ו: א')
- Give an example when the *shaliach* transgresses the prohibition of *meilah*. (ו: א')
- Give an example where the host, waiter and guests all violate the prohibition. (ו: א')
- What is the law if the *shaliach* was a minor? (ו: ב')
- What can the sender do if he realises that the money he gave to the *shaliach* was *hekdesh* after the *shaliach* already left to purchase the goods? (ו: ב')
- In what case do both the sender and messenger not violate the prohibition of *meilah*? (ו: ג')
- What two cases are debated whether both the sender and messenger violate the prohibition of *meilah*? (ו: ד')

- In what case would a moneychanger entrusted with *hekdesh* coins not violate *meilah* if he used those coins? (י: ה')
- Explain the debate regarding whether a storekeeper entrusted with such money has the same law. (י: ה')
- Explain the debate regarding the point when one transgresses the prohibition of *meilah* if he begins to use money from a purse that contains one coin of *hekdesh*. (י: ה')

## Tamid

- In what three locations do the *kohanim* stand watch? (א: יא)
- Describe the *Beit Ha'Moked* and what occurred there? (א: יא)
- What was the “*Beit Kiseh shel Kavod*”? (א: יא)
- How was it determined who would perform *trumat ha'deshen* and when was it decided? (ב: יא)
- From where would the *kohanim* enter the *heichal* in the beginning of the day? (ג: יא)
- After entering, into how many groups would they split and for what purpose? (ג: יא)
- Where would they meet up again and what would they say when they met? (ג: יא)
- What would they warn the person about to perform *trumat ha'deshen*? (ד: יא)
- How would they know when he reached the basin to wash his hands and feet? (ד: יא)
- Describe how *trumat ha'deshen* was performed? (ד: יא)
- What would happen after *trumat ha'deshen* was complete? (ב: יא)
- What was different about this process during *Yom Tov*? (ב: יא)
- What wood was not fit for use for the fire on the *mizbeach*? (ב: יא)
- Which wood did they prefer to use? (ג: יא)
- Describe the *ma'aracha gedolah*. (ב: יא)

- What was the second fire on the *mizbeach* used for and where was it located? (בי: ה') (ג')
- Why was the size of the second fire larger on *Shabbat*? (בי: ה') (ג')
- Where was the second “lottery” performed? (בי: ה') (ג')
- What roles were determined in the second lottery? (אי: ג') (ג')
- What was done to determine if it was time to offer the morning *tamid*? (בי: ג') (ג')
- From where would they take the animal that would be used for the morning *tamid* offering? (גי: ג') (ג')
- What were the four chambers in the *Beit Ha'Moked*? (גי: ג') (ג')
- How many utensils were taken out from the *lishchat keilim*? (גי: ג') (ג')
- What utensil would they use to give the animal to be used for the *tamid* a drink? (גד: ג') (ג')
- What else would they do prior to slaughtering the *tamid*? (גד: ג') (ג')
- Where would they slaughter the *tamid*? Describe that location. (ה: ג') (ג')
- What would the *kohanim* elected to clean the *menorah* and inner *mizbeach* carry with them in order to carry out his task? (י: ג') (ג')
- For what were the two small doors on each side of the gate to the *heichal* used? (יז: ג') (ג')
- Describe how the doors of the *heichal* were opened? (יז: ג') (ג')
- What were the eight/nine sounds in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* that could be heard from *Yericho*? (יח: ג') (ג')
- What smells could be smelled all the way from *Yericho*? (יח: ג') (ג')
- How was the *mizbeach* in the *heichal* cleaned? (יט: ג') (ג')
- How was the *menorah* cleaned? (יט: ג') (ג')
- How many steps were there before the *menorah*? (יט: ג') (ג')
- Who would hold down the *tamid*? (יא: ג') (ג')
- How was the morning *tamid* slaughtered? (יא: ג') (ג')
- How would this differ to how the afternoon *tamid* was slaughtered? (יא: ג') (ג')



- Describe how the *tamid* was stripped after slaughter. (ד': ב')
- Describe how the different parts of the *tamid* were removed. (ד': ב'-ג')
- What part was washed? Where was it washed and how many times? (ד': ב')
- What was left attached to the left flank? (ד': ג')
- Where were all the parts placed? (ד': ג')
- Where would the *kohanim* go next, and what would they do there? (ד': ג' – ה': א')
- What extra *bracha* would they recite on *Shabbat* and why? (ה': א')
- Who were invited to take part in the lottery to decide who would offer the *ketoret*? (ה': ב')
- What was decided in the fourth lottery? (ה': ב')
- What happened to those *kohanim* who did not receive any specific role? (ה': ג')
- What did the person who was elected to offer *ketoret* carry? (ה': ד')
- What did the person that would accompany him carry? (ה': ה')
- Described what this person would do and how it was different on *Shabbat*. (ה': ה')
- What were the three uses of the *psachter*? (ה': ה')
- What were the three activities that resulted from the sound of the *magreifah*? (ה': ו')
- What would occur prior to the *ketoret*? (ו': א')
- Describe how the *ketoret* was offered. (ו': ב'-ג')
- What did everyone do when the *ketoret* was offered? (ו': ג')
- Describe how the *kohen gadol* would enter the *kodesh* and what would he do there. (ו': ד')
- Describe where and how the *kohanim* would then “bless the nation”. (ו': ד')
- How would *birkat kohanim* differ when said in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* both in content and action? (ו': ד')
- Describe how the *kohen gadol* would place the parts of the *tamid* on the *mizbeach*. (ו': ד')

- Describe how he would then perform *nisuch ha 'yayin*. (יג: יג)
- What would happen just prior and after *nisuch ha 'yayin*? (יג: יג)
- What *shir* was recited by the *levi'im* on each day of the week? (יז: יג)

## Midot

- What were the three places the *kohanim* stood watch? (יא: יא)
- How many places did the *levi'im* stand watch? (יא: יא)
- What would happen if one was caught asleep while standing watch? (יב: יא)
- How many gates were in the wall surrounding *Har Ha'Bait*? (יג: יא)
- Which of the gates was not used for access? (יג: יא)
- What was different about the eastern gate and what was it used for? (יג: יא)
- How many gates were in the wall surrounding the *Azarah* and where were they located? (יז: יא)
- What were the names of the three gates on the northern wall? (יז: יא)
- At which of those gates did both a *kohen* and *levi* stand watch? (יז: יא)
- What were the three chambers inside the *Beit Ha'Moked*? (יח: יא)
- Was the *Beit Ha'Moked* located in *kodesh* or *chol*? (יח: יא)
- How many gates did the *Beit Ha'Moked* have? (יח: יא)
- Describe the roof of the *Beit Ha'Moked*? (יח: יא)
- Describe how the *kohanim* slept there? (יח: יא)
- Where were the keys to the *Azarah* hidden? (יט: יא)
- What would happen if a *kohen* needed to perform *tevilah* during the night? (יט: יא)
- What are the dimensions of *Har Ha'Bait*? (יא: ב)
- What part had the largest area of empty space? (יא: ב)
- Describe how people must enter *Har Ha'Bait*? (יב: ב)

- Who would enter in a different manner? (ב' : ב')
- What was the name of the small fence that was just inside the fence of *Har Ha'Bait*? (ב' : ג')
- How tall was that fence? (ב' : ג')
- How many breaches did the *Yavanim* make in that fence and why is it important? (ב' : ג')
- How many steps were there after this small fence and what was the space till those steps? (ב' : ג')
- What were the dimensions of all the steps in the *Beit Ha'Mikdash* and which steps were the exceptions? (ב' : ג')
- Which was the only entrance that did not have a door? (ב' : ג')
- Which was the only gate that did not have a cross-beam? (ב' : ג')
- Which was the only gate not made of gold? (ב' : ג')
- Which wall was smaller than all the others and why? (ב' : ד')
- What were the dimensions of the *Ezrat Nashim*? (ב' : ה')
- What were the four chambers at each corner of the *Ezrat Nashim* and what were they used for? (ב' : ה')
- What was different about these chambers? (ב' : ה')
- How many steps were there from the *Ezrat Nashim* to the *Ezrat Yisrael*? (ב' : ה')
- What were the chambers underneath the *Ezrat Yisrael* used for? (ב' : ו')
- What divided the *Ezrat Yisrael* and the *Ezrat Kohanim*? (ב' : ו')
- What were the dimensions of the *Azarah*? (ב' : ו')
- List all the gates of the *Azarah*? (ב' : ו')
- Describe the outer *mizbeach*? (ג' : א')
- What was the *chut ha'sikrah* and what was it used for? (ג' : א')
- How many pipes were there on the bottom south-west corner of the *mizbeach* and what were they used for? (ג' : ב')
- What else was near that corner? (ג' : ג')
- What were the dimensions of the ramp of the *mizbeach*? (ג' : ג')
- From where were the stones for the *mizbeach* taken? (ג' : ד')

- What would cause these stones to become invalid for use in the construction of the *mizbeach* and why? (י"ד: ג')
- According to *R' Akiva* what would they do to the stones every *erev Shabbat*? (י"ד: ג')
- How many “rings” were in front of the *mizbeach* and what were they used for? (י"ה: ג')
- What was to the north of the rings? (י"ה: ג')
- Where was the basin located? (י"ו: ג')
- What was the distance between the *ulam* and *mizbeach*? (י"ז: ג')
- What were the dimensions of the steps leading up to the *ulam*? (י"ז: ג')
- What were the dimensions of the entrance to the *ulam*? (י"ח: ג')
- What was above the entrance? (י"ח: ג')
- What was between the walls of the *ulam* and *heichal*? (י"ח: ג')
- What was above the entrance to the *heichal*? (י"ט: ג')
- Describe the entrance to the *heichal*? (י"ט: י"ד)
- What are the two opinions about how the doors opened to the *heichal*? (י"ט: י"ד)
- For what were the two small doors on either side of the entrance to the *heichal* used? (י"ט: י"ד)
- What are the two opinions regarding how the *kohen* would open the large doors to the *heichal*? (י"ט: י"ד)
- How many “*ta'im*” were there around the *heichal* and describe them? (י"ג: י"ד)
- Which *ta* had the most openings? (י"ג: י"ד)
- What were the dimensions of the *ta'im*? (י"ד: י"ד)
- Describe the *mesibah* and what was it used for? (י"ה: י"ד)
- What would divide between the *kodesh* and *kodesh ha'kodashim* in the attic of the *heichal*? (י"ה: י"ד)
- What were the dimensions of the *heichal*? (י"ו: י"ד)
- Describe the *heichal* from floor to roof? (י"ו: י"ד)
- Describe the *heichal* from east to west? (י"ז: י"ד)
- Describe the *heichal* from north to south? (י"ז: י"ד)
- What were the dimensions of the *azarah*? (י"ח: י"ד)

- Describe the *azarah* from east to west. (ה': א')
- Describe the *azarah* from north to south. (ה': ב')
- How many chambers were there in the *azarah* and where were they located? (ה': ג')
- What were all the chambers used for? (ה': ג'-ד')
- What was the *lishchat ha'gazit* used for with respect to the *kohanim*? (ה': ד')

## Kinim

- Where was the blood placed/sprinkled on the *mizbeach* for *chatat* and *olah* offerings for both animal and bird sacrifices? (א': א')
- What does a *ken chovah* consist of? (א': א')
- What is the difference between *nedarim* and *nedavot*? (א': א')
- What is the law regarding a mixture of:
  - *Chatat* and *olah* bird offerings?
  - *Chatat* and *ken chovah (stumah)*? (ב': א')
  - Two groups of *kinei chovah* of the same size?
  - Two groups of *kinei chovah* of different sizes? (ג': א')
- What does the *Mishnah* mean when it states that two *kinim* in a mixture were from “one name”? (ד': א')
- In what case does *R' Yosi* argue with respect to a mixture of *kinim* belonging to two women? (ד': א')
- What is the law regarding a *ken* where one of the birds dies? (ב': א')
- What is the law regarding a bird that flew from a group of *kinei chovah* and mixed with another group of *kinei chovah*? (ב': א')
- Regarding the previous question, what example does the *Mishnah* bring where the two groups are of equal size? Explain the ruling. (ב': ב')
- What case does the *Mishnah* bring where the groups are different sizes? Explain the ruling? (ג': ב')

- What is the law regarding a bird that flew from a *ken stumah* to a *ken mefureshet*? (ב' ד') (ב' ד')
- What is the law regarding a bird that flew back from that mixture? (ב' ד')
- Explain the case of "חטאת מִכֶּן וְעוֹלָה מִכֶּן וְיִסְתּוּמָה בְּאֶמְצַע" (ב' ה')
- Which birds can be used for bird sacrifices? (ב' ה')
- Can a *ken chovah* consist of different birds? (ב' ה')
- Explain the debate that relates to the previous question. (ב' ה')
- How does the third chapter differ from the previous ones? (ג' א')
- What is the law regarding a mixture of two groups of *kinei stumah* of different sizes where half of the birds were offered as *olah* offerings and the other half were offered as *chatat* offerings? (ג' ב')
- What is the general rule given for mixtures of groups of *kinei stumah*? (ג' ב')
- What is the rule regarding a mixture of a *chatat* and *olah* where: (ג' ג')
  - Both were offered above?
  - One was offered above and the other offered below?
- Explain the case of "חטאת ועולה וסתומה ומפורשת" and the ruling provided in the *Mishnah*. (ג' ד')
- What is the law regarding a *chatat* that mixed with a *ken chovah (stumah)*? (Consider both cases.) (ג' ה')
- Explain the case in the last *Mishnah*. (ג' ו')
- What case does *R' Yehoshua* bring that is similar to the ruling in the final *Mishnah*? (ג' ו')
- What is the difference between *Torah* elders and the elder *Amei Ha'Aretz*? (ג' ו')

### הדרון עלך סדר קדשים